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As	the	ongoing	battle	in	the	United	States	Congress	over	climate	change	legislation	demonstrates,	a	legislature	or	parliament	is	not	always	the	key	to	progressing	sus-
tainable	development	strategies.	It	is	often	in	the	courts	where	
progress	 can	be	made,	 and	 it	 is	 this	 exact	 idea	 that	 our	 staff	
endeavored	to	explore	in	our	fall	issue.
SDLP’s	work	on	this	topic	has	brought	to	light	a	number	
of	unexpected	realities.	For	example,	South	Asia	and	Africa	are	
doing	more	than	we	previously	believed	to	proliferate	sustain-
able	development,	with	constitutional	guarantees	of	the	right	to	
life	and	a	clean	environment	common	within	legal	systems	in	
those	regions.	Canada,	on	the	other	hand,	is	not	as	green	as	we	
once	thought,	with	its	provincial	system	building	barriers	to	sus-
tainable	development	unique	to	that	nation.
On	 the	 home	 front,	 many	 environmental	 lawyers	 were	
thrilled	to	see	so	many	cases	dealing	with	sustainability	issues	
go	up	to	the	US	Supreme	Court	in	the	last	few	terms,	but	Pro-
fessor	May	paints	a	much	bleaker	picture,	 laying	out	 the	 true	
impacts	those	new	precedents	may	have	dealt.	One	of	our	stu-
dent	writers	points	to	another	domestic	strategy—take	the	victo-
ries	we	do	have	in	the	US	courts	and	spread	them	far	and	wide.	
This	shows	that	even	in	the	face	of	little	Congressional	progress	
and	negative	precedent,	the	courts	can	be	used	by	creative	and	
innovative	litigators	to	push	the	envelope.
An	additional	article	covers	the	September	proceedings	of	
a	conference	 titled	Transformation:	The	Road	 to	a	21st	Cen-
tury	Energy	Infrastructure	Impediments	and	Opportunities	for	
Renewable	Energy	Deployment	sponsored	by	the	ABA	Section	
on	Environment	and	Energy	and	by	SDLP	and	the	WCL	Envi-
ronmental	Law	Society,	held	at	the	Washington	College	of	Law.
Our	hope	is	for	this	issue	to	broaden	the	discussion	going	
on	among	litigators	at	every	level	and	to	encourage	them	to	look	
outside	 their	own	system	and	their	own	paradigm	to	see	how	
sustainable	 development	 driven	 litigation	 is	 happening—and	
succeeding—everywhere.
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introDuction
by Marcos Orellana*
While	 its	 exact	 legal	 nature	 and	 status	 remains	 the	object	of	controversy,	sustainable	development,	at	a	minimum,	requires	the	integration	of	environmental	
concerns	in	development	decision-making.	The	Iron Rhine Rail-
way	arbitral	tribunal	recently	affirmed	this	notion.	While	the	pro-
cess	of	integration	required	by	sustainable	development	occurs	
mainly	in	the	planning	and	implementation	stage	of	projects	and	
policies,	the	resolution	of	disputes	concerning	those	economic	
activities	also	calls	for	an	attempt	to	integrate	the	various	rel-
evant	legal	fields.	In	this	regard,	sustainable	development	invites	
a	normative	dialogue	between	competing	norms	and	interests,	
and	courts	have	a	central	role	in	providing	a	forum	for	such	dia-
logue,	both	at	the	international	and	national	levels.
Sustainable	development	finds	 its	 roots	 in	 the	Stockholm	
Declaration	on	the	Human	Environment,	endorsed	by	the	UN	
General	Assembly	in	1972,	which	deals	with	the	integration	of	
economic,	 environmental,	 and	 social	 justice	 issues.	 In	 1975,	
a	 decision	 of	 the	UN	Environment	 Programme’s	Governing	
Council	employed	the	term	sustainable	development	as	a	con-
cept	“aimed	at	meeting	basic	human	needs	without	transgress-
ing	the	outer	limits	set	to	man’s	endeavours	by	the	biosphere.”	
In	1980,	the	International	Union	for	the	Conservation	of	Nature	
and	Natural	Resources	prepared	its	World	Conservation	Strat-
egy	which	emphasized	integration	in	its	definition	of	sustainable	
development:	“integration	of	conservation	and	development	to	
ensure	that	modifications	to	the	planet	do	indeed	secure	the	sur-
vival	and	well-being	of	all	people.”	The	concept	of	sustainable	
development	acquired	international	recognition	as	a	result	of	the	
report	of	the	World	Commission	on	Environment	and	Develop-
ment,	“Our	Common	Future:”
Sustainable	development	is	development	that	meets	the	
needs	of	the	present	without	compromising	the	ability	
of	future	generations	to	meet	their	own	needs.	It	con-
tains	within	it	two	key	concepts:
•	The	concept	of	needs,	in	particular	the	essential	needs	
of	the	world’s	poor,	to	which	overriding	priority	
should	be	given;	and
•	The	idea	of	limitations	imposed	by	the	state	
of	technology	and	social	organization	on	the	
environment’s	ability	to	meet	present	and	future	needs.
Sustainable	development	carries	profound	implications	for	
economic	 activities.	 The	 transition	 towards	 sustainability	 in	
response	 to	 the	alarming	deterioration	of	 the	earth’s	environ-
ment	requires	both	immediate	and	gradual	changes	in	production	
and	consumption	patterns.	The	required	regulatory	changes	will	
affect	not	only	new	activities,	but	also	those	economic	activities	
already	under	way,	as	clarified	by	the	International	Court	of	Jus-
tice	in	the	Gabcikovo/Nagymaros	case.	It	is	thus	foreseen	that	
the	necessary	changes	in	the	legal	structures	governing	the	local	
and	global	economies	will	impose	costs	on	existing	activities	as	
*Dr. Marcos A. Orellana is a WCL alumni from Chile. He is Senior Attorney at 
the Center for International Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and Adjunct Profes-
sor at American University Washington College of Law.
well	as	foster	new	opportunities	in	the	marketplace.	At	the	same	
time,	investments	in	activities	that	reduce	humanity’s	“ecologi-
cal	 footprint”	are	 indispensable	 to	 fuel	 the	 transition	 towards	
sustainability.	
It	 is	 also	 foreseen	 that	 sustainable	 development	 requires	
adaptive	management	and	evolving	norms	in	order	to	incorpo-
rate	new	scientific	 insights	and	 lessons	 learned	 regarding	 the	
operation	and	effectiveness	of	legal	tools.	In	a	long-term	per-
spective,	the	international	community	has	come	to	realize	that	
while	 the	challenges	 involved	 in	sustainable	development	are	
formidable,	they	are	also	indispensable	to	maintain	the	viability	
of	the	planet	and	to	safeguard	the	rights	of	unborn	generations.
With	the	emergence	of	sustainable	development	as	the	over-
arching	policy	 framework,	 the	 international	community	 faces	
the	challenge	of	finding	channels	for	normative	and	institutional	
dialogue	between	economic,	social,	and	environmental	regimes.	
An	important	tool	for	dialogue	is	sustainable	development’s	call	
for	science-based	decision-making,	including	with	regard	to	the	
precautionary	principle.	Indeed	the	2002	Plan	of	Implementa-
tion	concluded	at	the	World	Summit	for	Sustainable	Develop-
ment	expressly	recognizes	the	need	to	“[p]romote	and	improve	
science-based	decision-making	and	reaffirm	the	precautionary	
approach	as	set	out	 in	principle	15	of	 the	Rio	Declaration	on	
Environment	and	Development.”
In	the	1992	UN	Conference	on	Environment	and	Develop-
ment,	governments	officially	adopted	sustainable	development	
as	the	development	paradigm.	Since	that	adoption,	the	concept	
of	 sustainable	development	has	 influenced	not	only	 the	 legal	
structures	 governing	 policy-making,	 but	 also	 those	 concern-
ing	dispute	settlement.	Accordingly,	international	and	national	
courts	have	a	critical	role	in	clarifying	the	contents	of	sustain-
able	development	in	concrete	historical	circumstances.
The	 role	 of	 domestic	 courts	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	
regard	 to	 sustainable	 development,	 given	 that	 courts	 address	
particular	disputes	 that	 reflect	concrete	 tensions	and	 interests	
and	 not	 abstract	 controversies.	 In	 addition,	 the	 societal	 bal-
ance	between	competing	economic,	environmental,	and	social	
considerations	are	often	mediated	by	domestic	laws,	both	sub-
stantively	and	procedurally.	It	is	thus	incumbent	upon	domestic	
courts	to	interpret	and	give	effect	to	internal	laws	embodying	
societal	preferences,	with	the	aid	of	the	principle	of	sustainable	
development.	In	this	light,	 this	volume	explores	how	national	
and	 international	courts	are	using	 the	principle	of	sustainable	
development	to	reconcile	tensions	that	surface	between	environ-
mental,	social,	and	economic	issues.	
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InTroducTIon
This	article	briefly	discusses	emerging	trends	in	interna-tional	policy	and	law	on	sustainable	development,	focus-ing	on	how	international	forums	can	advance	sustainable	
development.	Drawing	on	 recent	 experience	 in	global	 policy	
making	processes,	international	treaty	regimes,	and	decisions	of	
international	courts	and	tribunals,	this	article	argues	that	inter-
national	forums	can	contribute	constructively	to	global	efforts	
to	 balance	 and	 integrate	 competing	 economic,	 human	 rights,	
and	environmental	priorities	for	development	that	can	last	over	
the	long	term.	It	notes	that	diverse	international	regimes	quite	
appropriately	contribute	differently	to	sustainable	development,	
depending	on	the	specific	challenge	being	addressed	or	the	par-
ticular	 resource	being	 jointly-managed.	The	devil,	 this	article	
suggests,	is	in	the	details.
Global commITmenTs To more susTaInable 
developmenT
Finding	one	 accepted,	 universal	 definition	of	 sustainable	
development	that	is	appropriate	for	all	cultures	and	regions	of	
the	world	is	not	straightforward.	International	understanding	of	
both	sustainability	and	development	has	evolved	a	great	deal	in	
recent	decades.	Like	other	important	global	objectives	(peace,	
democracy,	human	rights,	 freedom),	sustainable	development	
can	take	on	new	meanings	in	different	contexts.	
In	 the	Preamble	 to	 the	1986	Declaration	on	 the	Right	 to	
Development,	States	focus	on	development	as	iterative	processes	
to	improve	human	well-being.1	While	debates	persist	in	certain	
contexts,	major	international	institutions	active	in	development,	
as	well	as	international	development	agencies,	adopt	variations	
of	this	approach.2	This	article	takes	both	a	principled	and	a	prac-
tical	approach.	First,	as	a	matter	of	principle,	development	can	
be	understood	as	the	processes	of	expanding	people’s	choices,	
enabling	improvements	in	collective	and	individual	quality	of	
life	and	the	exercise	of	full	freedoms	and	rights.	Indian	Nobel	
Laureate	Amartya	Sen,	in	Development as Freedom,	provides	
theoretical	underpinnings	for	this	approach.	As	he	describes	it,	
development	is	a	process	of	expanding	the	real	personal	free-
doms	that	people	might	enjoy.3	The	expansion	of	freedoms,	as	
Sen	notes,	can	be	analyzed	through	recognition	of	the	“instru-
mental”	and	“constitutive”	roles	of	development	(the	means	and	
the	ends).	Second,	on	a	practical	level,	it	can	be	noted	that	in	
2000,	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	provided	an	import-
ant	global	set	of	 targets,	and	 that	among	194	countries	 in	 the	
world,	only	38	countries	are	characterized	as	developed	accord-
ing	to	 the	Human	Development	Index;	with	 the	vast	majority	
of	the	world’s	population	in	156	developing	countries.4	Just	in	
terms	of	development,	a	great	deal	remains	to	be	done.	
One	 important	 critique	 of	 development	 holds	 that	 if	 all	
human	beings	adopt	 the	extraction,	production,	consumption,	
and	pollution	patterns	that	are	currently	common	among	some	
countries,	 humanity	will	 quickly	 exceed	 the	 carrying	 capac-
ity	of	the	world’s	resources,	leading	to	collapse.5	In	short,	this	
view	 argues,	 current	 models	 of	 economic	 development	 are	
unsustainable.	 However,	 States	 hold	 sovereignty	 over	 their	
own	 natural	 resources,	 and,	 if	 developed	 countries	 achieved	
their	present	standard	of	living	due	to	exploitation	of	resources,	
it	is	scarcely	just	to	seek	to	prevent	developing	countries	from	
adopting	the	same	patterns,	in	spite	of	impacts	on	the	environ-
ment	or	long-term	global	survival.	The	global	objective	of	sus-
tainable	development	emerged	in	the	1980s	as	a	way	to	bridge	
these	deadlocked	views	of	developed	and	developing	countries	
and	 to	address	concerns	about	 the	 long-term	sustainability	of	
development.	In	certain	sectors	of	natural	resource	development,	
where	 the	common	resource	has	a	clear	 transboundary	nature	
and	can	be	studied	scientifically	(such	as	fish	stocks	or	perhaps	
shared	watercourses),	common	problems	are	clearer	and	create	
very	practical	imperatives	for	States	to	negotiate	rational	com-
mon	management	regimes.	In	other	areas,	however,	particularly	
where	 impacts	 are	 diffuse,	 global,	 and	 cumulative	 over	 time	
(such	as	depletion	of	 the	common	atmosphere,	 loss	of	global	
biological	diversity,	depletion	of	soil	or	seed	 resources),	 it	 is	
much	more	difficult	to	find	common	starting	points	to	develop	
agreements.	The	concept	of	sustainable	development	emerged	to	
help	countries	find	solutions	to	these	dilemmas	and	has	become	
a	key	objective	of	many	important	international	economic,	envi-
ronmental,	and	social	agreements	and	regimes	today.
International	 forums	 play	 important	 roles	 in	 advancing	
sustainable	development.	This	article	focuses	on	three.	First,	it	
argues	that,	through	international	“soft	law”	policy-making	pro-
cesses	on	sustainable	development,	States	have	worked	to	refine	
the role of international forumS in the 
aDvancement of SuStainable Development
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a	common	concept	of	sustainable	development,	identified	priori-
ties	for	sustainable	development,	and	found	certain	elements	of	
consensus	on	how	these	priorities	can	and	should	be	addressed	
at	different	levels	through	policy	and	even	law.	Second,	it	argues	
that	through	the	negotiation	and	implementation	of	international	
treaties	 on	 sustainable	 development,	 States	 seek	 to	 address	
specific	sustainability	challenges	related	to	economic,	environ-
mental,	and	also	social	aspects	of	development,	partly	through	
the	adoption	of	certain	operational	principles	in	the	context	of	
treaty	regimes.	Finally,	it	argues	that	through	the	peaceful	settle-
ment	of	disputes	related	to	sustainable	development,	States	are	
starting	to	gain	valuable	guidance	from	international	courts	and	
tribunals	on	how	it	is	possible	to	resolve	particular	transbound-
ary	problems	that	invoke	a	need	to	balance	environmental,	eco-
nomic,	and	social	development	priorities.
The role oF InTernaTIonal Forums In The 
advancemenT oF susTaInable developmenT
The	 following	 sections	 analyze	 the	 role	 of	 international	
forums	in	the	advancement	of	sustainable	development	by	dis-
cussing	the	progress	of	soft	law	
in	 the	 policy-making	 context,	
progress	 in	 the	 treaty	 making	
context,	 and	 progress	 in	 the	
realm	of	treaty	regimes	as	shown	
by	tribunal	decisions.
progreSS in “Soft law” 
policy-making proceSSeS: 
framing the DebateS
The	term	sustainable	devel-
opment,	 which	may	 have	 been	
first	coined	in	European	forestry	
laws	of	the	18th	century,6	gained	
recognition	 at	 the	 global	 level	
in	the	1970s	and	1980s.	In	1972,	the	United	Nations	called	an	
international	Conference	 on	 the	Human	Environment,	which	
led	to	the Stockholm	Declaration	on	the	Human	Environment,7	
the	creation	of	the	UN	Environment	Programme,	and	increased	
impetus	 to	agree	on	certain	multilateral	environmental	agree-
ments	such	as	 the	1973	Convention	on	International	Trade	in	
Endangered	Species.8	
In	 the	1980	World	Conservation	Strategy of	 the	 Interna-
tional	Union	 for	 the	Conservation	 of	Nature	 (“IUCN”),	 sus-
tainable	 development	 is	 defined	 as	 “the	 modification	 of	 the	
biosphere	and	 the	application	of	human,	financial,	 living	and	
non-living	 resources	 to	satisfy	human	needs	and	 improve	 the	
quality	of	human	life.”9	In	1982,	the	World	Charter	for	Nature	
was	adopted	by	the	UN	General	Assembly,	calling	for	“optimum	
sustainable	 productivity,”	 and	 affirming	 that	 in	 “formulating	
long-term	plans	for	economic	development,	population	growth	
and	the	improvement	of	standards	of	living,	due	account	shall	be	
taken	of	the	long-term	capacity	of	natural	systems	to	ensure	the	
subsistence	and	settlement	of	the	populations	concerned,	recog-
nizing	that	this	capacity	may	be	enhanced	through	science	and	
technology.”10	
In	 1983,	 after	 a	 decade	 of	 increasingly	 heated	 debates	
between	developed	and	developing	countries	on	environmental	
limits	 to	development,	 the	UN	General	Assembly	established	
the	World	Commission	on	the	Environment	and	Development	
(“WCED”).11	The	WCED,	chaired	by	Prime	Minister	Gro	Har-
lem	Brundtland	 of	 Norway,	 embarked	 on	 a	 global	 series	 of	
consultations.	 In	1987,	 it	 delivered	 its	Report	 to	 the	General	
Assembly,	Our Common Future.12	The	most	generally	accepted	
definition	of	sustainable	development	is	found	in	this	“Brundt-
land	Report”	where	it	is	defined	as	“…development	that	meets	
the	needs	of	 the	present	without	compromising	 the	ability	of	
future	generations	to	meet	their	own	needs.”13	The	Report	was	
accepted	by	the	General	Assembly	in	Resolution	42/187.	The	
Resolution	differentiates	between	the	objective	of	sustainable	
development	 and	 the	 objective	 of	 environmental	 protection,	
though	it	considers	them	linked.	The	Resolution	tasks	the	UN	
Economic	and	Social	Council,	other	development	 institutions	
of	the	UN,	and	economic	ministries	with	reorientation toward	
sustainable	development,	 focusing	on	“needs,”	especially	 the	
essential	needs	of	the	world’s	poor,	to	which	overriding	priority	
should	be	given.
In	 1992,	 in	 response	 to	
the	 Brundtland	 Report,	 the	
United	 Nations	 convened	 a	
global	 conference	 in	 Rio	 de	
Janeiro—the	 UN	 Conference	
on	Environment	 and	Develop-
ment (“UNCED,”	 or	 the	 “Rio	
Earth	Summit”).14	The	UNCED	
focused	on	development	needs	
and	 on	 how	 to	 integrate	 envi-
ronmental	 considerations	 into	
development	 planning	 and	
economic	decision-making.	At	
the	time,	developed	country	leaders	were	anxious	to	show	their	
political	concern,	and	developing	country	leaders	were	increas-
ingly	 frustrated	with	what	was	perceived	as	attempts	 to	 limit	
their	sovereign	decisions	concerning	the	use	of	natural	resources	
for	development.	Ultimately,	the	UNCED	was	broadly	viewed	
as	a	global	success,	with	specific	outcomes	including	the	1992	
Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	and	Development,	which	lays	
out	certain	principles,	and	the	1992	Agenda	21,	which	serves	
as	a	“blueprint”	to	halt	and	reverse	the	effects	of	environmen-
tal	degradation	and	to	promote	sustainable	development	in	all	
countries.15	The	text	of	Agenda	21	comprises	a	preamble	and	
four	sections	entitled:	Social	and	Economic	Dimensions,16	Con-
servation	 and	Management	 of	Resources	 for	Development,17	
Strengthening	the	Role	of	Major	Groups,18	and	Means	of	Imple-
mentation.19	Agenda	21	also	noted	in	several	places,	as	a	means	
of	 implementation	 of	 sustainable	 development,	 the	 need	 for	
international	action	to	codify	and	develop	“international	law	on	
sustainable	development.”20	Indeed,	the	UNCED	process	led	to	
three	international	treaties:	the	1992	UN	Framework	Conven-
tion	on	Climate	Change	(“UNFCCC”),21	the	1992	UN	Conven-
tion	on	Biological	Diversity	(“UNCBD”),22	and	the	1994	UN	
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Convention	 to	 Combat	 Desertification (“UNCCD”).23 After	
the	UNCED,	a	UN	Commission	on	Sustainable	Development	
(“UNCSD”)	 was	 established	 under	 the	 UN’s	 Economic	 and	
Social	authority,	to	annually	review	progress	in	implementation	
of	Agenda	21.
In	1997,	a	special	session	of	the	UN	General	Assembly,	the	
“Earth	Summit+5,”	was	held	in	New	York	to	review	progress	
toward	the	objectives	set	in	Rio.	The	resulting	Declaration,	the	
Programme	of	Further	Action	to	Implement	Agenda	21,	focused	
on	assessing	progress	since	Rio	and	calling	attention	to	areas	
where	implementation	of	Agenda	21	recommendations	was	fal-
tering,	highlighting	 the	need	 to	 further	 strengthen	and	codify	
international	 law	on	sustainable	development.24	The	UNCSD	
continued	to	meet	annually	from	1997	to	2002.	States	also	held	
further	global	summits,	adopting	non-binding	policy	outcomes	
identifying	points	of	global	consensus	on	sustainable	develop-
ment	issues	and	undertaking	a	series	of	legally	binding	negotia-
tions	on	specific	sustainable	development	challenges.	
The	 2002	 World	 Summit	 on	 Sustainable	 Development	
(“WSSD”)	in	Johannesburg	sought	to	reinvigorate	global	com-
mitment	to	sustainable	development,25	focusing	on	how	best	to	
implement	 sustainable	development	 in	a	context	of	globaliza-
tion.	The	WSSD	resulted	in	a	2002	Johannesburg	Declaration	
on	Sustainable	Development	and	a	Johannesburg	Plan	of	Imple-
mentation.	The	Johannesburg	Declaration,	rather	than	laying	out	
principles	like	the	Declarations	from	Stockholm	and	Rio,	pro-
vides	a	political	commitment	to	sustainable	development	from	
heads	of	State.26	The	2002	Johannesburg	Plan	of	Implementa-
tion (“JPOI”) provides	a	framework	for	action	to	implement	the	
commitments	originally	agreed	at	UNCED	and	to	address	a	few	
additional	challenges.27	New	resources	were	committed	to	the	
Global	Environment	Facility,	and	States	agreed	that	efforts	to	
address	desertification	would	be	henceforth	funded	by	the	GEF	
as	a	new	focal	area.	A	commitment	was	also	made	to	negotiate	a	
new	binding	regime	on	access	and	benefit	sharing	for	biodiver-
sity,	under	the	UNCBD.	Specific	attention	was	focused	on	cer-
tain	important	priorities	identified	by	the	UN	Secretary	General,	
in	the	areas	of	water	and	sanitation,	energy,	health,	agriculture	
and	biodiversity	(the	so-called	“WEHAB”	issues).	By	the	end	
of	the	WSSD,	a	number	of	the	WEHAB	commitments	set	out	in	
the	JPOI	had	been	linked	to	new	“voluntary”	partnerships	and	
financial	commitments.	Johannesburg	witnessed	the	launch	of	
180	“Type	II	Outcomes.”	These	were	specific	sustainable	devel-
opment	partnerships	between	governments,	 civil	 society,	 and	
industry,	agreed	to	under	the	auspices	of	the	WSSD	process	and	
supported	by	the	UNCSD,	to	achieve	a	set	of	measurable	objec-
tives	and	results	focused	on	the	implementation	of	sustainable	
development	in	specific	areas.	The	WSSD	process	set	in	place	a	
broadened	institutional	architecture	for	sustainable	development	
to	further	implement	Agenda	21	and	the	WSSD	outcomes	and	
to	meet	emerging	sustainable	development	challenges.28	JPOI	
Chapter	XI	lays	out	a	multi-tiered	international	architecture	for	
sustainable	development	governance.	
	 In	 sum,	 therefore,	 over	 the	 past	 thirty	 years,	 there	 has	
been	an	extensive	policy-making	process	related	to	sustainable	
development,	including	the	debates	and	outcomes	of	the	1992	
Rio	 UNCED,	 the	 1997	 New	 York	 UN	 General	 Assembly	
Special	Session	known	as	the	Earth	Summit	+5,	and	the	2002	
Johannesburg	WSSD.29	The	debates	helped	to	refine	a	common	
concept	of	sustainable	development	among	States.	For	instance,	
in	the	Johannesburg	Declaration,	States	“assume[d]	a	collective	
responsibility	to	advance	and	strengthen	the	interdependent	and	
mutually	reinforcing	pillars	of	sustainable	development—eco-
nomic	 development,	 social	 development	 and	 environmental	
protection—at	the	local,	national,	regional	and	global	levels.”30	
Championed	by	the	South	African	hosts	and	others,	the	social	
agenda	in	sustainable	development	was	deeply	emphasized.	By	
the	end	of	2002,	sustainable	development	was	accepted	as	an	
important	objective	not	only	for	bringing	economic	and	environ-
mental	authorities	together,	but	also	for	those	addressing	health,	
indigenous	peoples’	 rights,	 gender,	 and	other	 social	 issues.31	
In	addition,	the	process	identified	certain	priority	areas	of	con-
sensus	 in	State	policy-making	and	cooperation.	For	 instance,	
specific	targets	were	agreed	in	the	JPOI	that	built	on	the	Mil-
lennium	 Development	 Goals	 themselves,	 and	 new	 partner-
ships	were	launched	to	work	towards	achieving	the	targets.	The	
global	debates	also	 identified	areas	where	existing	economic,	
environmental,	and	social	development	treaties	could	be	refined	
to	better	 address	 sustainable	development	objectives,	 or	 new	
agreements	negotiated.	For	instance,	as	noted	above,	in	the	Rio	
process	 three	 important	 international	accords	addressing	both	
environmental	 and	 sustainable	 development	 objectives	 were	
signed,	with	several	others	negotiated	soon	afterwards.	Further-
more,	as	discussed	below,	in	the	Johannesburg	process,	certain	
emerging	principles	of	international	law	on	sustainable	develop-
ment	were	openly	debated,	such	as	common	but	differentiated	
responsibility,	precaution,	sustainable	use	of	natural	resources,	
equity,	integration,	and	openness,	transparency,	and	public	par-
ticipation.32	Unlike	international	treaties,	or	clearly	recognized	
international	customary	law,	the	1992	Rio	Declaration	and	the	
Agenda	21,	along	with	the	2002	Johannesburg	Declaration	and	
Johannesburg	Plan	of	Implementation	are	not	binding.	Rather,	
such	consensus	declarations	by	States	are	usually	described	as	
“soft	law.”33	UN	General	Assembly	resolutions,	while	they	can	
be	considered	evidence	of	an	emerging	customary	principle	and	
while	they	can	reflect	 treaty	law,	are	similarly	not	considered	
legally	binding	as	such.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	such	
consensus	 declarations	 of	States	 are	without	 legal	 relevance.	
Indeed,	 “soft	 law”	 declarations	 may	 give	 rise	 to	 legitimate	
expectations,	in	that	States,	assumed	to	be	acting	in	good	faith	
when	they	agree	to	such	statements,	might	be	precluded	from	
deliberately	violating	agreements	or	commitments	assumed	in	
soft	law	without	notice	or	a	least	assumed	to	be	acting	in	accord-
ance	with	such	commitments.34	In	a	related	manner,	“soft	law”	
can	provide	evidence	of	emerging	customary	norms.35	Though	
they	may	not	provide	a	solid	basis	for	robust	legal	analysis,	the	
global	“soft	law”	debates	on	sustainable	development	do	appear	
to	play	a	key	role	in	building	consensus	around	certain	priorities	
and	principles,	and	in	identifying	and	building	alliances	for	new	
areas	of	treaty-making	on	sustainable	development.
7 SuStainable Development law & policy
progreSS in treaty negotiation: Setting 
SuStainable Development obJectiveS
Unlike	 in	 the	1992	Rio	Earth	Summit,	 the	 Johannesburg	
Summit	process	did	not	produce	new	 treaties.	 Instead,	 in	 the	
JPOI,	 States	 specifically	 highlighted	 over	 60	 existing	 inter-
national	economic,	environmental,	and	social	instruments	that	
play	a	role	achieving	sustainable	development,	and	mentioned	
more	than	200	others.36	Essentially,	sustainable	development,	
once	almost	marginalized	as	 a	 second	or	 third	objective	of	 a	
few	international	environmental	accords,	came	to	be	recognized	
as	a	key	purpose	of	many	important	 treaties	and	 instruments,	
including	 specialized	 regimes	 for	 sustainable	management	of	
resources	 such	 as	 seeds,	 fisheries,	 and	 forests.	 One	 of	 these	
treaties	 even	 provides	 an	 agreed	
definition	of	 sustainable	 devel-
opment.37	While	the	concept	of	
sustainable	 development,	 like	
development	 (or	 world	 peace,	
or	 human	 rights),	 may	 have	
no	 single	 simple	 accepted	 uni-
versal	 definition,	 this	 does	 not	
require	that	the	meaning	of	sus-
tainable	development	must	also	
remain	 unclear	 in	 international	
treaty	 law.	 Different	 treaties,	
established	 to	 address	 distinct	
problems,	usually	 specify	what	
States	 mean	 by	 sustainable	
development	in	the	accord	itself,	
either	in	the	preamble	or	in	the	
operational	 principles,	 and	 this	
informs	 the	 specific	 mechan-
isms	 adopted,	 the	 manner	 of	
implementation,	 the	 resolution	
of	related	disputes,	and	often	the	
further	evolution	of	the	regime.	
One	 of	 the	 most	 signifi-
cant	of	 these	 treaties	 is	 the	UN	
Framework	Convention	on	Cli-
mate	 Change	 (“UNFCCC”).	
This	 treaty	 recognizes	 that	
the	climate	system	is	a	shared	resource	whose	stability	can	be	
affected	by	industrial	and	other	emissions	of	carbon	dioxide	and	
other	greenhouse	gases,	and	sets	an	overall	framework	for	inter-
governmental	efforts	to	tackle	the	challenges	posed	by	climate	
change.	In	the	UNFCCC,	the	promotion	of	sustainable	develop-
ment	is	framed	as	one	of	the	“Principles”	of	the	treaty,	where	it	
is	described	as	a	“right.”	The	provision	is	also,	however,	framed	
as	 a	 hortatory	 (“should”	 rather	 than	 “shall”)	 commitment	 to	
“promote.”38	In	this	context,	it	can	be	noted	that	Principle	4	of	
the	UNFCCC	is	provided	as	a	distinct	norm	from	Principle	1,	
which	states	in	part	“[t]he	Parties	should	protect	the	climate	sys-
tem	for	the	benefit	of	present	and	future	generations	of	human-
kind,	on	the	basis	of	equity	.	.	.	.”	It	is	also	distinct	from	Principle	
5,	which	states	that	“.	.	.	Parties	should	cooperate	to	promote	a	
supportive	and	open	international	economic	system	that	would	
lead	 to	 sustainable	 economic	 growth	 and	 development	 in	 all	
Parties,	particularly	developing	country	Parties,	 thus	enabling	
them	better	to	address	the	problems	of	climate	change.	.	.	.”	As	
such,	it	would	appear	that,	while	UNFCCC	Principle	4	recog-
nizes	a	right	and	(hortatory)	duty	of	States	to	promote	sustain-
able	development,	this	does	not	imply	either	intergenerational	
equity	or	a	“new	kind	of	economic	growth,”	as	both	of	these	are	
recognized	as	separate	principles.	Rather,	the	right	to	promote	
sustainable	development	appears	 to	refer	more	directly	 to	 the	
work	of	the	Parties	to	integrate	environmental	protection	with	
development	processes.	Further,	in	spite	of	the	Principles	dis-
cussed	above,	an	operational	reference	to	sustainable	develop-
ment	is	also	found	in	Article	2.	As	
such,	while	 it	 could	be	 argued	
that	 the	 “right	 to	promote	 sus-
tainable	development”	is	recog-
nized	as	a	Principle	by	States	in	
the	context	of	the	UNFCCC,	it	
also	seems	that	stabilization	of	
greenhouse	gas	reduction	levels	
“should”	 be	 achieved	within	 a	
time-frame	sufficient	to	“enable	
economic	development	 to	 pro-
ceed	in	a	sustainable	manner”—
essentially,	an	objective.	At	the	
first	 Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	
(1995),	 in	 the	Berlin	Mandate,	
Parties	launched	intense	negoti-
ations	that	resulted	in	the	Kyoto	
Protocol39	 on	 December	 11,	
1997.	 The	 1997	 Kyoto	 Proto-
col	shares	UNFCCC	objectives,	
principles,	and	institutions,	but	
commits	Annex	I	Parties	to	indi-
vidual,	 legally	 binding	 targets	
to	 limit	 or	 reduce	 their	 green-
house	 gas	 emissions.	 In	 con-
trast	to	the	UNFCCC,	the	Kyoto	
Protocol	 mentions	 sustainable	
development	as	an	objective	in	
an	extremely	clear	way.	Indeed,	it	
provides	quite	a	solid	definition	of	the	types	of	measures	that	
States	can	take	“in	order	to	promote	sustainable	development”	in	
the	area	of	climate	change.40	
A	 second	 relevant	 treaty	 is	 the	 1994	UN	Convention	 to	
Combat	Desertification	(“UNCCD”),	especially	in	Africa,	which	
built	on	the	Plan	of	Action	to	Combat	Desertification	from	the	
1977	UN	Conference	on	Desertification	to	address	land	degrada-
tion	in	arid,	semi-arid,	and	dry	sub-humid	areas.	In	Article	3	on	
Principles,	the	Parties	commit	to	cooperate	to	work	towards	the	
sustainable	use	of	land	and	water	resources.	But	in	the	UNCCD	
States	make	over	forty	references	to	“sustainable”	development,	
use,	management,	exploitation,	production,	and	practices	and/or	
unsustainable	development	and	exploitation	practices.	As	such,	
It is possible that 
international courts 
and tribunals . . . 
are becoming more 
willing to go beyond 
a simple “balance” 
of environmental 
and economic 
concerns, towards 
actual integration of 
environmental, economic 
and social considerations 
in development
8Fall 2009
while	“sustainable	use”	is	set	as	a	Principle	in	Article	3,	States	
also	clearly	incorporated	sustainable	development	as	an	“Objec-
tive”	of	 the	UNCCD,	speaking	both	 to	 their	 intention	 that	an	
integrated	approach	will	“contribute	to	the	achievement	of	sus-
tainable	development”	in	particular	areas,	and	that	the	adoption	
of	integrated	strategies	will	focus	on	“sustainable	management	
of	land	and	water	resources”	leading	to	“improved	living	condi-
tions.”41	In	the	UNCCD	States	essentially	seek	to	specify	how	
this	objective	will	be	realized,	through	action	plans	and	regional	
annexes,	 each	 of	which	 refers	 to	 sustainable	 development	 in	
slightly	different	(regionally	appropriate)	lights.
	 In	a	 third	example,	190	countries	have	ratified	 the	1992	
UN	Convention	 on	Biological	Diversity (“UNCBD”),	which	
covers	all	ecosystems,	species,	and	genetic	resources,	and	rec-
ognizes	that	the	conservation	of	biological	diversity	is	“a	com-
mon	concern	of	humankind”	while	also	noting	that	sustainable	
use	of	biodiversity	is	an	integral	part	of	the	development	proc-
ess.	In	essence,	in	the	treaty	States	
link	 traditional	 conservation	
efforts	 to	 the	 economic	 goal	
of	 using	 biological	 resources	
sustainably.	 The	UNCBD	 con-
tains	principles	 for	 the	fair	and	
equitable	sharing	of	the	benefits	
arising	from	the	sustainable	use	
of	 genetic	 resources,	 including	
genetic	 resources	 destined	 for	
commercial	use.	The	treaty	also	
covers	 the	 rapidly	 expanding	
field	of	biotechnology,	address-
ing	technology	development	and	
transfer,	 benefit-sharing,	 and	
biosafety.	The	UNCBD	regime	
agrees	 on	measures	 and	 incen-
tives	 for	 the	 conservation	 and	
sustainable	use	of	biological	diversity;	regulated	access	to	genetic	
resources;	access	to	and	transfer	of	technology	(including	bio-
technology);	technical	and	scientific	cooperation;	impact	assess-
ment;	 education	and	public	 awareness;	provision	of	financial	
resources;	and	national	reporting	on	efforts	to	implement	treaty	
commitments.	 In	 the	UNCBD,	States	 recognize	“that	ecosys-
tems,	species	and	genes	must	be	used	for	the	benefit	of	humans.	
However,	this	should	be	done	in	a	way	and	at	a	rate	that	does	not	
lead	to	the	long-term	decline	of	biological	diversity.”	Indeed,	in	
Article	2,	States	define	sustainable	use	as	“the	use	of	components	
of	biological	diversity	in	a	way	and	at	a	rate	that	does	not	lead	to	
the	long-term	decline	of	biological	diversity,	thereby	maintain-
ing	its	potential	to	meet	the	needs	and	aspirations	of	present	and	
future	generations.”42	As	such,	in	the	UNCBD,	States	appear	not	
only	to	clearly	adopt	sustainable	use	of	biological	diversity	as	a	
treaty	objective,	but	also	to	define	fairly	precisely	what	is	meant	
by	sustainable	use,	and	what	types	of	measures	and	activities	are	
needed	to	ensure	that	use	is,	indeed,	sustainable	in	the	context	of	
biological	resources.	On	January	29,	2000,	the	Conference	of	the	
Parties	of	the	UNCBD	adopted	a	supplementary	instrument,	the	
2000	Cartagena	Protocol	on	Biosafety.	In	the	Protocol,	States	
seek	to	protect	biological	diversity	from	the	potential	risks	posed	
by	living	modified	organisms	resulting	from	modern	biotechnol-
ogy.	They	establish	an	advance	 informed	agreement	 (“AIA”)	
procedure	 for	 ensuring	 that	 countries	 are	 provided	 with	 the	
information	necessary	to	make	informed	decisions	before	agree-
ing	to	the	import	of	such	organisms	into	their	territory.	They	also	
establish	a	Biosafety	Clearing-House	to	facilitate	the	exchange	
of	information	on	living	modified	organisms	and	to	assist	coun-
tries	 in	the	implementation	of	 the	Protocol.	Overall,	 there	are	
more	than	twenty	references	to	“sustainability”	in	this	Protocol,	
each	specific	to	the	actual	resource	being	managed.	“Sustainable	
use”	is	seen	as	an	objective	of	the	Protocol,	and	is	considered	
relevant	 to	 social	and	economic	 (not	 just	environmental)	pri-
orities	such	as	the	needs	of	indigenous	and	local	communities.	
This	highlights	the	point	raised	earlier,	that	there	are	important	
social	 and	 economic	dimensions	 to	 sustainable	development.	
Sustainable	 development,	 as	 an	
objective	of	international	treaty	
law,	cannot	simply	be	conflated	
with	 environmental	 protection	
in	developing	countries.	
The	 commitment	 “to	 pro-
mote	sustainable	development”	
has	not	just	been	made	in	mul-
tilateral	 environmental	 agree-
ments.	 In	 the	 preparations	 for	
the	2002	Johannesburg	Summit,	
after	 seven	 years	 of	 negotia-
tions,	the	Food	and	Agriculture	
Organization	 (“FAO”)	 Con-
ference	 (through	 Resolution	
3/2001)	 adopted	 the	 Interna-
tional	Treaty	 on	Plant	Genetic	
Resources	 for	 Food	 and	Agri-
culture43	(“Seed	Treaty”)	in	November	2001.	The	Seed	Treaty	
covers	all	plant	genetic	resources	relevant	for	food	and	agricul-
ture	and	is	vital	in	ensuring	the	continued	availability	of	the	plant	
genetic	resources	that	countries	will	need	to	feed	their	people.	In	
the	Seed	Treaty,	States	seek	to	conserve	for	future	generations	
the	genetic	diversity	that	is	essential	for	food	and	agriculture.	
Plant	genetic	resources	for	food	and	agriculture	are	defined	as	
“any	genetic	material	of	plant	origin	of	actual	or	potential	value	
for	food	and	agriculture.”	The	treaty	objectives	are	the	conser-
vation	and	sustainable	use	of	plant	genetic	resources	for	food	
and	agriculture	and	 the	 fair	 and	equitable	 sharing	of	benefits	
derived	from	their	use,	in	harmony	with	the	UNCBD,	for	sus-
tainable	agriculture	and	food	security.	In	the	Seed	Treaty,	States	
establish	a	Multilateral	System	for	Access	and	Benefit-Sharing	
that	is	meant	to	provide	an	efficient,	effective	and	transparent	
framework	to	facilitate	access	to	plant	genetic	resources	for	food	
and	agriculture,	and	to	share	the	benefits	in	a	fair	and	equitable	
way.	This	Multilateral	System	applies	to	over	64	major	crops	
and	forages.	The	Governing	Body	of	the	treaty	sets	out	the	con-
ditions	 for	access	and	benefit-sharing	 in	a	“Material	Transfer	
The process of identifying 
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Agreement.”	Resources	may	be	obtained	from	the	Multilateral	
System	for	utilization	and	conservation	 in	 research,	breeding	
and	 training.	When	a	commercial	product	 is	developed	using	
these	resources,	the	Treaty	provides	for	payment	of	an	equitable	
share	of	the	resulting	monetary	benefits,	with	the	condition	that	
the	use	of	the	product	may	not	be	restricted	and	the	seed	may	
be	used	for	further	research	and	breeding.	If	others	may	use	it,	
payment	is	voluntary.	The	Seed	Treaty	provides	for	sharing	the	
benefits	of	using	plant	genetic	resources	for	food	and	agricul-
ture	 through	information	exchange,	access	 to	and	the	 transfer	
of	 technology,	and	capacity-building.	Under	 the	Seed	Treaty,	
a	 funding	strategy	was	also	established	 to	mobilize	 funds	 for	
activities,	plans,	and	programs	to	help	small	farmers	in	develop-
ing	countries.	This	funding	strategy	also	includes	the	share	of	
the	monetary	benefits	paid	under	the	Multilateral	System.	There	
are	twenty-four	references	to	“sustainable”	agricultural	develop-
ment,	use,	and	systems	in	the	FAO	Seed	Treaty.	Sustainable	use	
of	genetic	resources	is	clearly	recognized	as	an	“Objective”	of	
the	treaty.	But	in	Article	6.1,	the	Contracting	Parties	also	accept	
a	duty.	States	“shall	develop	and	maintain	appropriate	policy	and	
legal	measures	that	promote	the	sustainable	use	of	plant	genetic	
resources	for	food	and	agriculture.”	In	Article	6.2,	the	Parties	
identify	seven	specific	such	measures,	including	“(a)	pursuing	
fair	agricultural	policies	that	.	.	.	enhance	the	sustainable	use	of	
agricultural	biological	diversity	and	other	natural	resources;	(b)	
strengthening	research	which	enhances	and	conserves	biologi-
cal	diversity	by	maximizing	intra-	and	inter-specific	variation	
for	the	benefit	of	farmers	.	 .	 .	(d)	broadening	the	genetic	base	
of	crops	 .	 .	 .	 (e)	promoting,	as	appropriate,	 the	expanded	use	
of	local	and	locally	adapted	crops,	varieties	and	underutilized	
species;	(f)	supporting	.	.	.	sustainable	use	of	crops	and	creating	
strong	links	to	plant	breeding	and	agricultural	development	in	
order	to	.	.	.	promote	increased	world	food	production	compati-
ble	with	sustainable	development	.	.	.	.”	This	is	important	for	two	
reasons.	First,	the	Seed	Treaty	is	a	recent	instrument,	and	there-
fore	offers	an	insight	into	States’	most	current	conceptions	of	
sustainability	as	an	economic,	social	and	environmental	objec-
tive	 that	 can	be	operationalized.	Second,	 in	 the	 treaty,	States	
focus	on	“sustainable	use”	in	one	particular	context,	that	of	plant	
genetic	resources	for	food	and	agriculture.	In	this	specific	sector,	
it	appears	possible	to	pinpoint	fairly	precisely	the	meaning	of	
sustainable	use	of	the	resource,	and	the	type	of	measures	that	are	
required	to	ensure	that	it	takes	place.
Furthermore,	 in	 several	 important	 trade	 and	 investment	
treaties	States	have	also	underlined	a	commitment	to	sustainable	
development,	one	that	has	been	interpreted	by	decisions	of	the	
Appellate	Body	of	the	World	Trade	Organization	(“WTO”)	and	
other	economic	tribunals.44	The	negotiation	of	the	Preamble	of	
the	1994	WTO	Agreement	was	influenced	by	the	outcomes	of	
the	1992	UNCED,	as	was	made	explicit	in	the	Uruguay	Round	
Decision	on	Trade	and	Environment	which	noted	the	Rio	Dec-
laration,	 Agenda	 21,	 and	 the	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Tariffs	
and	Trade	(“GATT”)	follow-up	process.45	The	Preamble	of	the	
WTO	Agreement	states	that:
Recognizing	that	their	relations	in	the	field	of	trade	and	
economic	endeavour	should	be	conducted	with	a	view	
to	raising	standards	of	living,	ensuring	full	employment	
and	a	large	and	steadily	growing	volume	of	real	income	
and	effective	demand,	and	expanding	 the	production	
of	and	trade	in	goods	and	services,	while	allowing	for	
the	optimal	use	of	the	world’s	resources	in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development,	seeking	
both	 to	protect	 and	preserve	 the	environment	 and	 to	
enhance	the	means	for	doing	so	in	a	manner	consistent	
with	 their	 respective	needs	and	concerns	at	different	
levels	of	economic	development	.	.	.
Recognizing	 further	 that	 there	 is	 need	 for	 positive	
efforts	designed	 to	ensure	 that	developing	countries,	
and	especially	the	least	developed	among	them,	secure	
a	share	in	the	growth	in	international	trade	commensu-
rate	with	the	needs	of	their	economic	development.46
While	Preambular	statements	are	not	formally	legally	bind-
ing	in	the	same	way	that	operational	provisions	can	be,	they	can	
play	a	role	in	interpretation	of	a	treaty,	particularly	in	identifica-
tion	of	the	treaty’s	object	and	purpose.47	Nearly	eight	years	after	
the	WTO	Agreement	was	adopted	in	Punta	del	Este	in	1994,	the	
importance	of	a	sustainable	development	objective	to	the	WTO	
was	underscored,	after	debates,	in	the	2001	Doha	WTO	Ministe-
rial	Declaration	at	paragraph	6	which	states:	
We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective 
of sustainable development,	as	stated	in	the	Preamble	
to	 the	Marrakesh	Agreement.	We	are	convinced	 that	
the	aims	of	upholding	and	safeguarding	an	open	and	
non-discriminatory	 multilateral	 trading	 system,	 and	
acting	 for	 the	protection	of	 the	environment	 and	 the	
promotion	of	 sustainable	development	 can	and	must	
be	mutually	supportive	.	.	.	.	We	encourage	efforts	to	
promote	cooperation	between	 the	WTO	and	relevant	
international	environmental	and	developmental	organi-
zations,	especially	in	the	lead-up	to	the	World	Summit	
on	Sustainable	Development	 to	be	held	 in	Johannes-
burg,	South	Africa,	in	September	2002.48	
It	can	be	argued	that	in	Doha,	Ministers	recognized	sustain-
able	development	as	an	objective	of	the	WTO,	and	placed	it	into	
a	strengthened	context,	referring	to	practical	measures	such	as	
the	need	for	cooperation	in	other	international	environment	and 
development	organizations.	References	to	this	objective	in	the	
Doha	Ministerial	Declaration	clearly	recognize	environmental	
protection	and	social	development	as	elements	that	need	to	be	
integrated	into	the	mandate	of	a	mainly	economic	organization,	
the	WTO.	The	Ministerial	Declaration	also	contains,	in	particu-
lar,	several	substantive	provisions	showing	that	a	commitment	
to	sustainable	development	provided	real	guidance	for	the	Min-
isters’	decisions.	Indeed,	after	2001,	the	WTO,	as	an	institution,	
moved	more	quickly	to	recognize	sustainable	development	and	
its	normative	nature.	As	noted	by	WTO	Director	General	Pascal	
Lamy,	the	objective	of	sustainable	development	mandates	WTO	
members	“to	no	longer	compartmentalize	[their]	work;	discuss-
ing	environmental	and	developmental	issues	in	isolation	of	the	
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rest	of	what	[they]	do.	These	are	issues	that	permeate	all	areas	
of	the	WTO.”49	Similarly,	the	1994	North	American	Free	Trade	
Agreement	 (“NAFTA”),	 and	most	 international	 trade	 agree-
ments	 signed	by	Canada,	 the	United	States,	 or	 the	European	
Union	since	the	1992	Rio	Earth	Summit,	contain	assurances	that	
States,	in	signing	these	regional	trade	and	investment	accords,	
seek	to	promote	sustainable	development	(North	American	bi-
lateral	trade	and	investment	treaties),	or	plan	to	carry	out	their	
treaty	commitments	in	accordance	with	a	principle	of	sustain-
able	development	(European	economic	association	agreements	
and	trade	accords).50
progreSS in treaty regimeS: operationalizing 
SuStainable Development principleS
These	last	three	decades	of	policy-making	and	treaty	nego-
tiations	have	reinforced	international	recognition	of	certain	key	
principles	 related	 to	 sustainable	 development,	 including	 the	
principles	of	 integration,	sustainable	use	of	natural	resources,	
and	equity,	as	well	as	principles	of	common	but	differentiated	
responsibility,	 precaution,	 good	 governance,	 and	 openness,	
transparency,	and	public	participation.51	They	also	highlighted	
the	emergence	and	refinement	of	international	instruments	and	
techniques	to	put	these	principles	into	practice.	As	was	predicted	
in	the	Annex	on	Legal	Principles	to	the	Brundtland	Report,52	a	
body	of	rules	of	international	law	related	to	sustainable	develop-
ment	is	emerging,	mainly	through	the	adoption	of	“hard	law”	
treaty	regimes.	When	States	set	sustainable	development	as	a	
policy	objective	of	an	international	treaty,	they	also	adopt	certain	
norms	to	realize	their	joint	purpose.	For	example,	the	principle	
of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	governs	the	way	
that	burdens	to	reduce	greenhouse	gases	are	apportioned	among	
States,	serving	the	sustainable	economic	development	objective	
of	the	1992	UNFCCC.53	Such	principles	which	aim	to	contrib-
ute	to	and	achieve	sustainable	development	may	even	come	to	
be	used	so	often,	and	to	be	accepted	so	generally,	that	they	do,	
indeed,	gain	recognition	as	customary	international	rules	them-
selves,	binding	on	all	States	that	have	not	persistently	objected.	
Existing	universal	adoption	of	these	principles	to	address	spe-
cific	international	issues,	moreover,	might	support	a	contention	
that	 in	 these	contexts	 (climate	change,	biodiversity,	desertifi-
cation,	law	of	the	sea),	certain	principles	have	already	reached	
such	a	status.	The	practical	implications	of	such	a	contention,	
in	some	nearly	universal	membership	treaties,	which	explicitly	
commit	to	these	principles,	might	be	minimal,	but	it	does	not	
discount	the	value	of	examining	the	principles	themselves.	
The	process	of	 identifying	principles	of	 international	 law	
and	policy	related	to	sustainable	development	has	been	reason-
ably	complex.	The	most	important	undertakings	ran	parallel	to	
the	global	policy-making	events	outlined	above,	and	included	
the	process	of	elaborating	the	1972	Stockholm	Declaration,	the	
1987	Brundtland	Commission’s	Legal	Experts	Group	on	Princi-
ples	of	International	Law	for	the	Protection	of	the	Environment	
and	Sustainable	Development,	 the	1992	Rio	Declaration,	 the	
2002	New	Delhi	Declaration	of	the	International	Law	Associa-
tion,	and	other	efforts.	The	1992	Rio	Declaration echoes	many	
of	the	Principles	recommended	by	the	Brundtland	Report,	and	
was	clearly	directly	influenced	by	its	findings.	Widely	accepted	
as	“soft	 law,”54	 the	central	concept	of	 the	1992	Rio	Declara-
tion	is	sustainable	development,	as	defined	by	the	Brundtland	
Report.	The	Rio	Declaration	was	followed	by	the	Report	of	the	
Expert	Group	Meeting	on	Identification	of	Principles	of	Inter-
national	Law	 for	Sustainable	Development,	which	was	 com-
missioned	 by	 the	UN	Division	 for	 Sustainable	Development	
in	accordance	with	a	request	by	States	at	the	second	session	of	
the	UN	Commission	on	Sustainable	Development	in	1994,	and	
released	in	September	1995.55	This	early	Report	identifies	nine-
teen	principles	and	concepts	of	international	law	for	sustainable	
development	but	did	not	resolve	international	debates	on	these	
questions.
In	1997,	States	noted	in	the	Programme	of	Action	for	Further	
Implementation	of	Agenda	21	that	“[p]rogress	has	been	made	in	
incorporating	the	principles	contained	in	the	Rio	Declaration	on	
Environment	and	Development	 .	 .	 .	 including	the	principle	of	
common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	.	.	.	[and]	the	precau-
tionary	principle	.	.	 .	in	a	variety	of	international	and	national	
legal	instruments	.	.	.	much	remains	to	be	done	to	embody	the	
Rio	principles	more	firmly	in	law	and	practice.”56	As	a	Resolu-
tion	of	the	70th	Conference	of	the	International	Law	Association	
(“ILA”)	 in	New	Delhi	 India,	April	2-6,	2002,	 the	Committee	
on	the	Legal	Aspects	of	Sustainable	Development	released	its	
New	Delhi	ILA	Declaration	on	Principles	of	International	Law	
relating	to	Sustainable	Development.57	It	outlines	seven	prin-
ciples	of	international	law	on	sustainable	development.	These	
principles	are	central	principles	of	most	 international	 treaties	
related	to	sustainable	development,	and	are	recognized	and	reaf-
firmed	throughout	the	2002	Johannesburg	Plan	of	Implementa-
tion.	Detailed	analysis	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	and	can	
be	found	elsewhere.58	However,	given	the	decade	of	study	and	
analysis	conducted	by	the	Committee	and	the	relative	normative	
clarity	of	their	findings,	the	2002	New	Delhi	Declaration	pro-
vides	a	current	benchmark	of	the	important	principles	of	interna-
tional	law	on	sustainable	development.59	As	such,	a	short	survey	
is	provided	below.
The	New	Delhi	Declaration	starts	by	recognizing	the	need	
to	further	develop	international	law	in	the	field	of	sustainable	
development,	with	a	view	to	according	due	weight	to	both	the	
developmental	and	environmental	concerns,	in	order	to	achieve	
a	balanced	and	comprehensive	international	law	on	sustainable	
development,	as	called	for	in	Principle	27	of	the	Rio	Declaration	
and	Chapter	39	of	Agenda	21	of	the	UNCED.	Then,	seven	“prin-
ciples”	are	highlighted.
The	first	evokes	a	duty	of	states	to	ensure	sustainable	use	of	
natural	resources.	States	have	sovereign	rights	over	their	natural	
resources,	and	a	duty	not	to	cause	(or	allow)	undue	damage	to	
the	environment	of	other	States	 in	 the	use	of	 these	resources.	
As	discussed	above,	this	principle	was	recognized	in	Stockholm	
Declaration	Principle	21	and	the	Rio	Declaration	Principle	2.60	
Though	 a	 comprehensive	 review	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	
article,	it	should	be	noted	that	this	principle	has	been	reflected	
and	 strongly	 reaffirmed	 in	 several	 international	 treaties	 on	
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sustainable	development	with	extremely	broad	membership	in	
the	past	two	decades.	In	the	UNFCCC,	at	the	Preamble,	Parties	
recognize	the	rights	of	sovereignty	over	natural	resources	and	
related	 responsibilities	 to	protect	 the	world’s	climate	 system.	
Similar	 recognition	 is	 found	 in	 the	Preamble	of	 the	UNCBD,	
and	is	highlighted	as	a	principle	of	sustainable	use	of	biological	
resources	in	Article	3	and	Article	10.61	Similarly,	in	the	UNCCD,	
at	Article	3(c),	Parties	agree	on	a	principle	to	work	toward	sus-
tainable	use	of	scarce	water	and	land	resources,	and,	in	Article	
10.4	on	national	action	plans,	Article	11	on	regional	and	sub-
regional	actions,	Article	17.1(a)	on	research	and	development,	
and	Art	19.1(c)	and	 (e)	on	capacity-building,	 the	principle	 is	
reaffirmed.62	 The	WTO	 Agree-
ment	also	recognizes,	 in	 its	Pre-
amble,	the	need	to	ensure	optimal	
use	 of	 the	 world’s	 resources	 in	
accordance	with	the	objective	of	
sustainable	 development.63	 The	
FAO	Seed	Treaty,	at	Article	1.1,	
sets	the	conservation	and	sustain-
able	use	of	plant	genetic	resour-
ces	 for	 food	 and	 agriculture,	
making	 the	 commitment	 oper-
ational	in	Article	6	which	lays	out	
a	series	of	specific	law	and	policy	
measures	that	States	should	adopt	
to	ensure	sustainable	use	of	plant	
genetic	resources.64	
The	 second	 principle	 of	
equity	 and	 poverty	 eradication	
refers	 to	both	 inter-generational 
equity (a	 right	of	 future	genera-
tions	 to	enjoy	a	fair	 level	of	 the	
common	 patrimony)	 and	 intra-
generational equity (a	right	of	all	
peoples	 within	 the	 current	 gen-
eration	of	fair	access	 to	 the	cur-
rent	 generation’s	 entitlement	 to	
the	Earth’s	 natural	 resources).65	
According	to	the	New	Delhi	Declaration,	the	principle	of	equity	
includes	a	duty	to	cooperate	to	secure	development	opportuni-
ties	of	developed	and	developing	countries,	and	a	duty	to	co-
operate	for	the	eradication	of	poverty,	as	noted	in	Chapter	IX	on	
International	Economic	and	Social	Co-operation	of	the	Charter	
of	the	United	Nations.66	This	principle	is	also	reflected	in	inter-
national	treaty	law	on	sustainable	development.	In	the	UNCBD,	
the	principle	is	reflected	in	Article	15.7	on	access	to	the	bene-
fits	of	biological	resources	and	related	obligations	to	ensure	that	
the	benefits	are	equitably	shared.67	In	the	Preamble	of	the	1992	
UNFCCC,	Parties	commit	to	take	into	full	account	the	legitimate	
priority	needs	of	developing	countries	for	 the	achievement	of	
sustained	economic	growth	and	the	eradication	of	poverty,	while	
also	noting	their	determination	to	protect	the	climate	system	for	
present	and	future	generations.	Indeed,	one	of	the	treaty	princi-
ples	in	Article	3	states	an	intention	to	“protect	the	climate	system	
for	the	benefit	of	present	and	future	generations	of	humankind,	
on	the	basis	of	equity”	and	commits	that	accordingly,	“devel-
oped	country	Parties	should	take	the	lead	in	combating	climate	
change.”68	In	the	UNCCD,	Parties	included	provisions	on	pov-
erty	eradication	and	intra-generational	equity	at	Article	16(g)	on	
the	sharing	of	traditional	knowledge	sharing,	at	Article	17.1(c)	
on	 research	 and	 development	 related	 to	 traditional	 knowl-
edge,	and	in	Article	18.2(b)	on	technology	transfer.69	Further,	
a	 responsibility	 for	 inter-generational	 and	 intra-generational	
equity	in	sharing	the	benefits	of	plant	genetic	resources	is	rec-
ognized	in	the	Preamble	of	the	FAO	Seed	Treaty,	as	well	as	at	
Article	1.1	as	an	objective	of	access	and	benefit-sharing	provi-
sions,	and	Articles	10,	11,	12,	
and	 13	 which	 operationalize	
the	principle	by	establishing	a	
multilateral	 system	 of	 access	
and	 benefit	 sharing	 for	 plant	
genetic	resources.70
The	 third	 principle	 con-
cerned	the	common	but	differ-
entiated	obligations	of	States	in	
securing	 sustainable	 develop-
ment.	 According	 to	 the	 New	
Delhi	 Declaration,	 this	 prin-
ciple	 holds	 that	 the	 common	
responsibility	of	states	for	 the	
protection	of	 the	environment	
at	 the	 national,	 regional,	 and	
global	levels	shall	be	balanced	
by	the	need	to	take	account	of	
different	 circumstances,	 par-
ticularly	 in	 relation	 to	 each	
state’s	 historical	 contribution	
to	 the	 creation	of	 a	 particular	
problem,	as	well	as	 its	ability	
to	prevent,	reduce,	and	control	
the	 threat.71	 This	 principle	 is	
reflected	in	the	UNFCCC	at	its	
Preamble,	as	well	as	in	Article	
3	on	Principles	 and	Article	 4	on	 commitments,	which	 estab-
lishes	the	differentiated	obligations	of	Annex	1	and	non-Annex	
1	Parties.72	Parties	also	affirm	and	operationalize	the	principle	
in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	at	Article	10,	which	recognizes	common	
but	differentiated	 responsibilities	 to	establish	 inventories	and	
programmes	 to	 abate	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions,	 and	Article	
12,	which	operationalizes	the	principle	by	establishing	a	Clean	
Development	Mechanism	to	help	cover	the	costs	of	low	emis-
sion	 technologies	and	energy	systems.73	The	principle	 is	also	
prominent	in	the	UNCCD,	where	Parties	reaffirm,	in	Article	3	
on	principles,	the	need	to	respect	the	common	but	differentiated	
responsibilities	of	States,	in	Articles	4	through	6,	which	lay	out	
the	obligations	for	affected	and	developed	country	Parties,	and	
in	Article	7,	which	includes	specific	provisions	for	Africa.74	The	
principle	is	reaffirmed	and	made	operational	in	the	FAO	Seed	
Treaty	at	Article	7.2(a),	which	provides	for	developing	country’s	
As a general principle, 
international forums 
have contributed to the 
growth and expansion of 
sustainable development 
by providing a space 
within which State and 
non-state actors may 
come together for a 
collective discussion 
of their sustainability-
related challenges
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different	capabilities,	at	Article	8	which	commits	to	technical	
assistance,	at	Article	15.1(b)(iii)	which	grants	special	benefits	
to	least	developed	countries	and	to	centers	of	diversity,	and	in	
Article	18.4(d)	on	financing	implementation	of	the	treaty.75
The	fourth	was	the	principle	of	the	precautionary	approach	
to	 human	 health,	 natural	 resources,	 and	 ecosystems,	 in	 that	
where	there	are	threats	of	serious	or	irreversible	damage,	lack	
of	full	scientific	certainty	shall	not	be	used	as	a	reason	for	post-
poning	cost-effective	measures	 to	prevent	degradation.76	This	
principle	is	reflected	in	UNCBD in	its	Preamble,	and	made	oper-
ational	through	Article	14.1(b),	which	addresses	likely	adverse	
impacts	and	Article	8(g)	on	transboundary	movement	of	living	
modified	organisms	(“LMOs”).77	It	is	also	central	to	the	Carta-
gena	Protocol	on	Biosafety,	both	through	explicit	reaffirmation	
of	 the	principle	 in	 its	Preamble,	at	Article	1	 that	 lays	out	 the	
precautionary	objective	of	the	Protocol,	and	in	the	way	that	it	
is	operationalized	at	Article	7	on	advanced	informed	agreement	
requirements	that	must	be	fulfilled	prior	to	the	first	transbound-
ary	movement	of	an	LMO,	at	Article	10.6	with	regards	the	deci-
sion-making	procedures	that	will	be	followed	in	implementation	
of	the	Protocol,	at	Article	11.8	which	establishes	simplified	pro-
cedures	for	LMOs	destined	for	food,	feed,	and	processing	uses,	
at	Article	15	on	risk	assessment	which	references	Annex	III.4,	in	
which	precautionary	decision-making	is	explicitly	permitted.78	
Precaution	also	appears	in	the	UNFCCC	at	Article	3	as	a	Prin-
ciple	of	the	treaty.79	The	precautionary	principle	is	reflected	in	
the	design	of	1998	Rotterdam	Convention	on	the	Prior	Informed	
Consent	Procedure	for	Certain	Hazardous	Chemicals	and	Pes-
ticides	in	International	Trade,	which	requires	exporters	of	cer-
tain	hazardous	substances	to	obtain	the	prior	informed	consent	
of	 importers	 before	 proceeding,	 and	 accepts	 precautionary	
measures	by	Parties	in	Article	14(3)	and	the	Annex	V	on	infor-
mation	exchange.80	The	2001	Stockholm	Convention	on	Per-
sistent	Organic	Pollutants	also	acknowledges,	at	its	Preamble,	
that	“precaution	underlies	the	concerns	of	all	the	Parties	and	is	
embedded	within	 this	Convention.”	At	Article	1,	Parties	note	
that	they	are	mindful	of	the	precautionary	approach	as	set	forth	
in	Principle	15	of	the	Rio	Declaration	in	setting	their	objective	
to	protect	human	health	and	 the	environment	 from	persistent	
organic	pollutants.	Article	8	makes	precaution	an	operative	pri-
ority;	Parties	agree	to	use	“a	precautionary	manner”	when	decid-
ing	which	chemicals	to	list	in	the	Annexes	of	the	Convention,	
where	lack	of	full	scientific	certainty	shall	not	prevent	a	proposal	
to	list	from	proceeding.	Further,	Part	V(B)	of Annex	C	speci-
fies	that	“precaution	and	prevention”	should	be	considered	when	
determining	the	best	available	techniques.	In	the	1995	Agree-
ment	for	the	Implementation	of	the	Provisions	of	the	UN	Con-
vention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	of	December	10,	1982,	relating	
to	the	Conservation	and	Management	of	Straddling	Fish	Stocks	
and	Highly	Migratory	Fish	Stocks	at	Article	6,	Parties	agree	that	
“[s]tates	shall	apply	the	precautionary	approach	widely	to	con-
servation,	management	and	exploitation	of	straddling	fish	stocks	
and	highly	migratory	fish	 stocks…	States	 shall	be	more	cau-
tious	when	information	is	uncertain,	unreliable,	or	inadequate.	
The	absence	of	adequate	scientific	information	shall	not	be	used	
as	a	reason	for	postponing	or	failing	to	take	conservation	and	
management	measures.”	And	according	to	the	WTO	Appellate	
Body,	the	WTO	Agreement	on	the	Application	of	Sanitary	and	
PhytoSanitary	Measures,	enshrines	the	precautionary	principle	
in	Article	5.7	which	permits	provisional	measures	to	be	taken	to	
restrict	trade	where	scientific	data	is	uncertain,	though	this	does	
not	exhaust	its	relevance	in	WTO	law.81	
The	fifth	 is	a	principle	of	public	participation	and	access	
to	 information	and	justice.	According	to	 this	principle,	States	
have	a	duty	to	ensure	that	individuals	have	appropriate	access	to	
“appropriate,	comprehensible	and	timely”	information	concern-
ing	sustainable	development	that	is	held	by	public	authorities,	
and	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	decision-making	processes,	
as	well	as	effective	access	 to	 judicial	and	administrative	pro-
ceedings,	 including	 redress	 and	 remedy.82	 The	 1998	Aarhus	
Convention	on	Access	 to	Information,	Public	Participation	 in	
Decision-making	and	Access	to	Justice	in	Environmental	Mat-
ters83	is	an	example	of	an	international	legal	instrument	based	
on	this	principle.	Many	international	human	rights	instruments	
also	provide	specifically	for	public	participation,	access	to	infor-
mation,	and	access	to	justice,	including	through	the	UN	Human	
Rights	Council	itself,	which	has	public	participation	procedures	
similar	 to	 those	of	 the	UNCSD.84	Provisions	to	ensure	public	
participation	 in	 the	 international	 treaty-making	processes	 are	
also	reflected	in	UNCBD	at	Article	13	on	public	education	and	
awareness,	and	Article	14.1(a)	on	participation	in	impact	assess-
ment.85	The	Cartagena	Protocol	on	Biosafety	contains	similar	
provisions	at	Article	23	on	public	awareness	and	participation;86	
and	the	UNCCD	reaffirms	the	principle	in	Article	3(a),	and	in	
Article	10.2(f),	which	recommends	public	participation	in	the	
development	of	national	 action	plans.87	The	North	American	
Agreement	on	Environmental	Cooperation,	which	runs	parallel	
to	NAFTA,	allows	citizens	to	make	claims	under	Article	14	and	
15	processes	 to	prompt	 the	 investigation	of	non-enforcement	
of	environmental	 laws.88	Furthermore,	 the	FAO	Seed	Treaty,	
at	Article	9.2(c),	has	specific	provisions	to	recognize	farmers’	
rights	to	participate	in	decision-making	concerning	the	sustain-
able	use	of	plant	genetic	resources.89
The	sixth	is	a	principle	of	good	governance.	According	to	
the	New	Delhi	Declaration,	 this	principle	commits	States	and	
international	organizations	 inter alia	 to	adopt	democratic	and	
transparent	decision-making	procedures	and	financial	account-
ability;	 to	 take	effective	measures	 to	combat	official	or	other	
corruption;	to	respect	the	principle	of	due	process	in	their	pro-
cedures;	and	to	observe	the	rule	of	law	and	human	rights.	The	
Declaration	also	notes	 that	non-state	actors	should	be	subject	
to	internal	democratic	governance	and	to	effective	accountabil-
ity,	and	encourages	corporate	social	responsibility	and	socially	
responsible	investment	among	private	actors.	Good	governance	
is	specifically	noted	as	a	priority	in	the	Johannesburg	Plan	of	
Implementation,	and	the	Commission	on	Human	Rights	Resolu-
tion	2001/72	on	the	Role	of	Good	Governance	in	 the	Promo-
tion	of	Human	Rights	has	also	underlined	the	importance	of	this	
principle.90	While	an	international	organization	or	government	
that	did	not	meet	any	of	the	‘good	governance’	criteria	described	
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above	would	certainly	be	subject	to	critique,	international	trea-
ties	 are	 only	 just	 beginning	 to	 incorporate	 such	 obligations.	
The	main	treaty	in	this	area	is	the	UN	Convention	against	Cor-
ruption,91	which	 is	founded	on	international	support	 for	good	
governance.	This	Convention	 notes	 in	 its	 Preamble	 that	 cor-
ruption	threatens	the	political	stability	and	sustainable	develop-
ment	of	States,	and	at	Article	5.1	obliges	all	State	Parties	 to,	
in	accordance	with	the	fundamental	principles	of	its	legal	sys-
tem,	develop	and	implement	or	maintain	effective,	coordinated	
anti-corruption	policies	that	promote	the	participation	of	society	
and	reflect	the	principles	of	the	rule	
of	 law,	 proper	management	 of	
public	 affairs	 and	public	 prop-
erty,	integrity,	transparency,	and	
accountability.92	 Further,	 Arti-
cle	62.1	commits	that	in	regard	
to	 economic	 development	 and	
technical	assistance,	States	will	
take	measures	to	implement	the	
Convention	in	their	international	
cooperation,	taking	into	account	
“the	negative	effects	of	corrup-
tion	 on	 society	 in	 general,	 in	
particular	on	sustainable	devel-
opment.”93	 A	 commitment	 to	
good	governance	is	also	promi-
nent	in	UNCCD	at	Article	3(c)	
which	lays	out	the	principles	of	
the	 treaty,	 and	 Article	 10.2(e)	
on	 establishing	 institutional	
frameworks	 for	national	action	
plans,	as	well	as	in	Article	11	on	
sub-regional	and	regional	action	
plans,	 and	Article	 12	 on	 inter-
national	cooperation.94	
The	 seventh	 is	 a	 principle	
of	integration	and	interrelation-
ship,	 in	 particular	 in	 relation	 to	
human	rights	and	social,	economic,	and	environmental	objec-
tives.	Principle	4	of	the	Rio	Declaration	states	that,	“[i]n	order	
to	achieve	sustainable	development,	environmental	protection	
shall	constitute	an	integral	part	of	the	development	process	and	
cannot	be	considered	in	isolation	from	it.”95	If	a	customary	inter-
national	rule	named	“sustainable	development”	were	to	emerge,	
this	principle	is	the	most	likely	candidate.	However,	as	the	New	
Delhi	Declaration	itself	recommends,	such	a	norm	could	just	as	
easily	be	characterized	as	the	“integration	principle.”96	One	cor-
ollary	of	this	principle	that	is	recognized	in	the	Preambles	of	both	
the	UNFCCC	and	 the	UNCBD,	 involves	 the	 recognition	 that	
“[s]tates	should	enact	effective	environmental	legislation,	that	
environmental	standards,	management	objectives	and	priorities	
should	reflect	the	environmental	and	developmental	context	to	
which	they	apply,	and	that	standards	applied	by	some	countries	
may	be	inappropriate	and	of	unwarranted	economic	and	social	
cost	to	other	countries,	in	particular	developing	countries.”	This	
recognition,	 like	 the	 right	 to	 promote	 sustainable	 economic	
development	 that	 is	enshrined	as	a	principle	of	 the	UNFCCC 
is	important	to	understand	the	implications	of	integrating	envi-
ronmental	protection	with	social	and	economic	development—
while	there	is	a	commitment	to	take	priorities	into	account	in	
decision-making,	and	seek	mutually	supportive,	balanced	solu-
tions,	this	principle	is	not	a	trump	card	for	the	environment.	It	
is	 a	 commitment	 to	compromise	 in	good	 faith.	The	principle	
is	 core	 to	 international	 treaties	 on	 sustainable	 development.	
It	is	reflected	in	the	Preamble	of	the	UNCBD	and	at	Article	6	
on	 integrating	 conservation	 and	
use	 objectives	 in	 policies	 and	
plans;97	 and	 in	 the	 Cartagena	
Protocol	on	Biosafety	at	the	Pre-
amble	where	trade	and	environ-
ment	regimes	are	referred	to	as	
mutually	 supportive,	 and	 set	
in	 practice	 by	Articles	 2.4	 and	
2.5	 on	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	
Protocol	 to	 other	 international	
instruments.	The	principle	also	
governs	 the FAO	Seed	Treaty,	
in	 the	 Preamble	 of	which	 Par-
ties	 note	 the	 need	 for	 syner-
gies	 between	 environment	 and	
development	objectives,	and	 in	
Article	5.1	they	commit	to	pro-
mote	an	 integrated	approach	 to	
the	use	of	plant	genetic	resour-
ces	 for	 food	 and	 agriculture.98	
Arguably,	 the	GATT	at	Article	
XX	 provides	 exceptions	 for	
health,	 environment,	 and	 the	
conservation	of	 natural	 resour-
ces	 in	 order	 to	 take	 social	 and	
environmental	 objectives	 into	
account,99	 as	does	 the	NAFTA	
through	 Articles	 103,	 104	 and	
104.1,	which	 govern	 the	 relationships	with	 other	 accords,	 as	
well	as	Article	1114	on	not	lowering	environmental	standards	
to	attract	 investment,	and	Article	2101	on	general	exceptions	
also	seeks	to	take	environmental	protection	into	account	in	the	
development	process	related	to	trade.100
In	 sum,	 through	 the	 negotiation	 and	 implementation	 of	
international	treaties	on	sustainable	development,	States	seek	to	
address	specific	sustainability	challenges	related	to	economic,	
environmental,	and	also	social	aspects	of	development.	Sustain-
able	development	objectives	are	recognized	by	states	not	 just	
in	multilateral	 environmental	 agreements,	but	 also	 in	 treaties	
governing	sustainable	management	of	certain	resources,	such	as	
food	and	agriculture,	and	in	trade	and	investment	agreements.	
The	collections	of	principles	identified	by	the	Legal	Annex	to	
the	WCED	Report,	the	UNCSD,	and	the	ILA,	among	others,	are	
not	exhaustive.	In	the	most	part	these	principles	are	not	yet	rec-
ognized	as	binding	rules	of	customary	international	law.	And	in	
It seems probable that 
the future of sustainable 
development law will be 
advanced and enhanced 
over the coming decades 
through the interaction 
of international treaty 
regimes with domestic 
regulatory regimes, 
as well as through a 
dialogue of international 
courts and tribunals.
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some	cases,	they	may	never	be.	Though	States	can	and	do	refer	
to	broad	objectives	and	principles	of	sustainable	development	
in	 these	 treaties,	 such	 general	 commitments	 are	 increasingly	
being	operationalized	in	the	more	detailed	provisions	of	certain	
accords,	including	through	the	recommendation	of	specific	legal	
and	policy	measures	to	ensure	that	a	particular	globally	import-
ant	 resources	 can	 last	over	 the	 long	 term.	Further,	States	 are	
starting	to	apply	functional	principles,	which,	in	the	context	of	
each	specific	treaty	regime,	take	on	particular	meanings	to	guide	
the	cooperation	of	the	Parties	in	the	advancement	of	sustainable	
development.
proGress In InTernaTIonal TrIbunals
Since	 the	1992	Rio	Earth	Summit,	as	noted	above,	 inter-
national	tribunals	and	courts	have	also	begun	to	pronounce	on	
sustainable	development,	mainly	 in	order	 to	 resolve	disputes	
that	require	a	balance	between	environmental	and	development	
concerns	in	a	transboundary	context.	In	decisions	of	the	Inter-
national	Court	of	 Justice	 (“ICJ”),	 important	 references	 to	 the	
need	to	manage	resources	in	a	sustainable	manner,	and	to	bal-
ance	between	environment	and	development	interests,	are	found	
in	the	Gabcikovo-Nagymaros	Case,101	the	Nuclear Tests	Advi-
sory	Opinion	(especially	Judge	Weeramantry’s	Dissent),102	the	
Kasikili / Sedudu	Case	(especially	Judge	Weeramantry’s	Dis-
sent),103	and	the	Order	of	Provisional	Measures	in	the	Pulp Mills 
on the River Uruguay	Case,104	as	well	as	in	the	recent	findings	of	
the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	in	the	Tribunal	Award	of	the	
Iron Rhine Arbitration.105	Such	decisions	appear	to	be	slowly	
taking	into	account	some	of	the	principles	mentioned	above,	as	
an	aid	 to	 judicial	reasoning.	Certain	selected	examples	below	
focus	mainly	on	recent	international	courts	and	tribunals’	con-
sideration	of	the	“integration	principle”	mentioned	above,	which	
may	occasionally	be	characterized,	in	less	than	elucidatory	legal	
shorthand,	as	a	“sustainable	development	principle.”	
It	is	possible	that	international	courts	and	tribunals,	in	the	
years	 since	 the	 1992	Rio	Earth	 Summit,	 are	 becoming	more	
willing	to	go	beyond	a	simple	“balance”	of	environmental	and	
economic	concerns,	towards	actual	integration	of	environmen-
tal,	economic,	and	social	considerations	in	development.	A	key	
example	of	the	way	the	dilemma	of	balancing	environment	and	
development	 is	 found	 in	 the	 often-quoted	 early	Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros	Case,106	where	pursuant	to	a	treaty,	one	Party	sought	
to	build	a	dam	on	a	transboundary	river	over	the	objections	of	
the	other.	The	majority	stated	that:	
Throughout	the	ages,	mankind	has,	for	economic	and	
other	reasons,	constantly	interfered	with	nature.	In	the	
past,	this	was	often	done	without	consideration	of	the	
effects	 upon	 the	 environment.	Owing	 to	 new	 scien-
tific	insights	and	to	a	growing	awareness	of	the	risks	
for	mankind—for	present	and	future	generations—of	
pursuit	of	 such	 interventions	at	an	unconsidered	and	
unabated	 pace,	 new	norms	 and	 standards	 have	 been	
developed,	set	forth	in	a	great	number	of	instruments	
during	the	last	two	decades.	Such	new	norms	have	to	
be	 taken	 into	 consideration,	 and	 such	new	standards	
given	proper	weight,	not	only	when	States	contemplate	
new	activities	 but	 also	when	 continuing	with	 activi-
ties	begun	in	the	past.	This need to reconcile economic 
development with protection of the environment is aptly 
expressed in the concept of sustainable development.	
For	the	purposes	of	the	present	case,	this	means	that	the	
Parties	together	should	look	afresh	at	the	effects	on	the	
environment	of	the	operation	of	the	Gabcíkovo	power	
plant.	In	particular	they	must	find	a	satisfactory	solu-
tion	for	the	volume	of	water	to	be	released	into	the	old	
bed	of	the	Danube	and	into	the	side-arms	on	both	sides	
of	the	river.107	
Due	 to	 the	 specific	 facts	 of	 this	 case,	 it	 appears	 at	 first	
glance	that	only	procedural	requirements	were	imposed	on	the	
Parties	 in	 connection	with	 a	 “concept”	 of	 sustainable	 devel-
opment.	However	 the	Court	did,	essentially,	order	 the	Parties	
to	 balance	 environmental	 protection	with	 their	 development	
interests	by	ordering	them	to	“look	afresh	at	the	effects	on	the	
environment	.	.	.”	and	“find	a	satisfactory	solution.”	The	major-
ity	described	 this	as	a	 ‘need’	 to	 reconcile	economic	develop-
ment	with	the	protection	of	the	environment.	H.E.	Judge	C.G.	
Weeramantry,	as	Vice-President	of	the	ICJ,	further	argued	that	
sustainable	development	is	a	principle	of	international	law	in	his	
Separate	Opinion	in	the	Gabcikovo-Nagymaros	Case.	In	particu-
lar,	he	stated	that	he	considers	sustainable	development	 to	be	
“more	than	a	mere	concept,	but	as	a	principle	with	normative	
value	which	is	crucial	to	the	determination	of	this	case.”108	
If	there	were,	indeed,	a	normative	function	for	such	a	prin-
ciple,	it	might	involve	the	requirement	to	integrate	environment	
and	development	considerations.	More	recently,	the	2005	Iron 
Rhine (Belgium	v.	Netherlands)	Award109	of	the	Arbitral	Tribu-
nal	struck	under	the	auspices	of	the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbi-
tration	addressed	the	issue	of	balance	between	environment	and	
development	considerations.	The	case	concerned	a	Party	seeking	
to	reactivate	a	railway	across	the	territory	of	another	pursuant	to	
a	venerable	treaty,	where	it	was	unclear	which	State	should	bear	
the	burden	of	environmental	impact	assessment	and	mitigation	
measures.	In	its	decision,	the	Tribunal	first	recognized	that:	
There	is	considerable	debate	as	to	what,	within	the	field	
of	environmental	law,	constitutes	‘rules’	or	‘principles’;	
what	is	‘soft	law’;	and	which	environmental	treaty	law	
or	principles	have	contributed	 to	 the	development	of	
customary	international	law.	Without	entering	further	
into	those	controversies,	the	Tribunal	notes	that	in	all	
of	these	categories	‘environment’	is	broadly	referred	to	
as	 including	air,	water,	 land,	flora	and	fauna,	natural	
ecosystems	and	sites,	human	health	and	safety,	and	cli-
mate.	The	emerging	principles,	whatever	their	current	
status,	make	reference	 to	conservation,	management,	
notions	of	prevention	and	of	sustainable	development,	
and	protection	for	future	generations.
The	Tribunal	then	explained:
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Since	the	Stockholm	Conference	on	the	Environment	
in	1972	there	has	been	a	marked	development	of	inter-
national	law	relating	to	the	protection	of	the	environ-
ment.	Today,	both	international	and	EC	law	require	the 
integration of appropriate environmental measures in 
the design and implementation of economic develop-
ment activities.	Principle	4	of	the	Rio	Declaration	on	
Environment	and	Development,	adopted	in	1992	which	
reflects	this	trend,	provides	that	‘environmental	protec-
tion	shall	constitute	an	integral	part	of	the	development	
process	and	cannot	be	considered	in	isolation	from	it.’	
Importantly,	 these	emerging	principles	now	integrate	
environmental	 protection	 into	 the	 development	 pro-
cess.	Environmental	law	and	the	law	on	development	
stand	not	as	alternatives	but	as	mutually	reinforcing,	
integral	concepts,	which	require that where develop-
ment may cause significant harm to the environment 
there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such 
harm	.	.	.	.	This	duty,	in	the	opinion	of	the	Tribunal,	has	
now	become	a	principle	of	general	international	law.	
This	principle	applies	not	only	in	autonomous	activities	
but	also	in	activities	undertaken	in	implementation	of	
specific	treaties	between	the	Parties.110	
The	 Tribunal	 recalled	 the	 observation	 of	 the	 ICJ	 in	 the	
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case	 that	 “[t]his	 need	 to	 reconcile	
economic	development	with	protection	of	 the	environment	 is	
aptly	expressed	in	the	concept	of	sustainable	development”111
and	 cited	 with	 approval	 the	 ICJ’s	 recognition	 that	 “new	
norms	have	to	be	taken	into	consideration,	and	.	 .	 .	new	stan-
dards	given	proper	weight,	not	only	when	States	contemplate	
new	activities	but	also	when	continuing	with	activities	begun	in	
the	past	.	.	.	.”112	It	held	that	“this	dictum	applies	equally	to	the	
Iron	Rhine	railway.”113	
This	determination	was	directly	relevant	for	the	decision	in	
this	case:
As	the	Tribunal	has	already	observed	above	.	.	.	eco-
nomic	development	is	to	be	reconciled	with	the	protec-
tion	of	the	environment,	and,	in	so	doing,	new	norms	
have	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration,	 including	when	
activities	 begun	 in	 the	 past	 are	 now	 expanded	 and	
upgraded.
.	.	.
Applying	the	principles	of	 international	environmen-
tal	law,	the	Tribunal	.	.	.	is	of	the	view	that,	by	anal-
ogy,	where	a	state	exercises	a	right	under	international	
law	within	the	territory	of	another	state,	considerations	
of	environmental	protection	also	apply.	The	exercise	
of	Belgium’s	right	of	 transit,	as	 it	has	formulated	 its	
request,	 thus	may	well	 necessitate	measures	 by	 the	
Netherlands	to	protect	the	environment	to	which	Bel-
gium	will	have	to	contribute	as	an	integral	element	of	
its	request.	The reactivation of the Iron Rhine railway 
cannot be viewed in isolation from the environmental 
protection measures necessitated by the intended use 
of the railway line. These measures are to be fully inte-
grated into the project and its costs.114	
In	 the	 Iron Rhine	 award,	 the	 Tribunal	 found	 that	where	
development	may	 cause	 significant	 harm	 to	 the	 environment	
there	is	a	duty	to	prevent,	or	at	least	mitigate,	such	harm,	and	
stated	that	this	is	now	an	accepted	principle	of	international	law.	
But	the	Tribunal	also	mentions	various	other	potential	principles	
of	law	such	as	“sustainable	development,”	and	makes	a	further	
finding	that	environmental	measures	must	be	“fully	integrated	
into	 the	project	 and	 its	 costs,”	 linking	 this	 to	 the	exhortation	
found	in	Principle	4	of	the	Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	and	
Development	which	provides	that	“in	order	to	achieve	sustain-
able	development,	environmental	protection	shall	constitute	an	
integral	part	of	the	development	process	and	cannot	be	consid-
ered	in	isolation	from	it.”	One	interpretation	is	that	the	Arbitral	
Panel	was	 applying	an	 “integration	principle”	 in	 conjunction	
with	the	directly	recognized	“no	environmental	harm”	principle,	
in	order	to	find	that	the	costs	of	impact	assessments	and	miti-
gation	measures	should	be	borne	by	the	Party	carrying	out	the	
development	(as	an	integral	part	of	the	reactivation	of	the	Iron	
Rhine	Railway),	rather	than	by	the	Party	through	whose	territory	
the	railway	would	pass.	In	the	future,	this	recognition	might	be	
extended	by	States	to	include	situations	where	the	“development	
process”	consists	of	undertaking	new	trade	and	investment	dis-
ciplines,	or	initiating	development	projects	that	will	significantly	
affect	 the	global	commons.	Were	such	a	principle	eventually	
recognized,	it	would	likely	still	have	real	limits—“constituting	
an	integral	part”	is	not	the	same	as	“becoming	a	trump	card.”	
Indeed,	such	a	principle	might	also	press	States	to,	a l’envers,115	
ensure	 that	 environmental	 protection	 activities	 (such	 as	 the	
development	of	new	environmental	laws)	not	be	undertaken	“in	
isolation”	without	ensuring	that	social	and	economic	develop-
ment	priorities	and	norms	are	taken	into	account.	
A	 recent	 decision	 in	 the	 ICJ	 does	 suggest	 such	 an	 outer	
boundary	 to	 such	a	norm.	Positive	 claims	based	on	a	States’	
“sovereign	right	 to	 implement	sustainable	economic	develop-
ment	projects”	were	used	by	States	in	the	2006	Pulp Mills on 
the River Uruguay Case.	 In	 its	findings	of	Provisional	Meas-
ures	of	July	2006,	the	ICJ	notes	that	Uruguay	“maintained	that	
the	provisional	measures	sought	by	Argentina	would	therefore	
irreparably	prejudice	Uruguay’s	sovereign	right	 to	 implement	
sustainable	economic	development	projects	in	its	own	territory.”	
As	Alan	Boyle,	Counsel	for	Uruguay	before	the	ICJ	in	the	pub-
lic	sitting	for	provisional	measures	in	the	aforementioned	Pulp 
Mills	on the River Uruguay	Case,	argued:
This	is	not	a	dispute	in	which	the	Court	has	to	choose	
between	 one	 party	 seeking	 to	 preserve	 an	 unspoiled	
environment	 and	 another	 party	 recklessly	 pursu-
ing	unsustainable	development,	without	regard	to	the	
environment,	or	to	the	rights	and	interests	of	neighbor-
ing	States.	It	 is	a	case	about	balancing	the	legitimate	
interests	 of	 both	 parties.	 It	 is	 a	 case	 in	which	Uru-
guay	 has	 sought—without	 much	 co-operation	 from	
its	neighbor—	to	pursue	sustainable	economic	devel-
opment	 while	 doing	 everything	 possible	 to	 protect	
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the	environment	of	the	river	for	the	benefit	of	present	
and	future	generations	of	Uruguayans	and	Argentines	
alike.116
It	is	possible	that	a	concern	for	such	a	right	of	a	State	was	
a	principal	element	in	the	ICJ’s	reasoning	in	its	first	Order	with	
regards	to	Provisional	Measures	in	the	Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay	case,117	where	it	found:
.	 .	 .	 the	present	case	highlights	the	importance	of	the	
need	 to	 ensure	 environmental	 protection	 of	 shared	
natural	resources	while	allowing	for	sustainable	eco-
nomic	development;	.	.	.	it	is	in	particular	necessary	to	
bear	in	mind	the	reliance	of	the	Parties	on	the	quality	
of	the	water	of	the	River	Uruguay	for	their	livelihood	
and	economic	development;	.	.	.	from	this	point	of	view	
account	must	 be	 taken	 of	 the	 need	 to	 safeguard	 the	 	
continued	conservation	of	 the	 river	environment	and	
the	 rights	 of	 economic	 development	 of	 the	 riparian	
States;	.	.	.118
Should	an	“integration”	or	“sustainable	development”	prin-
ciple	be	recognized	in	international	law,	it	seems	that	the	norm	
would	not	 forbid	sustainable	economic	development	as	 such.	
Rather,	it	would	require	States	not to prevent or frustrate each 
other from promoting sustainable development,	 and	 further,	
“where	development	may	cause	significant	harm	to	the	environ-
ment”	or	to	social	development,	it	would	require	States	to	take	
steps	 to	address	“a	duty	 to	prevent,	or	at	 least	mitigate”	such	
harm	by	ensuring	that	environmental	(and	social)	measures	are	
“fully	integrated	into	the	project	and	its	costs.”	Bounded	on	one	
side	by	the	Iron Rhine Railway	award,	and	on	the	other	by	the	
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay	order,	such	an	“integration”	
principle	might	become	recognised	as	an	emerging	principle	of	
customary	law,	and	could	be	useful	to	guide	States	in	resolving	
differences	that	require	a	balance	between	environmental,	eco-
nomic,	and	social	development	priorities.
Another	 international	 tribunal	 has	 also	 had	 occasion	 to	
examine,	between	the	Rio	and	Johannesburg	Summits,	the	need	
to	balance	between	environmental	protection	and	international	
economic	development	priorities,	taking	a	different	approach.119	
The	Retrospective Analysis of the 1994 Canadian Environ-
mental Review of the WTO,	carried	out	by	Canada’s	Department	
of	Foreign	Affairs	and	International	Trade	(“DFAIT”)	after	five	
years	of	GATT	implementation,	focused	on	GATT	Article	XX	
as	an	important	safeguard	for	a	State’s	ability	to	secure	sustain-
able	 development.120	 In	 1998,	 in	 the	United States—Shrimp 
Case,	 the	WTO	dispute	settlement	mechanism	considered	the	
meaning	of	these	exceptions,	in	light	of	the	WTO	Agreement’s	
Preambular	 commitment	 to	 sustainable	 development.	By	 the	
time	the	dispute	was	resolved,	four	Panel	and	Appellate	Body	
Reports	had	evaluated	the	same	measures,	providing	the	clear-
est	expression,	 to	date,	of	 the	meaning	of	State	commitments	
to	 sustainable	 development	 in	 the	 WTO	 Agreements.	 The	
United States – Shrimp Dispute concerned	a	regulation	under	
the	1973	U.S.	Endangered	Species	Act	to	protect	five	different	
species	of	endangered	sea	turtles.	A	U.S.	law	requires	that	U.S.	
shrimp	 trawlers	use	“turtle	excluder	devices”	 in	 their	nets.	A	
different	law	then	prohibits	shrimp	imports	from	States	that	har-
vest	shrimp	in	areas	where	these	endangered	turtles	are	found,	
unless	the	States	in	question	are	certified	users	of	the	technolo-
gies	that	protect	the	sea	turtles.	India,	Malaysia,	Pakistan,	and	
Thailand,	as	shrimp	exporters,	complained	that	the	prohibition	
was	inconsistent	with	U.S.	GATT	obligations.	The	complainants	
argued	that	the	embargo	on	shrimp	violated	the	most-favoured	
nation	rule	of	Article	I:1	of	the	GATT	1994	because	products	
from	different	countries	were	 treated	differently	based	solely	
on	the	method	of	harvest	(i.e.	whether	a	turtle	excluder	device	
had	been	used).121	The	complainants	also	argued	a	violation	of	
Article	XI:1	of	the	GATT	1994	because	contrary	to	their	obliga-
tions	to	generally	eliminate	quantitative	restrictions	on	imports	
and	 exports,	 the	United	States	 had	 implemented	 an	 embargo	
which	restricted	trade.	The	complainants	also	alleged	a	viola-
tion	of	Article	XIII:1	of	GATT	1994	because	the	United	States	
restricted	the	importation	of	shrimp	and	shrimp	products	from	
countries	which	had	not	been	certified,	while	“like	products”	
from	other	countries	which	in	turn	meant	a	differential	treatment	
of	“like	products.”	(This	would	imply	that	the	United	States	was	
discriminating	between	like	products	on	the	basis	of	how	they	
are	made,	their	production	processes,	and	methods	(“PPMs”),	
rather	 than	 due	 to	 distinct	 physical	 characteristics	 and	 other	
permissible	grounds).	The	Panel	 found	 that	 the	United	States	
had	violated	Article	XI:1	of	 the	GATT	1994.122	 It	 then	exer-
cised	judicial	restraint,	and	did	not	express	itself	on	the	possible	
violation	of	Article	I	or	XIII:1	of	the	GATT	1994	because	one	
violation	had	been	found.	From	that	point	onward,	most	of	the	
Panel’s	 analysis	 centered	on	 interpretations	of	 the	 scope	 and	
nature	of	Article	XX	of	the	GATT	1994,	on	general	exceptions.	
Article	XX	(g)	GATT	1994,	which	provides	for	a	general	excep-
tion	to	GATT	obligations:	
Subject	to	the	requirement	that	such	measures	are	not	
applied	in	a	manner	which	would	constitute	a	means	of	
arbitrary	or	unjustifiable	discrimination	between	coun-
tries	where	the	same	conditions	prevail,	or	a	disguised	
restriction	on	international	trade,	nothing	in	this	Agree-
ment	 shall	 be	 construed	 to	 prevent	 the	 adoption	 or	
enforcement	by	any	contracting	party	of	measures:	.	.	.
(g)	relating	to	the	conservation	of	exhaustible	natural	
resources	if	such	measures	are	made	effective	in	con-
junction	with	 restrictions	 on	domestic	 production	or	
consumption	.	.	.123
In	the	case,	the	US	proposed	that	Art.	XX	GATT	should	be	
interpreted	in	the	light	of	the	Preamble	of	the	WTO	Agreement;	
“[a]n	environmental	purpose	is	fundamental	to	the	application	
of	Article	XX,	and	such	a	purpose	cannot	be	ignored,	especially	
since	the	preamble	to	the	WTO	Agreement	acknowledges	that	
the	rules	of	trade	should	be	in	accordance	with	the	objective	of	
sustainable	development,	and	should	seek	 to	protect	and	pre-
serve	the	environment.124	(In	its	arguments,	 the	United	States	
omitted	 the	 reference	 to	 the	world’s	 resources	 and	 the	 state-
ment	concerning	the	“respective	needs	and	concerns	at	differ-
ent	levels	of	economic	development”).	The	United	States,	at	the	
Panel	stage	of	the	dispute,	specifically	argued	that	sustainable	
17 SuStainable Development law & policy
development	is	a	principle	of	international	law,	in	particular	of	
WTO	law:
The	United	States	noted	 that	 the	World	Trade	Orga-
nization	Agreement,	which	was	 the	first	multilateral	
trade	agreement	concluded	after	the	UN	Conference	on	
Environment	and	Development,	provided	that	the	rules	
of	trade	must	not	only	promote	expansion	of	trade	and	
production,	but	must	do	so	in	a	manner	 that	respects	
the	principle of sustainable development	and	protects	
and	 preserves	 the	 environment.	 Yet,	 the	 complain-
ants	claimed	that	in	becoming	a	Member	of	the	World	
Trade	Organization,	 the	United	States	had	agreed	 to	
accept	imports	of	shrimp	whose	harvest	and	sale	in	the	
US	market	might	mean	the	extinction	from	the	world	of	
sea	turtles	for	all	time.”125
The	 interpretation	 that	 the	 Panel	 and	 Appellate	 Body	
adopted	was	a	change	from	the	findings	of	a	much	earlier	GATT	
Panel	in	the	Tuna – Dolphin Case I.126	In	that	earlier	un-adopted	
GATT	report,127	the	Panel	had	found	that	references	to	domes-
tic	production	and	consumption	meant	that	a	GATT	Contracting	
Party	could	only	adopt	restrictions	within	their	own	jurisdiction,	
rather	 than	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 resources	 in	 other	 countries	
and	suggested	that	furthermore,	such	a	measure	could	only	be	
adopted	for	the	resource	in	question	(in	that	case	tuna),	not	for	
other	species	(such	as	dolphins).	In	the	United States—Shrimp 
Case,	the	Panel	found	that	the	new	preambular	language	of	the	
WTO	Agreement	could	have	an	influence	on	the	interpretation	
of	Article	XX	GATT.	The	Panel	further	clarified	that,	thus	“the	
Preamble	 endorses	 the	 fact	 that	 environmental	 policies	must	
be	designed	taking	into	account	the	situation	of	each	Member,	
both	in	terms	of	its	actual	needs	and	in	terms	of	its	economic	
means.”128	In	its	reasoning,	the	Panel	highlighted	a	quote	from	
the	1992	Rio	Declaration,	recognizing	that	all	countries	could	
design	 their	 own	environmental	 policy	 and	 that	 international	
cooperation	rather	than	unilateral	measures	are	needed	for	sus-
tainable	development.129	
The	WTO	Appellate	 Body	 further	 clarified	 the	 findings	
of	the	Panel.	It	found	in	favor	(contrary	to	the	Tuna – Dolphin	
cases)	of	the	United	States	that	Article	XX	(g)	could	be	applied	
to	protect	turtles.	However	it	did	not	completely	follow	the	US	
argument	regarding	a	principle	of	international	law:	
The	 words	 of	 Article	 XX(g),	 ‘exhaustible	 natural	
resources,’	were	actually	crafted	more	 than	50	years	
ago.	They	must	be	read	by	a	 treaty	 interpreter	 in	 the	
light	of	contemporary	concerns	of	 the	community	of	
nations	 about	 the	protection	and	conservation	of	 the	
environment.	 While	 Article	 XX	 was	 not	 modified	
in	 the	Uruguay	Round,	 the	preamble	attached	 to	 the	 	
WTO	Agreement	 shows	 that	 the	 signatories	 to	 that	
Agreement	were,	 in	1994,	 fully	aware	of	 the	 impor-
tance	and	legitimacy	of	environmental	protection	as	a	
goal	of	national	and	international	policy.	The	pream-
ble	of	the	WTO	Agreement—which	informs	not	only		
the	 GATT	 1994,	 but	 also	 the	 other	 covered	 agree-
ments—	explicitly	acknowledges	‘the	objective	of	sus-
tainable	development.’130
The	enclosed	legal	note,131	as	part	of	the	Appellate	Body’s	
decision,	 deserves	 particular	 attention.	 The	 Appellate	 Body	
refers	 to	 the	 objective	 of	 sustainable	 development	 and	 then	
provides	in	the	footnote	a	simple	definition	for	the	concept.	In	
particular,	 the	Appellate	Body	 explained	 that	 “[t]his	concept	
has	been	generally	accepted	as	integrating	economic	and	social	
development	and	environmental	protection.”132	This	is	remark-
able	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	WTO	Appellate	Body	expresses	
itself	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 sustainable	 development,	 agreeing	
that	 it	 is	 considered	 to	be	an	objective	of	 the	WTO.	Second,	
the	WTO	recognises	(in	line	with	the	findings	of	the	1997	UN	
General	Assembly	Special	Session,	the	Earth	Summit	+5)	the	
need	to	integrate	all	 three	elements	or	“pillars”	of	sustainable	
development—social	development,	economic	development	and	
environmental	protection.	This	highlights	the	important	social	
dimension	of	 the	concept,	as	was	 later	also	recognised	 in	 the	
2002	WSSD.
In	cases	before	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	States	
have	similarly	been	allowed	a	wide	margin	of	appreciation	to	
pursue	economic	objectives	provided	they	regulate	environmen-
tal	nuisances	and	enforce	their	own	law,133	and	otherwise	main-
tain	a	fair	balance	between	the	benefits	for	 the	community	as	
a	whole	and	the	protection	of	the	individual’s	right	to	private	
and	family	life	or	protection	of	possessions	and	property.134	In	
the	latter	context	economic	development	may	be	seen	as	unsus-
tainable	 if	 it	 fails	adequately	 to	respect	human	rights,	but	 the	
case	will	have	to	be	a	fairly	extreme	one.	Similar	considerations	
have	been	made	by	the	Inter-American	Commission	and	Court	
of	Human	Rights,135	 the	African	Commission	on	Human	and	
Peoples	Rights,136	and	the	UN	Human	Rights	Committee.137
conclusIons
This	 article	 highlights	 how	 the	 objective	 of	 sustainable	
development,	and	its	principles,	have	been	enhanced	and	fur-
thered	by	 international	 forums.	As	 a	general	 principle,	 inter-
national	forums	have	contributed	to	the	growth	and	expansion	
of	sustainable	development	by	providing	a	space	within	which	
State	and	non-state	actors	may	come	together	for	a	collective	
discussion	 of	 their	 sustainability-related	 challenges.	 Both	 in	
terms	of	“soft	 law”	(in	this	area,	a	process	of	global	summits	
and	declarations),	and	“hard	law”	(in	this	field,	mainly	treaties),	
the	global	objective	of	sustainable	development	is	advanced	by	
international	forums.	This	article	has	focused	on	three	ways	that	
this	advancement	takes	place.	First,	it	has	shown	that	through	
international	“soft	law”	policy	making	processes	on	sustainable	
development,	States	are	defining	and	refining	a	deeper	under-
standing	 of	what	 sustainable	 development	means	 in	 specific	
instances,	identifying	the	most	important	priorities	for	sustain-
able	development,	and	seeking	certain	elements	of	consensus	
on	how	these	priorities	can	and	should	be	addressed	at	differ-
ent	levels	through	policy	and	even	law.	The	Agenda	21	and	the	
JPOI,	in	particular,	demonstrate	this	process	of	evolving	defin-
itions,	priority	setting,	and	action	plans,	supported	by	informal	
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partnerships.	Second,	it	argues	that	through	the	negotiation	and	
implementation	of	international	treaties	on	sustainable	develop-
ment,	States	and	others	are	using	 international	venues	 to	find	
cooperative	 solutions	 for	 specific	 sustainability	 challenges	
related	to	economic,	environmental,	and	also	social	aspects	of	
development.	This	includes,	where	appropriate,	the	adoption	in	
treaty	regimes	of	certain	operational	principles	such	as	a	duty	to	
ensure	sustainable	use	of	natural	resources,	precaution,	equity,	
openness	and	public	participation,	common	but	differentiated	
responsibility,	or	 integration.	And	 third,	 it	has	suggested	 that	
through	the	peaceful	settlement	of	disputes	related	to	sustain-
able	development,	States	are	gaining	valuable	guidance	 from	
international	courts	and	tribunals	on	how	it	is	possible	to	resolve	
certain	particular	transboundary	problems	that	invoke	a	need	to	
balance	environmental,	economic,	and	social	development	pri-
orities.	There	even	appears	to	be	certain	willingness	on	the	part	
of	international	courts	and	tribunals	to	refer	to	principles	such	as	
‘integration’	in	their	attempts	to	resolve	such	disputes.
International	 forums	 are	 not	 just	 useful	 to	 sustainable	
development	as	a	matter	of	history,	however.	International	treaty	
law	in	the	field	of	sustainable	development	is	a	vital,	and	indeed	
vibrant,	area	of	study	that	has	seen	a	dramatic	growth	through-
out	its	relatively	short	history.	Given	the	inevitable	differences	
involved	in	coordinating	social,	environmental	economic	devel-
opment	policy	between	194	countries	with	distinct	cultures,	pri-
orities,	and	challenges,	and	given	the	short	timelines	of	the	last	
three	decades,	a	great	deal	of	progress	is	actually	being	made	for	
sustainable	development	in	many	areas.	However,	this	space	is	
very	much	“still	developing,”	with	many	of	the	most	interesting	
and	difficult	details	still	to	be	worked	out.	
It	 seems	probable	 that	 the	 future	of	 sustainable	develop-
ment	law	will	be	advanced	and	enhanced	over	the	coming	dec-
ades	through	the	interaction	of	international	treaty	regimes	with	
domestic	regulatory	regimes,	as	well	as	through	a	dialogue	of	
international	 courts	 and	 tribunals.	 Indeed,	 the	 scope	of	 inter-
national	forums,	which	have	and	will	affect	sustainable	develop-
ment	 and	 its	 legal	 underpinnings,	 has	 expanded	 to	 include	
international	arbitral	bodies,	including	those	associated	primar-
ily	with	trade	such	as	the	WTO.	This	article	only	paints	a	brief,	
broad-brush	picture	of	 certain	 emerging	 trends.	Further	 legal	
scholarship	and	practice	is	needed	to	realize	the	promise	of	sus-
tainable	development	in	international	law.
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tionships,	laying	out	the	need	for	a	new	international	development	strategy	
which	could	establish	a	more	dynamic	and	stable	world	economy,	stimulate	
accelerating	economic	growth,	counter	the	worst	impacts	of	poverty,	and	pro-
mote	greater	equity.	
10	 	World	Charter	for	Nature,	G.A.	Res	37/7,	¶	8,	U.N.	Doc.	A/Res/37/7	(Oct.	
28,	1982),	available at	http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/424/85/IMG/NR042485.pdf?OpenElement.
11	 	Process	of	Preparation	of	the	Environmental	Perspective	to	the	Year	2000	
and	Beyond,	G.A.	Res.	38/161,	¶	2,	U.N.	Doc.	A/RES/38/161	(Dec.	19,	1983),	
available at	http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/445/53/
IMG/NR044553.pdf?OpenElement.
12	 	U.N.	World	Comm’n	on	Env’t	&	Dev.,	Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development: Our Common Future; Annex 1: Summary 
of Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development Adopted by the WCED Experts Group on Environmental Law,	
U.N.	Doc.	A/42/427	(Aug.	4,	1987),	available at	http://www.un-documents.net/
ocf-a1.htm	[hereinafter	Our Common Future].
13	 	Id.	at	54.	
14	 	alexanDre kiSS & Dinah Shelton, international environmental law 67 
(1994).
15	 	international union for conServation of nature anD natural reSourceS 
commiSSion on environmental law, agenDa 21: earth’S action plan	§38.1	
(Nicholas	A.	Robinson,	ed.	1993)	[hereinafter	agenDa 21], available at http://
www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_00.shtml.	
16	 	Id.	§§1.1-8.54	(addressing	international	co-operation	to	accelerate	sustain-
able	development	in	developing	countries,	poverty,	consumption	patterns,	
demographic	dynamics,	human	health,	human	settlements,	and	integrating	
environment	and	development	in	decision-making).	
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the importance of regulating tranSbounDary 
grounDwater aquiferS
by Emily Brophy*
If	 the	United	States	Supreme	Court	grants	certiorari	 in	a	
case	between	Mississippi	and	Tennessee,1	the	Court	will	have	its	
first	opportunity	to	determine	if	and	how	transboundary	aquifers	
should	be	regulated.	The	applications	of	this	case	are	far	from	
surface	level.	Regulated	groundwater	allocation	would	protect	
environmental	 and	 economic	
sustainability	by	restricting	over-
pumping,	thereby	tempering	the	
harmful	 effects	 of	 groundwa-
ter	 depletion,	 and	 protecting	
all	 parties	 to	 a	 transboundary	
aquifer	from	losing	a	freshwater	
source	due	to	another’s	careless	
usage.2	Over-pumping	of	 aqui-
fers	 results	 in	 significant	harm,	
including	 increased	 water	 pol-
lution,	 changes	 in	 stream	flow,	
and	increased	costs.3	If	ground-
water	continues	 to	be	managed	
at	the	state	level,4	then	the	lack	
of	standardized	data	and	regula-
tion	 across	multi-state	 aquifers	
may	 prolong	 the	 problem	 of	
over-pumping,	turning	our	nation’s	
groundwater	sources	into	a	tragedy	of	the	commons.5	
In	Hood v. City of Memphis,	Mississippi	 seeks	 damages	
from	the	City	of	Memphis	 for	 the	 theft	of	billions	of	gallons	
of	water	that	the	city	sold	to	the	public	through	the	city’s	water	
utility.6	By	pumping	water	from	a	transboundary	aquifer	over	
the	course	of	several	decades,	the	utility	has	effectively	changed	
the	aquifer’s	flow.7	As	a	result,	water	that	would	naturally	be	
located	below	Mississippi	now	flows	towards	Memphis	where	
it	accounts	for	about	one-third	of	all	water	supplied	through	the	
public	utility.8	
This	case	 illustrates	 the	detrimental	effects	 that	a	 lack	of	
regulation	 can	 have	 on	 groundwater	 sources.	 In	 the	 United	
States,	fresh	groundwater	use	is	rising	steadily,	increasing	five-
percent	between	1990	and	2000,	compared	to	no	change	in	total	
freshwater	use	and	only	a	one-percent	increase	in	fresh	surface-
water	use.9	In	a	city	such	as	Memphis	that	pumps	water	from	
a	transboundary	aquifer,	 the	absence	of	regulatory	groundwa-
ter	allocation	magnifies	the	detrimental	effects	of	the	increased	
pumping	 on	 all	 users	 of	 the	 aquifer.	Water	 experts	 already	
expect	groundwater	shortages	in	at	least	forty-one	states	in	the	
next	twenty	years	due	to	social	and	environmental	pressures.10	
Furthermore,	climate	change	threatens	to	increase	the	pressure	
on	 fresh	groundwater	 supplied	by	possibly	 affecting	drought	
cycles,	aquifer	recharge	and	discharge,	and	human	reliance	on	
groundwater	resources.11
The	 transboundary	 implications	 of	 unregulated	 ground-
water	 pumping	 extend	 beyond	
changes	 in	 aquifer	 flows	 as	
experienced	 between	 Missis-
sippi	 and	 Tennessee.	 Declin-
ing	 water	 levels	 may	 lead	 to	
the	diminished	water	quality	of	
the	aquifer,	affecting	the	water	
supply	of	all	who	draw	from	the	
system.12	Because	of	 the	 inter-
connectedness	of	the	hydrologic	
system,	a	decrease	in	groundwa-
ter	 levels	due	 to	over-pumping	
may	result	 in	a	drop	in	surface	
water	 levels,	 affecting	 rivers,	
lakes,	 wetlands,	 and	 similar	
features.13	These	and	additional	
consequences	 of	 over-pump-
ing	 illuminate	 the	 importance	
of	 implementing	 regulation	 over	
transboundary	aquifers.	
Endnotes:
1	 	See Hood v. City of Memphis,	533	F.	Supp.	2d	646	(N.D.	Miss.	2008),	aff’d,	
570	F.3d	625,	petition for cert. filed,	(U.S.	Sept.	2,	2009)	(No.	09-289).
2	 	See	A.	Dan	Tarlock,	Water Law Reform in West Virginia,	106	w. va. 
l. rev.,	495,	530	(2004)	(“The	best	guarantee	that	water	will	be	used	in	an	
environmentally	sustainable	manner	to	serve	the	full	range	of	uses	from	basic	
human	consumption	to	aquatic	ecosystem	conservation	is	an	effective	state	
water	law	regime.”).
3	 	See	J.r. bartolino & w.l. cunningham, uS geological Survey, grounD-
water Depletion acroSS the nation[hereinafter	Depletion],	available at	
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-103-03/JBartolinoFS(2.13.04).pdf.
4	 	See generally	fooD anD water watch, unmeaSureD Danger: america’S hiD-
Den grounDwater criSiS 5	(2009),	available at	http://www.foodandwaterwatch.
org/water/pubs/reports/unmeasured-danger-america2019s-hidden-groundwater-
crisis	(pointing	out	that	groundwater	is	managed	at	the	state	level,	not	at	the	
federal	level,	which	creates	discrepancies	over	data	collection	across	the	states,	
giving	an	incomplete	view	of	the	state	of	a	transboundary	aquifer	as	a	whole).
* Emily Brophy is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University 
Washington College of Law.
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not at all:  
environmental SuStainability in the Supreme court
by James R. May*
InTroducTIon
The	principle	of	“sustainability”	is	soon	to	mark	its	40
th	
anniversary.	 It	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 has	 experienced	both	
evolution	 and	 stasis.	 It	 has	 shaken	 the	 legal	 founda-
tion,	often	engaged,	 recited,	and	even	 revered	by	policymak-
ers,	lawmakers,	and	academics	worldwide.	This	essay	assesses	
the	extent	to	which	sustainability	registers	on	the	scales	of	the	
United	States	Supreme	Court,	particularly	during	the	tenure	of	
Chief	Justice	John	Roberts.	
Sustainability	entered	the	general	public	conscience	in	1972	
with	the	Stockholm	Declaration	on	the	Human	Environment.1	
In	1987	it	secured	center	stage	when	the	World	Commission	on	
Environment	and	Development	 released	 its	pioneering	study,	
Our Common	Future,2	which	defines	“sustainable	development”	
as	“development	 .	 .	 .	 that	 .	 .	 .	meets	 the	needs	of	 the	present	
without	compromising	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	meet	
their	own	needs.”3	In	1992	the	Earth	Summit’s	Rio Declaration 
declared	that	sustainable	development	must	“respect	the	inter-
ests	of	all	and	protect	the	integrity	of	the	global	environmental	
and	developmental	system.”4	The	Rio	Declaration’s	blueprint	
document,	Agenda 21,	provides	 that	sustainable	development	
must	 coincidently	 raise	 living	 standards	while	preserving	 the	
environment:	“[I]ntegration	of	environment	and	development	
concerns	.	.	.	will	lead	to	the	fulfillment	of	basic	needs,	improved	
living	standards	for	all,	better	protected	and	managed	ecosys-
tems	and	a	safer,	more	prosperous	future.”5	The	unmistakable	
thread	that	runs	through	threshold	definitions	of	sustainability	is	
the	interconnectedness	of	living	things,	opportunity,	and	hope.	
Recognition	of	the	importance	of	sustainability	has	grown	
exponentially	since	the	Earth	Summit.6	Since	then,	the	concept	
of	sustainability	has	been	regularly	recognized	in	international	
accords,7	by	nations	in	constitutional,	legislative	and	regulatory	
reform,8	by	States,	municipalities	and	 localities	 in	everything	
from	policy	statements	to	building	codes,9	and	in	corporate	mis-
sion	statements	and	practices	worldwide.10	Sustainability	princi-
ples	are	shape-shifters,	adaptive	to	most	environmental	decision	
making,	including	water	and	air	quality,	species	conservation,	
and	national	environmental	policy	in	 the	U.S.	and	around	the	
globe.11	Furthermore,	it	has	entered	the	bloodstream	of	courts	
around	the	globe	as	a	guiding	principle	of	judicial	discretion	in	
environmental	cases.12	
There	remains	one	notable	bastion	still	indifferent	about	if	
not	immune	to	sustainability.	A	situs	where	the	word	“sustain-
ability”	is	never	uttered,	nor	written,	nor	argued,	nor	acknowl-
edged:	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court.	 Forty	 years	 on,	 it	
seems	reasonable	to	expect	that	at	least	one	member	of	the	most	
influential	juridical	body	on	the	planet	would	have	found	a	case	
or	a	cause	or	a	controversy	befitting	a	mention	of	what	many	
behold	as	the	common	denominator	in	environmental	law	and	
policy,	 a	 field	well	 represented	 before	 the	Court.13	Yet,	 this	
hasn’t	happened.	In	the	roughly	4,000	or	so	cases	the	court	has	
decided	during	the	era	of	modern	environmental	law,	it	has	seen	
fit	to	decide	about	300	“environmental”	cases	(those	involving	
pollution	control,	natural	resources	and	property	management,	
and	energy).14	More	than	one-half	of	these	cases	involve	either	
State’s	or	individual	property	rights,	or	disposition	of	the	West’s	
mineral,	 land,	 and	water	 resources,	 or	 both.	 This	 is	 a	 testa-
ment	to	the	southwest-tinged	and	Barry	Goldwater	influenced	
ideals	of	Chief	Justice	William	Rehnquist	and	Justice	Sandra	
Day	O’Connor,	both	of	whom	were	raised	in	Arizona,	and	who	
together	served	the	court	for	nearly	sixty	years.	When	Rehnquist	
and	O’Connor	 left	 the	court	 in	2005	 to	 their	 successor	urban	
brethren	from	the	Northeast,	Chief	Justice	John	G.	Roberts	and	
Justice	Samuel	Alito,	fair	money	was	that	 the	court’s	 interest	
in	environmental	cases	would	wane,	diminishing	opportunity	to	
have	the	Supreme	Court	engage	sustainability.15
Yet	the	Roberts’	Court	has	shown	more	than	a	passing	inter-
est	in	environmental	cases.	Chief	Justice	Roberts’	Court-issued	
opinions	had	something	to	rejoice	or	revile	for	nearly	every	sus-
tainability	enthusiast.	The	Court	decided	cases	across	the	envi-
ronmental	spectrum:	endangered	species,	cost	recovery,	climate	
change,	air	and	water	pollution,	the	intersection	between	two	of	
environmental	 law’s	most	venerated	statutes,	and	 the	overlap	
between	local	solid	waste	control	efforts	and	the	U.S.	Constitu-
tion.	The	Court	ruled	on	the	profound,	such	as	whether	the	Clean	
Air	Act	gives	 the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(“EPA”)	
authority	to	regulate	new	vehicle	emissions	of	greenhouse	gases	
that	alter	the	Earth’s	climate	(yes),	and	the	practical,	including	
whether	it	is	appropriate	to	issue	a	preliminary	injunction	under	
the	National	Environmental	Policy	Act	to	ameliorate	the	impact	
of	the	Navy’s	use	of	submarine	detecting	sonar	(no),	whether	
EPA	may	use	cost-benefit	analyses	when	deciding	how	to	pro-
tect	aquatic	life	from	intake	structures	(yes),	whether	an	Army	
Corps	of	Engineers’	permit	obviates	 the	need	to	comply	with	
EPA’s	technology	based	standards	under	the	Clean	Water	Act	(it	
* James R. May is a professor of law and graduate engineering (adjunct), and 
the H. Albert Young Fellow in Constitutional Law at Widener University, and 
Associate Director of the Widener Environmental Law Center. He is a former 
Council Member of the American Bar Association’s Section of Environment, 
Energy, and Resources; Chair of the SEER Annual Conference on Environmen-
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does),	whether	intent	is	a	qualifying	condition	for	liability	as	an	
“arranger”	under	the	Comprehensive	Environmental	Response,	
Compensation,	and	Liability	Act	(it	is),	and	whether	plaintiffs	
have	standing	to	challenge	a	national	regulation	that	authorizes	
salvage	timber	sales	(they	don’t).	Each	environmental	case	saw	
a	different	justice	write	the	majority	(and	in	one	case,	plurality)	
opinion,	with	opinions	by	Justice	John	Paul	Stevens,	Chief	Jus-
tice	Roberts,	and	Justice	Anthony	Kennedy	ascendant.	Yet,	at	no	
time	does	anyone	mention	sustainability.	
None	of	the	environmental	cases	decided	thus	far	during	the	
tenure	of	Chief	Justice	Roberts	engage	sustainability.	The	word	
“sustainability”	does	not	appear	to	exist	before	the	Court.	It	does	
not	appear	in	any	majority,	concurring,	or	dissenting	opinion.	
While	the	Court	seems	to	be	agnostic	about	the	idea	of	sustain-
ability	as	a	governing	norm,	strong	astringent	reveals	that	with	
some	counterexamples	the	extent	to	which	decisions	before	the	
Roberts’	Court	 regarding	biodiversity,	 land	use,	 air	pollutant	
emissions,	and	cleanup	standards	implicate	sustainability,	they	
do	 so	negatively,	 as	discussed	below.	 I	 conclude	 that	 factors	
having	 little	or	nothing	 to	do	with	sustainability	per	se	are	at	
the	heart	of	these	results.	Yet	unless	and	until	parties	amass	the	
courage	of	their	conviction	and	infuse	“sustainability”	into	liti-
gative	lexicon	and	strategy,	sustainability	will	continue	to	matter	
to	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	not	at	all.	
promoTInG bIodIversITy
If	at	all,	sustainability	most	 likely	should	 influence	 juris-
prudence	involving	biodiversity,	which	often	engenders	related	
notions	of	sustainable	and	optimum	yields,	minimizing	adverse	
environmental	 effects,	 species	 conservation,	 and	 even	 cost-
benefit	 analysis.	Yet	 the	 Supreme	Court	 has	 yet	 to	 consider	
sustainability	per	se	 in	 reaching	decision	 in	a	dispute	 involv-
ing	biodiversity.	To	be	sure,	decisions	issued	during	the	tenure	
of	Chief	Justice	Roberts	involving	biodiversity	seem	contrary	
to	sustainability	principles.	By	way	of	example,	the	Court	has	
been	unconcerned	about	sustainability	in	evaluating	impacts	on	
marine	mammals,	fish	stocks,	aquatic	habitat,	and	forest	man-
agement,	discussed	below.
marine mammalS
In	 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
(“NRDC”),16	the	Court	reversed	the	U.S.	Court	of	Appeals	for	
the	Ninth	Circuit	and	ruled	5-4	that	the	U.S.	Navy’s	interests	in	
security	and	military	preparedness	outweighs	the	respondent’s	
interest	in	protecting	whales	and	other	marine	mammals	from	
acoustic	harm	caused	by	submarine	seeking	sonar	devices.	
In	Winter, the	Court	voted	to	lift	a	“narrowly	tailored”	pre-
liminary	 injunction	 to	enjoin	 the	U.S.	Navy’s	use	of	mid-fre-
quency	active	sonar	off	of	the	southern	California	coast,	known	
as	the	“SOCAL	exercise.”17	The	Navy	regards	mid-frequency	
active	sonar	as	the	sole	effective	means	for	detecting	and	track-
ing	enemy	diesel-electric	submarines.	The	Navy’s	sonar,	how-
ever,	also	disrupts	marine	mammals	 that	 rely	upon	 their	own	
sonar.	
The	 NRDC	 challenged	 the	 Navy’s	 failure	 to	 perform	
an	 environmental	 impact	 statement	 under	 the	 National	
Environmental	Policy	Act	(“NEPA”)	and	attached	other	claims	
under	 the	Coastal	Zone	Management	Act	 (“CZMA”)	and	 the	
Endangered	Species	Act.	
Finding	 the	 “possibility”	 of	 causing	 irreparable	 environ-
mental	harm,	the	district	court	issued	a	preliminary	injunction	
requiring,	inter alia,	the	Navy	to	“power	down”	(1)	completely	
if	marine	mammals	were	spotted	within	2,200	yards	of	Navy	
vessels	or	(2)	by	seventy-five	percent	in	the	presence	of	other	
significant	“surface	ducting”	conditions.
Following	 the	 initial	grant	of	preliminary	 injunction,	 the	
Bush	administration	then	identified	the	SOCAL	exercise	to	be	of	
“paramount	interest	to	the	United	States”	and	granted	the	Navy	
a	waiver	from	the	CZMA.	Correspondingly,	the	White	House	
Council	on	Environmental	Quality	granted	the	Navy’s	request	
for	“alternative	arrangements	for	compliance	with”	NEPA	due	
to	a	national	“emergency.”	
Thereafter,	the	Navy	appealed	the	lower	court’s	injunction	
to	the	Ninth	Circuit.	Rather	than	lift	 the	injunction,	the	Ninth	
Circuit	 remanded	to	have	 the	district	court	weigh	the	exemp-
tion’s	impacts	on	the	injunction.
On	 remand	 the	 lower	 court	 threw	 out	 the	 “emergency”	
premise	behind	the	Council	on	Environmental	Quality’s	“alter-
native	arrangements”	decision.	While	finding	it	“constitution-
ally	suspicious,”	the	lower	court	did	not	rule	on	the	legality	of	
the	waiver	of	CZMA	requirements.	The	Ninth	Circuit	affirmed,	
finding	the	lower	court	had	not	abused	its	discretion	in	issuing	
the	limited	preliminary	injunction.18	The	Ninth	Circuit	stayed	
the	injunction’s	“power	down”	provisions,	however,	allowing	
the	Navy	to	appeal	the	case	to	the	Supreme	Court.	The	Navy	still	
would	be	subject	to	the	injunction’s	four	less	restrictive	condi-
tions	that	the	Navy	did	not	appeal,	including	a	twelve	nautical-
mile	 no-sonar	 zone	 along	 the	California	 coast	 and	 enhanced	
monitoring	requirements.
Writing	for	the	majority,	Roberts	reversed	the	Ninth	Circuit	
5-4	and	vacated	the	injunction	and	its	“power	down”	require-
ments	on	two	grounds.	First,	 the	majority	held	 that	 the	 lower	
courts’	preliminary	injunction	analysis	applied	an	incorrect	stan-
dard	that	did	not	require	a	sufficient	showing	of	harm.	It	held	
that	 the	 lower	 court	 should	 have	 asked	whether	 the	 SOCAL	
exercise	would	result	in	the	“likelihood”	rather	than	the	“possi-
bility”	of	irreparable	harm,	because	the	“possibility”	standard	is	
“too	lenient.”19	Second,	it	determined	the	lower	courts	had	given	
short	shrift	to	the	Navy’s	interests	in	security	and	preparedness.
Turning	to	the	merits,	the	Court	held	first	that	respondents	
had	 not	met	 their	 burden	 of	 showing	 irreparable	 harm.	 The	
Court	reached	this	conclusion	notwithstanding	the	Navy’s	own	
countervailing	data,	which	while	both	lower	courts	found	to	be	
“cursory,	unsupported	by	evidence	 [and]	unconvincing,”	 still	
revealed	that	sonar	training	had	resulted	in	564	physical	inju-
ries	and	170,000	behavioral	disturbances	of	marine	mammals.20	
The	environmental	respondents	also	argued	that	countless	other	
reported	and	undetected	mass	strandings	of	marine	animals	had	
been	“associated”	with	sonar	training.21	Instead,	the	Court	con-
cluded	 that	 the	Navy	had	been	 conducting	 sonar	 training	 for	
forty	years	without	documented	cases	of	irreparable	harm.22
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Next,	 the	majority	concluded	that,	properly	balanced,	 the	
Navy’s	military	interests	far	outweighed	respondents’	interest	in	
protecting	and	observing	marine	mammals.	It	reasoned	that	bal-
ancing	the	public	interest	supporting	the	Navy’s	national	secu-
rity	and	military	preparedness	against	NRDC’s	public	interest	
in	protecting	marine	mammals	 for	observation	and	education	
“does	not	strike	us	as	a	close	question.”23	Disagreeing	with	the	
lower	courts,	the	majority	found	the	equities	tipped	strongly	in	
the	Navy’s	favor:	“To	be	prepared	for	war	is	one	of	the	most	
effectual	 means	 of	 preserving	 peace.”24	 The	majority	 noted	
that	the	president	deemed	active	sonar	as	“essential	to	national	
security”	 because	 adversaries	 possess	 300	 submarines.	Mid-
frequency	active	 sonar,	 the	Navy	argued,	 is	 “the	most	 effec-
tive	technology”	for	“antisubmarine	warfare,	a	top	war-fighting	
priority	for	the	Pacific	Fleet.”25	Citing	senior	naval	officers,	the	
majority	 observed	 the	 importance	
of	 training	 ship	 crews	with	 all	
possible	 war	 stressors	 occur-
ring	 simultaneously,	 thus	mak-
ing	mid-frequency	active	sonar	
“mission	critical”	for	training.26	
The	imposition	of	the	mitigating	
regulations	 would	 require	 the	
Navy	“to	deploy	an	inadequately	
trained	submarine	force,”	which	
would	 in	 turn	 jeopardize	 the	
safety	of	 the	fleet.27	Imposition	
of	 other	mitigating	 factors,	 the	
majority	 held,	 could	 decrease	
the	overall	effectiveness	of	sonar	
training	 generally.28	 On	 the	
other	hand,	“[f]or	the	plaintiffs,	the	most	serious	possible	injury	
would	be	harm	to	an	unknown	number	of	the	marine	mammals	
that	they	study	and	observe…”	in	contrast,	forcing	the	Navy	to	
deploy	an	inadequately	trained	antisubmarine	force	jeopardizes	
the	safety	of	the	fleet.”29	The	majority	concluded	that	the	“public	
interest	in	conducting	training	exercises	with	active	sonar	under	
realistic	conditions	plainly	outweighs	the	interests	advanced	by	
the	plaintiffs.”30
Thus	 the	 majority	 found	 the	 district	 court	 had	 applied	
the	incorrect	standard	and	abused	its	discretion	on	the	merits.	
Finding	in	favor	of	the	Navy,	the	Court	reversed	the	decisions	
below	 and	 did	 not	 impose	 the	 lower	 court’s	 “power	 down”	
requirements.31
While	the	majority	did	not	engage	sustainability	principles	
at	 all,	 the	dissent	concerned	 itself	with	 just	how	 the	SOCAL	
exercise	affected	marine	mammals.	 Justice	Ruth	Bader	Gins-
burg,	joined	by	Justice	David	Souter,	dissented:	“In	light	of	the	
likely,	 substantial	 harm	 to	 the	 environment,	NRDC’s	 almost	
inevitable	success	on	the	merits	of	its	claim	that	NEPA	required	
the	Navy	to	prepare	an	EIS,	the	history	of	this	litigation,	and	the	
public	interest,	I	cannot	agree	that	the	mitigation	measures	the	
district	court	imposed	signal	an	abuse	of	discretion.”32	
In	particular,	Ginsburg	had	no	trouble	finding	irreparable	
harm,	and	thus,	diminution	of	sustainability.	She	was	dismayed	
about	how	the	Court	could	overlook	“170,000	behavioral	distur-
bances,	including	8,000	instances	of	temporary	hearing	loss;	and	
564	Level	A	harms,	including	436	injuries	to	a	beaked	whale	
population	 numbering	 only	 1,121.”	 She	 also	 observed	 that,	
“sonar	is	linked	to	mass	strandings	of	marine	mammals,	hemor-
rhaging	around	the	brain	and	ears,	acute	spongiotic	changes	in	
the	central	nervous	system,	and	lesions	in	vital	organs.”33	On	
balancing	the	competing	interests	of	the	parties,	Ginsburg	con-
cluded	that	these	injuries	“cannot	be	lightly	dismissed,	even	in	
the	face	of	an	alleged	risk	to	the	effectiveness	of	the	[Navy’s	
training	exercises].”34
Charting	a	more	solicitous	course,	Justice	John	Paul	Ste-
vens,	joining	Justice	Stephen	G.	Breyer,	concurred	in	part	and	
dissented	 in	 part.	 They	would	 have	 found	 that	 neither	 court	
below	adequately	explained	why	the	balance	of	equities	favored	
the	 two	 specific	 mitigation	 mea-
sures	being	challenged	over	the	
Navy’s	 assertions	 that	 it	 could	
not	effectively	conduct	its	exer-
cises	 subject	 to	 the	conditions.	
They	would	have	remanded	for	
a	more	narrowly	tailored	injunc-
tion,	 but	 continued	 the	 Ninth	
Circuit’s	stay	conditions	as	 the	
status	 quo	 until	 the	 comple-
tion	 of	 the	 SOCAL	 exercise,	
thus	promoting	sustainability	to	
some	extent.35
The	 postscript	 is	 that	 the	
Navy	 concluded	 its	 SOCAL	
exercise	 and	 completed	 its	
NEPA	environmental	impact	statement	for	the	SOCAL	exercise	
in	January	2009.
fiSh StockS
In	Entergy v. Riverkeeper,36	the	Supreme	Court	reversed	the	
U.S.	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Second	Circuit	and	ruled	5-1-3	
that	the	EPA	may	conduct	a	cost-benefit	analysis	in	regulating	
the	substantial	adverse	impacts	of	“cooling	water	intake	struc-
tures”	under	Section	316(b)	of	the	Clean	Water	Act.37	Section	
316(b)	 of	 the	 act	 requires	 that	 any	 standards	 established	 for	
existing	discharge	sources	ensure	that	the	“design,	location,	con-
struction	and	capacity”	of	any	such	intake	structures	“reflect	the	
best	technology	available	for	minimizing	adverse	environmental	
impact.”38
Some	thirty	years	after	the	enactment	of	the	Clean	Water	
Act,	 EPA	 issued	 rules	 applying	 Section	 316(b)	 to	 existing	
dischargers.	The	 rules	allow,	but	do	not	 require,	 the	use	of	a	
cost-benefit	analysis	before	setting	performance-based	best	tech-
nology	available	standards	and	in	deciding	whether	to	grant	site-
specific	variances.	Cost-benefit	 analysis	 is	 invariably	at	odds	
with	sustainability,	as	it	is	skewed	heavily	in	favor	of	industrial	
and	power	producing	interests	over	those	in	providing	access	to	
sustainable	fisheries	for	future	generations.
None of the environmental 
cases decided thus far 
during the tenure of Chief 
Justice Roberts engage 
sustainability.
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The	Second	Circuit,	in	an	opinion	by	then	judge	and	now	
Justice	Sonia	Sotomayor,	ruled	that	the	language,	structure,	and	
history	of	Section	316(b)	do	not	permit	cost-benefit	analysis.	It	
then	remanded	the	case	to	EPA	to	explain	the	role,	if	any,	cost-
benefit	analysis	played	in	EPA’s	regulations	for	existing	intake	
structures.
Writing	 for	 the	 Court,	 Justice	 Antonin	 Scalia	 reversed,	
reasoning	 that	Section	316(b),	when	 read	 together	with	other	
performance-based	provisions	of	the	act,	gives	EPA	discretion	
to	base	BTA	on	a	cost-benefit	analysis.	Scalia	relied	upon	a	tra-
ditional	Chevron	 two-part	analysis.	First,	he	held	that	Section	
316(b)	does	not	contain	a	plain	meaning	with	 regard	 to	cost-
benefit	analysis.	To	be	sure,	he	held	that	the	word	“best”	invites	
many	meanings,	including	that	which	“most	efficiently	produces	
some	good,”	even	if	the	“good”	is	of	a	lower	quality	than	other	
options.39	He	also	wrote	that	“minimize”	has	many	meanings,	
and	“is	a	term	that	necessarily	admits	of	degree	[but]	is	not	nec-
essarily	used	to	refer	exclusively	to	the	greatest	possible	reduc-
tion.”40	Scalia	then	found	that	EPA’s	interpretation	of	Section	
316(b)	was	reasonable	because	while	 the	provision	“does	not	
expressly	authorize	cost-benefit	analysis,”	it	does	not	show	“an	
intent	 to	 forbid	 its	use.”41	Thus,	
he	wrote,	it	is	“eminently	reason-
able”	to	conclude	that	Congress’	
silence	on	the	use	of	cost-benefit	
analysis	in	cooling	tower	regula-
tory	 cases	 “is	meant	 to	 convey	
nothing	more	than	a	refusal	to	tie	
the	agency’s	hands	as	to	whether	
cost-benefit	 analysis	 should	 be	
used,	and	if	so	to	what	degree.”42
Justice	 Stevens	 dissented,	
joined	by	Souter	and	Ginsburg,	
advocating	a	result	more	consis-
tent	 with	 principles	 of	 sustain-
ability.	Stevens	asserted	that	the	
court	had	“misinterpreted”	Sec-
tion	316(b)’s	plain	language,	and	
that	 the	majority	 “unsettles	 the	
scheme	Congress	established.”43	
According	to	this	view,	either	the	
absence	of	plain	language	authorizing	cost-benefit	analysis,	or	
congressional	silence	on	the	matter,	is	conclusive,	especially	in	
light	of	the	fact	that	Congress	expressly	authorized	the	use	of	
cost-benefit	analysis	with	powerplant	regulations	in	other	con-
texts.44	This,	Stevens	argued,	 is	“powerful	evidence”	of	Con-
gress’	decision	not	to	authorize	cost-benefit	analysis	in	Section	
316(b).45	In	Stevens’	view,	the	Court	“should	not	treat	a	provi-
sion’s	silence	as	an	implicit	source	of	cost-benefit	authority.”46	
Indeed,	quoting	Justice	Scalia	verbatim	from	another	case,	he	
noted	that	Congress	does	not	draft	fundamental	regulatory	plans	
in	“vague	terms	or	ancillary	provisions,”	and	“hide	elephants	in	
mouseholes.”47
Stevens	viewed	EPA’s	interpretation	as	unreasonable	and	
outcome	 determinative:	 “[I]n	 the	 environmental	 context,	 in	
which	a	regulation’s	financial	costs	are	often	more	obvious	and	
easier	to	quantify	than	its	environmental	benefits	.	.	.	cost-benefit	
analysis	often,	if	not	always,	yields	a	result	that	does	not	maxi-
mize	environmental	protection.”48
Breyer	concurred	and	presented	a	middle	ground	for	sus-
tainability,	observing	that	“those	who	sponsored	the	legislation	
intended	the	law’s	text	to	be	read	as	restricting,	though	not	for-
bidding,	the	use	of	cost-benefit	comparisons.”49	He	would	have	
found	that	the	Clean	Water	Act’s	extensive	history	demonstrates	
Congress’	intent	to	limit	cost-benefit	analysis.	Quoting	the	act’s	
principal	sponsor,	Senator	Edmund	Muskie,	Breyer	wrote	that,	
“while	cost	should	be	a	factor	in	the	Administrator’s	judgment,	
no	balancing	test	will	be	required.”50	Formal	cost-benefit	anal-
ysis,	he	feared,	would	induce	extensive	delays	and	a	distorted	
emphasis	on	easily	quantifiable	factors,	running	in	contrast	to	the	
goal	of	promoting	cheaper,	more	effective	cleanup	technology.51
threateneD anD enDangereD SpecieS
In	 a	 case	 that	 both	 pits	 two	 of	 the	 nation’s	more	 vener-
ated	 environmental	 statutes	 crosswise,	 and	 runs	 counter	 to	
sustainability,	the	Court	decided	by	a	5-4	majority	that	EPA’s	
delegation	to	a	State	of	an	envi-
ronmental	 permitting	 program	
under	 the	 Clean	 Water	 Act	
does	not	trigger	“consultation”	
under	 the	Endangered	Species	
Act	(“ESA”).	In	National Ass’n 
of Home Builders v. Defenders 
of Wildlife,52	an	environmental	
organization	challenged	EPA’s	
decision	 that	 it	 is	 not	 autho-
rized	to	conduct	“consultation”	
with	federal	wildlife	agencies	to	
“insure”	conservation	of	threat-
ened	 and	 endangered	 species	
before	delegating	Clean	Water	
Act	permit	authority	to	a	State.	
Section	 402(b)	 of	 the	 Clean	
Water	Act	 lists	 criteria	 that	 if	
satisfied	dictate	that	EPA	“shall	
approve”	 the	 State’s	 authority	
to	issue	permits	under	the	Act.53	These	criteria	do	not	include	
effects	on	threatened	and	endangered	species.	On	the	other	hand	
the	ESA	impels	that	federal	agencies	“shall”	“consult”	with	fed-
eral	wildlife	agencies	prior	to	conducting	any	“agency	action”	
“authorized,	funded	or	carried	out”	by	the	agency.
Writing	 for	 the	 majority,	 Justice	 Samuel	 Alito	 upheld	
EPA’s	“expert	interpretation”	(and	one	it	changed	from	an	ear-
lier	interpretation)	that	the	ESA	must	yield	to	the	CWA’s	per-
mitting	authority:	“the	transfer	of	permitting	authority	to	state	
authorities—who	will	exercise	that	authority	under	continuing	
federal	oversight	to	ensure	compliance	with	relevant	mandates	
of	the	Endangered	Species	Act	and	other	federal	environmental	
protection	statutes—was	proper.”54	Curiously,	 the	Court	held	
that	Section	7	of	 the	Endangered	Species	Act	only	applies	 to	
Two cases decided by 
the Roberts’ Court 
look to future and past 
application of the Clean 
Air Act and reach 
results that promote 
sustainability to some 
degree.
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agency	actions	that	are	“discretionary.”	Because	Section	402(b)	
is	nondiscretionary,	Section	7	does	not	apply,	thus	diminishing	
sustainability.
In	so	doing,	the	Court	rejected	the	U.S.	Court	of	Appeals	
for	the	Ninth	Circuit’s	conclusions	(1)	that	the	ESA,	as	an	inde-
pendent	source	of	legal	authority,	trumps	the	CWA,	(2)	applying	
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,55	in	concluding	
that	EPA’s	approval	of	Arizona’s	National	Pollutant	Discharge	
Elimination	 System	 (“NPDES”)	 permitting	 program	was	 the	
legally	relevant	cause	of	impacts	to	threatened	and	endangered	
species	resulting	from	future	private	land-use	activities,	and	(3)	
EPA’s	application	of	the	act	is	arbitrary	and	capricious.
Stevens,	 writing	 for	 himself	 and	 Justices	 David	 Souter,	
Ruth	Bader	Ginsburg,	and	Stephen	Breyer	dissented,	advocating	
a	position	consistent	with	sustainability.	For	that	conclusion,	the	
dissenters	relied	principally	on	ESA	Section	7’s	express	applica-
tion	to	“all	federal	agencies”	for	all	“actions	authorized,	funded	
or	carried	out	by	them,”	and	the	broad	reading	of	the	statute	dat-
ing	back	to	Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.56
habitat
In	Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation 
Council,57	 the	Supreme	Court	 reversed	 the	Ninth	Circuit	 and	
held	5-1-3	that	when	the	U.S.	Army	Corps	of	Engineers	issues	a	
Section	404	permit	under	the	Clean	Water	Act	it	displaces	oth-
erwise	applicable	new	source	performance	standards	that	EPA	
applies	to	pollutant	discharges	subject	to	a	Section	402	permit.58	
This	has	the	effect	of	eliminating	freshwater	lake	habitat,	and	
diminishing	sustainability.
Coeur	Alaska,	Inc.	sought	to	open	a	new	gold	mine	about	
forty-five	miles	north	of	Juneau,	dubbed	the	“Kensington	Gold	
Mine,”	adjacent	to	Lower	Slate	Lake,	a	“water	of	the	U.S.”	in	
the	Tongass	National	Forest.	The	Kensington	Mine	would	use	
the	froth	flotation	process,	producing	over	the	life	of	the	project	
about	one	million	ounces	of	gold	and	4.5	million	tons	of	waste	
tailings	in	the	form	of	waste	mill	slurry.	Coeur	Alaska	hoped	to	
discharge	the	slurry	into	Lower	Slate	Lake,	the	most	economi-
cally	advantageous	option.	The	slurry	would	consist	of	about	45	
percent	water	and	55	percent	froth	flotation	mill	tailings.	Even-
tually	 the	mine	would	produce	enough	slurry	 to	fill	 the	more	
than	50-foot	depth	of	Lower	Slate	Lake,	thus	converting	the	23	
acre	lake	into	a	60	acre	impoundment.	It	was	undisputed	that	this	
would	“destroy	the	lake’s	small	population	of	common	fish	…”	
and	other	plant	and	animal	life.59	
Upholding	the	Corps’	and	petitioner’s	less	environmentally	
protective	 interpretation,	 the	Court	 ruled	 that	 pollutants	 that	
have	the	effect	of	changing	the	bottom	elevation	of	a	body	of	
water	may	be	regulated	as	“fill	material”	instead	of	“pollutant	
discharges”	subject	to	new	source	performance	standards.	Con-
sequently,	the	Court	held	that	EPA	has	jurisdiction	to	issue	Sec-
tion	402	permits	for	discharges	into	waters	except	to	the	extent	
that	the	Corps	regulates	the	permits	to	constitute	a	disposal	of	
“dredge	or	fill	material”	under	Section	404.
Coeur Alaska	pits	the	Clean	Water	Act’s	two	principal	per-
mitting	provisions	against	one	another.	On	the	one	hand,	the	act	
prohibits	the	“discharge	of	any	pollutant”	except	in	compliance	
with	a	permit	issued	under	Section	402,	including	new	source	
performance	standards	 for	categories	and	classes	of	pollutant	
discharges	such	as	“froth	flotation	mills”	here.	Froth	flotation	
is	a	process	in	which	raw	ore	material	is	ground	into	fine	gravel	
and	mixed	in	slurry	with	chemicals	whereby	pebbles	of	desired	
metal	float	to	the	surface	for	capture	and	processing.	The	pol-
luted	“waste	mill	tailings,”	laden	with	mercury,	lead,	and	other	
hazardous	heavy	metals,	however,	sink	to	the	bottom,	destined	
for	disposal	on	land,	or	as	in	this	case,	in	a	nearby	body	of	water.	
EPA’s	new	source	performance	standards	prohibit	discharges	
from	froth	flotation	mills.
On	the	other	hand,	the	Clean	Water	Act	also	prohibits	the	
“discharge	 of	 dredge	 or	 fill	 material”	 except	 in	 compliance	
with	a	permit	issued	under	Section	404.	The	Corps	administers	
and	issues	permits	under	Section	404	in	most	States,	including	
Alaska.	 In	2002,	EPA	and	 the	Corps	 issued	 joint	 regulations	
defining	“fill	material”	as	that	which	“has	the	effect	of	changing	
the	bottom	elevation”	of	a	water	of	the	U.S.,	including	mining	
slurry.60	“Fill	material”	includes	“slurry,	or	tailings,	or	similar	
mining-related	materials.”61	Thus,	the	requirements	of	the	act’s	
two	permitting	schemes	potentially	converge	if	discharge	of	a	
pollutant,	such	as	waste	slurry	mill	tailings,	also	has	the	effect	of	
raising	the	bottom	elevation	of	an	affected	water	body.
Because	 the	 slurry	would	have	 the	 “effect	 of	 raising	 the	
bottom	elevation”	of	Lower	Slate	Lake,	Coeur	Alaska	sought	a	
Section	404	permit	from	the	Corps.	The	Corps	accepted	jurisdic-
tion,	finding	that	the	slurry	would	be	“fill	material”	instead	of	a	
prohibited	“pollutant	discharge”	from	froth	flotation	mills	under	
EPA’s	New	Source	Performance	Standards	(“NSPS”)	rules.	It	
then	issued	the	Section	404	permit,	determining	that	discharging	
the	tailings	into	Lower	Slate	Lake	and	eventually	converting	it	
into	an	impoundment,	was	the	least	environmentally	damaging	
disposal	option	and	was	a	preferable	environmental	alternative	
to	filling	adjacent	wetlands.	Contending	that	all	this	constituted	
an	end	run	around	Section	402	and	the	applicable	zero	discharge	
NSPS,	Southeast	Alaska	Conservation	Council	sued	to	enjoin	
the	Corps	from	issuing	the	Section	404	permit.
The	Federal	District	Court	in	Alaska	rejected	the	Southeast	
Alaska	Conservation	Council’s	position.	It	held	that	unlike	with	
Section	402	permits,	new	source	performance	standards	do	not	
explicitly	apply	to	Section	404	permits.	Therefore,	EPA’s	rule	
barring	froth	flotation	discharges	did	not	apply	once	the	Corps	
assumed	jurisdiction.	
The	Ninth	Circuit	reversed,	holding	that	“§	404’s	silence	
regarding	the	explicit	and	detailed	requirements	[that	apply	to	
§	402]	cannot	create	an	exception	 to	 those	sections’	 strongly	
worded	blanket	prohibitions.”62	
Notwithstanding	the	United	States’	opposition,	the	Supreme	
Court	 granted	Coeur	Alaska’s	writ	 of	certiorari.	The	United	
States	then	joined	as	a	petitioner.
The	Supreme	Court	reversed	the	Ninth	Circuit	5-1-3.	Ken-
nedy,	writing	for	the	Court,	upheld	the	Corps’	interpretation	of	
the	Clean	Water	Act.	First,	instead	of	reviewing	the	Corps’	inter-
pretation	under	Chevron,63	Kennedy	applied	the	more	searching	
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Mead64	standard	of	review	because,	he	found,	the	Corps’	inter-
pretation	was	not	intended	to	be	formal.	Nonetheless,	Kennedy	
upheld	the	Corps’	interpretation	of	the	Clean	Water	Act,	finding	
persuasive	the	argument	that	it	does	not	unambiguously	apply	
NSPS	to	permits	issued	under	Section	404.
Second,	Justice	Kennedy	held	that	the	Corps	properly	issued	
the	Section	404	permit.	He	observed	that	“if	the	tailings	did	not	
go	into	the	lake,	they	would	be	placed	on	nearby	wetlands	[and]	
.	.	.	would	destroy	dozens	of	acres	of	wetlands.”65	Moreover,	the	
Section	404	permit	required	Coeur	Alaska	to	cover	what	used	to	
be	Lower	Slate	Lake	with	about	four	inches	of	“native	material,”	
thereby	in	his	view	improving	the	local	environment	for	wildlife	
habitat	and	repopulation.66
Justice	Ginsburg	dissented,	joined	by	Stevens	and	Souter,	
reasoning	 that	 the	majority’s	 reading	 of	 the	 statute	 “strained	
credulity”	and	creates	a	“loophole”	to	NSPS:	“A	discharge	of	
a	pollutant,	otherwise	prohibited	by	firm	statutory	command,	
becomes	lawful	if	it	contains	sufficient	solid	matter	to	raise	the	
bottom	of	a	water	body,	transformed	into	a	waste	disposal	facil-
ity.	Whole	categories	of	regulated	industries	can	thereby	gain	
immunity	from	a	variety	of	pollution-control	standards.”67	
Justice	Ginsburg’s	dissent	conjured	principles	of	sustain-
ability,	observing	 that	 it	was	undisputed	 that	 the	Section	404	
permit,	if	granted,	would	“kill	all	the	fish	and	wildlife”	of	the	
lake,	possibly	permanently	as	repopulation	was	“uncertain.”68
Justice	Breyer	concurred	in	the	judgment,	believing	that	too	
literal	an	application	of	NSPS	or	too	narrow	an	interpretation	of	
“fill”	or	“dredge	material”	would	undermine	the	purpose	of	the	
statute,	and	with	it,	some	degree	of	sustainability.69
national foreStS
In	Summers v. Earth Island Institute,70	the	Supreme	Court	
reversed	 the	 Ninth	 Circuit	 and	 held	 5-4	 that	 plaintiffs	must	
establish,	with	affidavits,	knowledge	of	future	injuries	to	use	of	
specific	 tracks	of	soon	 to	be	harvested	national	 forest	 land	 to	
demonstrate	sufficient	“concrete	and	particularized”	injury	so	as	
to	satisfy	constitutional	standing	under	Article	III,71	thus	having	
the	effect	of	diminishing	sustainability.
The	Decision	Making	and	Appeals	Reform	Act	requires	the	
U.S.	Forest	Service	to	provide	advance	notice	and	an	opportu-
nity	for	comment	and	appeals	processes	regarding	land	and	tim-
ber	management	decisions	for	national	forests	under	the	Forest	
and	Rangeland	Renewable	Resource	Planning	Act.72	The	For-
est	Service	issued	rules	that	provide	a	“categorical	exclusion”	
for	activities	that	in	the	aggregate	do	not	significantly	affect	the	
quality	of	the	human	environment	and	do	not	trigger	the	need	for	
either	an	environmental	assessment	or	an	environmental	impact	
statement	under	NEPA.73
The	 Forest	 Service	 subsequently	 determined	 that	 “fire	
rehabilitation”	 timber	efforts	 involving	 less	 than	4,200	acres,	
or	“timber	salvage”	 involving	 less	 than	250	acres,	 fall	within	
this	categorical	exclusion,	including	a	timber	salvage	sale	of	238	
acres	in	the	Burnt	River	Project,	an	area	affected	by	large	fires	
that	swept	through	the	Sequoia	National	Forest	in	California	in	
2002.74
Earth	Island	challenged	both	the	timber	salvage	sale	for	the	
Burnt	Ridge	Project	in	particular	and	the	Forest	Service’s	cat-
egorical	exemption	rule	in	general.	The	parties	subsequently	set-
tled	the	action	challenging	the	Burnt	Ridge	Project,	but	pressed	
ahead	on	the	legality	of	the	underlying	rule	as	applied	nation-
wide	to	“many	thousands	of	small	parcels.”75	Siding	with	Earth	
Island,	the	district	court	blocked	the	application	of	the	rule.76	
The	Ninth	Circuit	affirmed,	ruling	that	the	Forest	Service	
must	allow	 the	public	 to	contest	 internal	administrative	deci-
sions	on	small	timber-clearing	projects	such	as	the	Burnt	Ridge	
timber	sale.77
Without	 reaching	 the	merits,	 the	Supreme	Court	held	by	
another	bare	majority	that	Earth	Island	lacked	standing	to	chal-
lenge	the	application	of	the	rule	nationwide,	and	dismissed	the	
case.	
Writing	for	the	majority,	Justice	Scalia	held	that	Earth	Island	
did	not	possess	any	injury	in	fact	because	it	had	voluntarily	set-
tled	the	portion	of	the	lawsuit	pertaining	to	its	only	member	who	
suffered	any	injury	that	was	“concrete	and	particularized.”78	The	
settlement	 agreement	 already	 fully	 addressed	 the	 procedural	
injury	alleged	by	one	member	who	had	visited	the	project	site	
with	plans	to	return:	“[W]e	know	of	no	precedent	for	the	propo-
sition	that	when	a	plaintiff	has	sued	to	challenge	the	lawfulness	
of	certain	action	or	threatened	action	but	has	settled	that	suit,	
he	retains	standing	to	challenge	the	basis	for	that	action.”79	The	
majority	explained	that	Earth	Island	“identified	no	other	applica-
tion	of	the	invalidated	regulations	that	threatens	imminent	and	
concrete	harm”	to	any	of	its	members	who	planned	to	visit	sites	
where	the	rules	were	to	be	applied.80
Justice	Scalia	also	rejected	standing	for	another	affiant	who	
stated	 that	 he	had	been	 a	 long	 time	visitor	 of	Forest	Service	
sites	and	would	continue	to	visit	sites,	some	of	which	would	be	
subject	to	the	rule.	He	wrote	that	the	“vague	desire	to	return	is	
insufficient	to	satisfy	the	requirement	of	imminent	injury:	Such	
someday	intentions—without	any	description	of	concrete	plans,	
or	indeed	any	specification	of	when	the	someday	will	be—do	
not	support	a	finding	of	the	actual	or	imminent	injury	that	our	
cases	require.”81
Justice	Breyer	 dissented,	 joined	 by	Stevens,	 Souter,	 and	
Ginsburg,	arguing	in	favor	of	a	position	more	consistent	with	
sustainability.	He	noted	that	the	majority’s	conclusion	is	“coun-
terintuitive”	because	a	programmatic	failure	to	provide	notice,	
opportunity	 for	 comment,	 and	 appeal	 would	 eventually	 and	
inevitably	cause	members	to	suffer	concrete	injury.82	“To	know,	
virtually	for	certain,	that	snow	will	fall	in	New	England	this	win-
ter	is	not	to	know	the	name	of	each	particular	town	where	it	is	
bound	to	arrive,”	Justice	Breyer	wrote.83	“The	law	of	standing	
does	not	require	the	latter	kind	of	specificity.	How	could	it?”84	
In	particular,	he	noted	that	a	“threat	of	future	harm	may	be	real-
istic	even	where	the	plaintiff	cannot	specify	precise	times,	dates	
and	GPS	coordinates.”85
Justice	Breyer	also	questioned	whether	the	result	is	consis-
tent	with	precedent	respecting	standing	for	future	harm	in	the	
global	warming	context:	“[W]e	recently	held	that	Massachusetts	
has	standing	to	complain	of	a	procedural	failing,	namely,	EPA’s	
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failure	properly	to	determine	whether	to	restrict	carbon	dioxide	
emissions,	even	though	that	failing	would	create	Massachusetts-
based	harm	which	(though	likely	to	occur)	might	not	occur	for	
several	decades.”86
cleanInG up ToxIc sITes
In	 Burlington Northern v. United States,87	 the	 Court	
reversed	 the	 Ninth	 Circuit	 and	 held	 8-1	 that	 liability	 as	 an	
“arranger”	under	the	Comprehensive	Environmental	Response	
Compensation	 and	Liability	Act	 (“CERCLA”)	 requires	more	
than	knowledge	of	chemical	spillage;	one	must	intend	or	plan	to	
arrange	for	the	disposal	at	issue.	In	addition,	it	held	that	CER-
CLA	 does	 not	 impose	 joint	 and	
several	 liability	when	 there	 is	a	
“reasonable	basis”	 to	 apportion	
liability.88	 Neither	 result	 pro-
motes	sustainability.
In	 Burlington Northern,	 a	
now	 defunct	 company	 called	
Brown	&	Bryant	(“B&B”)	once	
owned	and	operated	a	plant	that	
stored	 and	 distributed	 agricul-
tural	 chemicals	 on	 land	 owned	
in	part	 by	predecessors	 to	peti-
tioners	Burlington	Northern	and	
Union	Pacific	Railroad	(“railroads”).	B&B	obtained	some	of	its	
chemicals,	including	D-D	pesticide,	from	the	Shell	Oil	Company	
(“Shell”).	Shell	would	deliver	the	chemicals	by	truck	for	transfer	
into	large	storage	tanks	onsite.	Spills	sometimes	occurred	during	
delivery,	and	 the	 tanks	 leaked,	 leading	 to	substantial	soil	and	
groundwater	contamination.
Eventually	EPA	and	 the	State	of	California	 investigated,	
responded,	and	then	filed	suit	under	CERCLA	Section	107(a)	
against	B&B,	Shell,	and	the	railroads	as	“potentially	responsible	
parties”	for	the	costs	of	feasibility	studies	and	response	action.	
The	district	court	found	the	railroads	liable	as	owners	“at	the	
time	of	disposal,”	and	Shell	liable	as	a	“person	who	.	.	.	arranged	
for	disposal.”	The	Court,	however,	declined	to	hold	the	parties	
subject	to	joint	and	several	liability.	Instead,	it	found	liability	
to	be	subject	to	equitable	apportionment	and	set	the	railroads’	
and	Shell’s	liability	at	nine	and	six	percent,	respectively,	which	
had	the	effect	of	limiting	the	government’s	recovery	by	about	
eighty-five	percent.	
The	 Ninth	 Circuit	 affirmed	 on	 liability	 but	 reversed	 on	
apportionment.	First,	it	held	that	although	Shell	did	not	qualify	
as	a	“traditional	arranger,”	it	could	still	be	held	liable	under	a	
“broader	category”	if	the	disposal	was	a	known	or	foreseeable	
by-product	of	 the	 transaction.89	Second,	 it	 reversed	 the	 lower	
court’s	 apportionment	 of	 liability.	 The	Ninth	Circuit	 instead	
held	that	CERCLA	intends	for	the	government	to	recover	full	
response	costs	against	targeted	parties,	envisioning	subsequent	
civil	actions	by	them	against	additional	potentially	responsible	
parties	for	contribution.90
The	Supreme	Court	reversed	the	Ninth	Circuit	8-1	at	both	
turns,	finding	Shell	had	not	“arranged	 for	disposal,”	and	 that	
joint	and	several	liability	is	not	required	when	it	is	practicable	
to	 apportion	 liability.	Writing	 for	 the	Court,	 Justice	 Stevens	
maintained	that	“it	is	.	.	.	clear	that	an	entity	could	not	be	held	
liable	as	an	arranger	merely	for	selling	a	new	and	useful	product	
if	 the	purchaser	of	that	product	later,	and	unbeknownst	to	the	
seller,	disposed	of	the	product	in	a	way	that	led	to	contamina-
tion.”91	In	other	words,	“arrange”	implies	action	directed	to	a	
specific	purpose.	Thus,	under	the	statute,	“an	entity	may	qualify	
as	an	arranger	.	.	.	when	it	takes	intentional	steps	to	dispose	of	
a	hazardous	substance.”92	Arranging	for	disposal	must	involve	
the	purpose	of	discarding	a	“used	and	no	longer	useful	hazard-
ous	substance.”93	Stevens	acknowledged	 that	determining	 the	
arranger’s	 purpose	 could	 involve	
a	 “fact-intensive	 inquiry.”94	
Rejecting	 the	 Ninth	 Circuit’s	
analysis,	the	Court	found	Shell	
had	 not	 arranged	 for	 disposal:	
“	 .	 .	 .	Shell	must	have	entered	
into	 the	 sale	 of	 D-D	with	 the	
intention	that	at	least	a	portion	
of	 the	 product	 to	 be	 disposed	
of	 during	 the	 transfer	 process	
by	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	 meth-
ods	described.”95	Thus,	Justice	
Stevens	 concluded,	 Shell	 was	
not	 liable	 as	 an	 arranger	 under	CERCLA	because	 it	 did	 not	
“intend”	for	its	chemicals	to	be	released	into	the	environment,	
even	though	it	knew	it	was	delivering	its	product	 to	a	sloppy	
operator.96
The	Court	also	held	that	joint	and	several	liability	does	not	
apply	when	reasonable	apportionment	is	practicable	and	upheld	
the	district	court’s	initial	allocation	of	liability.97
Justice	Ginsburg	 again	 urged	 a	 position	more	 consistent	
with	sustainability.	She	argued	in	dissent	that	Shell	had	arranged	
for	disposal	because	it	exercised	“the	control	rein”	over	deliv-
ery	of	the	D-D	pesticide,	specifying	transportation	and	storage	
features	that	resulted	in	“inevitable”	spills	and	leaks.98	Indeed,	
Justice	Ginsburg	 observed,	 “[t]he	 deliveries,	 Shell	 was	well	
aware,	directly	and	 routinely	 resulted	 in	disposals	of	hazard-
ous	substances	through	spills	and	leaks	for	more	than	[twenty	
years].”99	Shell	arranged	to	have	its	chemicals	shipped	by	bulk	
tank	truckload	stored	in	bulk	storage	facilities	instead	of	ship-
ping	 drums.100	 Shell	 knew	 that	 spills	 occurred	 during	 every	
delivery.101	 It	 also	 knew	 about	 “numerous	 tank	 failures	 and	
spills	as	the	chemical	rusted	tanks	and	eroded	valves.”102
Justice	Ginsburg	was	troubled	by	the	blind	eye	arrangers	
may	now	turn	 to	chemical	 transport	and	storage,	emboldened	
by	the	court’s	decision:	“The	sales	of	useful	substances	[does	
not]	exonerate	Shell	from	liability,	for	the	sales	necessarily	and	
immediately	resulted	in	the	leakage	of	hazardous	substances.”103	
She	questioned	the	Court’s	dismissal	of	joint	and	several	liabil-
ity,	noting	that	the	lower	court	“undertook	an	heroic	labor”	by	
apportioning	costs	without	the	benefit	of	briefing—indeed,	with-
out	even	a	request	to	apportion—by	the	parties.104	
In some ways, 
sustainability seems 
consigned to the elected 
branches.
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On	the	other	hand,	the	Court	has	issued	recent	opinions	in	
this	 context	 that	 seem	more	consistent	with	 sustainability.	 In	
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,105	 the	Court	unani-
mously	ruled	that	under	CERCLA	Section	107(a)	private	par-
ties	not	subject	 to	an	enforcement	action	who	incurred	“other	
necessary	response	costs”	may	seek	cost	recovery	claims	against	
“any	other	person,”	including	the	Federal	Government.	At	issue	
in	Atlantic Research was	whether	such	a	Potentially	Responsible	
Party	(“PRP”)	may	recover	costs	from	other	PRPs	under	CER-
CLA	Section	107(a)	instead	of	113(f).106	Likewise,	in	Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,	the	Court	held	CERCLA	
does	not	allow	private	parties	who	have	voluntarily	cleaned	up	
contaminated	property	but	who	have	not	been	the	subject	of	an	
EPA	enforcement	action	to	recover	“contribution”	costs	from	
other	responsible	parties	under	CERCLA	Section	113(f).107	
WasTe FloW conTrol
The	Court	recently	revisited	
its	 dormant	 commerce	 clause	
jurisprudence	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	
more	 consistent	 with	 sustain-
ability.	 It	 upheld	 a	 county	flow	
control	 ordinance	 that	 requires	
all	solid	waste	generated	within	
the	 county	 to	 be	 delivered	 to	 a	
publicly	 owned	 county	 waste	
processing	 facility.	 In	 United 
Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Manage-
ment Authority,108	 the	 Court	
decided	that	a	county’s	flow	con-
trol	 ordinance	 does	 not	 violate	
the	 dormant	 commerce	 clause.	
Chief	Justice	Roberts,	for	a	plu-
rality,	 applied	 the	 Pike	 balanc-
ing	test	and	determined	that	the	ordinance	does	not	violate	the	
dormant	commerce	clause	because	it	creates	at	least	“minimal”	
local	benefits	that	outweigh	whatever	“insubstantial”	differen-
tial	burden	it	may	place	on	interstate	commerce:	“[W]e	uphold	
these	ordinances	because	any	incidental	burden	they	may	have	
on	interstate	commerce	does	not	outweigh	the	benefits	they	con-
fer	on	 the	citizens	of	Oneida	and	Herkimer	counties.”109	The	
Court	rejected	the	interstate	waste	hauling	companies’	argument	
that	the	ordinance	is	per	se	invalid	as	economically	protection-
ist	under	Philadelphia v. New Jersey.110	The	companies	argued	
that	under	C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,111	gov-
ernment	instrumentalities	may	not	“hoard	wastes”	regardless	of	
whether	the	“preferred	processing	facility”	is	owned	by	a	pub-
lic	entity	arguably	within	the	“market	participant	exception”	to	
the	dormant	commerce	clause.	The	plurality	disagreed,	finding	
the	public/private	distinction	 is	 “constitutionally	 significant.”	
Breathing	judicial	restraint	the	Court	observed:	“there	is	no	rea-
son	to	step	in	and	hand	local	businesses	a	victory	they	could	not	
obtain	through	the	political	process.”112	
polluTIon emIssIons
Two	cases	decided	by	the	Roberts’	Court	look	to	future	and	
past	application	of	the	Clean	Air	Act	and	reach	results	that	pro-
mote	sustainability	to	some	degree.	
climate change
In	the	Court’s	initial	foray	into	the	global	climate	change	
imbroglio,	the	Court	decided	in	Massachusetts v. EPA,113 that	
Title	II	of	the	Clean	Air	Act	authorizes	EPA	to	regulate	green-
house	gas	emissions	from	new	motor	vehicles	that	“endanger”	
public	health	or	welfare,	thereby	promoting	sustainable	air	emis-
sions	 and	 energy	 policy.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	Commonwealth	 of	
Massachusetts	and	a	litany	of	mostly	downwind	“blue”	States	
and	environmental	organizations	contended	that	EPA	improp-
erly	exercised	its	discretion	in	denying	petition	by	several	States	
calling	for	rulemaking	to	regulate	carbon	dioxide	and	three	other	
greenhouse	 gas	 emissions—
methane,	 nitrous	 oxide,	 and	
hydrofluorocarbons—from	new	
motor	 vehicles	 under	 Title	 II	
of	 the	Clean	Air	Act.	 Section	
202(a)(1)	 of	 the	 Act	 directs	
EPA	to	regulate	tailpipe	emis-
sions	that	(1)	“in	his	judgment”	
(2)	“may	reasonably	be	antici-
pated	to	endanger	public	health	
or	 welfare.”	Massachusetts	 et	
al.	maintained	both	prongs	had	
been	met.	EPA	argued	that	the	
Clean	Air	Act	does	not	autho-
rize	it	 to	regulate	emissions	to	
address	global	 climate	 change	
and	that	it	has	discretion	not	to	
regulate	 based	 on	 policy	 con-
siderations,	including	foreign	policy.114	
The	 Court	 decided	 three	 issues.	 First,	 that	 petitioners	
(namely,	Massachusetts)	demonstrated	standing	under	Article	
III	of	 the	U.S.	Constitution	 to	challenge	EPA’s	 inaction.	The	
Court	held	that	States	enjoy	“special	solicitude”	in	demonstrat-
ing	standing.	Second,	the	Court	held	that	greenhouse	gas	emis-
sions	constituted	an	“air	pollutant”	under	the	Clean	Air	Act’s	
“capacious	definition	of	air	pollutant.”	Last,	 it	held	 that	EPA	
“offered	no	reasoned	explanation”	and	that	it	was	arbitrary	and	
capricious	for	the	agency	to	refuse	to	decide	whether	these	emis-
sions	“endanger	public	health	and	welfare”	due	to	policy	consid-
erations	not	listed	in	the	Clean	Air	Act,	mainly	foreign	policy.115
In	dissent,	Roberts	questioned	Stevens’	“state	solicitude”	
standard	as	an	“implicit	concession	that	petitioners	cannot	estab-
lish	 standing	 on	 traditional	 terms.”	 Scalia	 thought	 the	Court	
should	have	deferred	to	EPA	in	what	he	says	is	a	“straightfor-
ward	administrative-law	case,”	and	that	it	had	“	.	.	.	no	business	
substituting	its	own	desired	outcome	for	the	reasoned	judgment	
of	the	[EPA].”116
So perhaps the reason 
sustainability doesn’t 
exist in the U.S. Supreme 
Court is the simplest: it 
has yet to be presented to 
the Court.
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new Source review
In	 the	 other	 Clean	 Air	 Act	 case	 decided	 the	 same	 day,	
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.,117	 the	 Court	
unanimously	held	that	EPA	by	regulation	could	define	the	word	
“modification”	differently	for	different	parts	of	 the	Clean	Air	
Act,	thereby	potentially	reducing	pollutant	emissions	and	pro-
moting	sustainability.	The	case	asks	whether	the	term	as	applied	
to	an	existing	Major	Emitting	Facility	under	the	Prevention	of	
Significant	Deterioration	(“PSD”)	aspect	of	the	Clean	Air	Act	
refers	to	“increases”	in	emission	annual quantity	or	hourly rates.	
For	the	Court,	Souter	wrote	that	EPA	does	not	need	to	harmo-
nize	the	two	regulatory	interpretations	of	the	same	term.	He	said	
it	was	reasonable	for	EPA	to	interpret	the	term	“modification”	
differently	in	different	parts	of	the	statute.118	
EPA	 initially	 had	 interpreted	 the	 term	 “modification”	
to	 require	New	 Source	Review	 for	 any	 operational	 or	 facil-
ity	changes	that	result	 in	“increases”	in	net	annual	emissions.	
Duke	Energy	contended	instead	that	“modification”	under	the	
PSD	program	requires	an	“increase”	in	hourly	emission	rates—
as	EPA	interprets	the	term	under	the	New	Source	Performance	
Standards	aspect	of	the	Act—but	does	not	reach	increased	hours	
of	operation	and	increased	annual	emissions,	and	the	U.S.	Court	
of	Appeals	for	the	Fourth	Circuit	agreed.	Along	the	way,	EPA	
aligned	with	Duke	Energy’s	interpretation.
Interestingly,	 only	 intervenor	 Environmental	 Defense	
sought	review.	Ironically,	EPA	initially	opposed	review,	only	to	
rejoin	Environmental	Defense	after	the	Court	granted	certiorari,	
then	joining	Duke	Energy’s	interpretation	of	the	Clean	Air	Act	
as	applied	to	future	rulemaking.	Environmental	Defense	agreed	
with	EPA’s	 initial	 interpretation	 of	 the	Clean	Air	Act.	Duke 
Energy	is	notable	insofar	as	it	marks	the	first	time	since	Sierra 
Club v. Morton119	that	the	Court	granted	review	over	the	Federal	
Government’s	opposition,	at	the	exclusive	request	of	an	environ-
mental	organization	who	does	not	enjoy	support	from	a	State,	as	
in	Massachusetts v. EPA.	In	the	vast	majority	of	environmental	
cases	the	Court	grants	review	at	the	behest	of	State	or	industrial	
petitioners	who	argue	for	more	constrained	application	or	inter-
pretation	of	an	environmental	law.	Moreover,	past	experience	
demonstrates	that	when	the	Court	grants	certiorari	in	a	case	with	
an	environmental	group,	it	nearly	always	rules	against	the	group.	
Duke Energy	also	is	perhaps	the	only	case	where	EPA	opposed	
a	parties’	petition	 for	 review	only	 to	 rejoin	 it	 after	 the	Court	
granted	certiorari,	but	then	only	to	stake	a	legal	position	oppos-
ing	its	original	 legal	position	(“increase”	in	amount,	not	rate)	
and	that	of	co-plaintiff	(Environmental	Defense),	the	petitioner.
dIscussIon
The	Court’s	 environmental	 cases	 do	 not	 engage	 sustain-
ability.	 If	anything,	 they	reveal	more	about	 its	 jurisprudential	
ideologies	than	any	environmental	jurisprudence	and	invite	five	
observations.	First,	the	surfeit	of	sustainability	tinged	cases	does	
not	necessarily	reveal	anything	about	judicial	receptiveness	to	
the	concept	of	sustainability.	Rather,	these	cases	are	a	surrogate	
for	 the	 jurisprudential	 ideologies	of	 the	Court’s	 conservative	
wing	to	curtail	federal	power,	promote	State’s	rights,	and	protect	
private	property	rights.	If	anything,	Chief	Justice	Roberts,	and	
Justices	Alito,	Scalia,	and	Thomas	seem	to	reject	principles	of	
sustainability,	except	when	it	becomes	a	matter	of	State’s	rights.	
Yet	curiously	when	the	State’s	interest	is	to	protect	rather	than	
develop	 land	 and	 environment,	 such	 as	 shoreline	 loss	due	 to	
global	climate	change,	these	same	justices	wonder	aloud	how	it	
can	be	that	the	State	has	a	sufficient	interest	to	protect.	All	this	
seems	counterintuitive	because	 sustainability	 is	a	quintessen-
tially	“conservative”	position	insofar	as	it	counsels	conservation	
and	careful	consideration	of	externalized	social	costs.
Justices	Ginsburg	and	Stevens	seem	to	be	much	more	recep-
tive	to	notions	of	sustainability.	They	argue	in	favor	of	greater	
consideration	of	the	environmental	consequences.	Justice	Soto-
mayor	may	be	cut	from	the	same	cloth,	having	written	the	opin-
ion	while	sitting	on	the	Second	Circuit	that	the	Supreme	Court	
later	reversed	in	Entergy.	
Nonetheless,	 as	 Justice	Kennedy’s	 decisions	 go	 in	 cases	
implicating	sustainability,	so	goes	the	Court.	Justice	Kennedy	
voted	with	the	majority—or	perhaps	more	accurately	the	major-
ity	voted	with	him—in	each	case	that	implicates	sustainability.	
Justice	Kennedy	almost	always	votes	in	a	manner	that	does	not	
promote	sustainability.	
Second,	the	Court	may	just	consider	the	concept	of	sustain-
ability	to	be	unworkable.	The	United	States	lacks	“sustainability	
law”	per se,	so	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	Court	has	failed	to	
engage	sustainability	law	per se.	“Sustainability”	does	not	invite	
facile	 definition	 or	 judicially	 cognizable	 guidelines.	 In	 some	
ways,	sustainability	seems	consigned	to	 the	elected	branches.	
Indeed,	most	of	the	environmental	cases	that	arguably	invoke	
sustainability	place	a	premium	on	arguments	cloaked	in	statu-
tory	“plain	meaning.”	 In	Atlantic Research,	 the	Court	unani-
mously	 found	 that	CERCLA	Section	107’s	 reference	 to	“any	
other	person,”	allows	cost	recovery,	indeed,	by	other	PRPs.	This	
is	 likely	to	allow	courts	 to	turn	to	the	merits	 in	myriad	CER-
CLA	private	cost	recovery	actions	working	their	way	through	
the	federal	system.	The	same	plain	meaning	thread	weaves	its	
way	through	Duke Energy,	in	which	the	Court	gave	EPA	wide	
latitude	to	interpret	“modification.”	Duke Energy’s	ripple	effect	
looms	 large,	 as	 it	 potentially	 subjects	more	 than	 100	 of	 the	
nation’s	largest	and	eldest	coal-fired	power	plants,	and	hundreds	
of	other	existing	major	emitting	facilities,	including	cement	kiln	
plants,	coke	ovens,	minerals	and	metals	processors,	and	petro-
chemical	processors,	located	in	Prevention	of	Significant	Dete-
rioration	areas,	to	New	Source	Review.
Likewise,	plain	meaning	ruled,	although	only	by	the	slim-
mest	 of	margin,	 in	 both	Massachusetts v. EPA	 and	National 
Ass’n of Home Builders.	 In	Massachusetts v. EPA,	 the	Court	
promoted	the	plain	meaning	of	“air	pollutant”	to	include	climate	
changing	gases	and	that	EPA	does	not	have	discretion	to	refuse	
to	 regulate	pollutants	 that	 “may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger	public	health	or	welfare.”	
In	National Ass’n of Home Builders,	the	Court	used	plain	
meaning	in	support	of	elevating	the	Clean	Water	Act’s	mean-
ing	over	that	of	the	Endangered	Species	Act.	Section	402(b)	of	
the	Clean	Water	Act	provides	“[EPA]	shall approve	a	[state’s	
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NPDES	program]	unless he determines that adequate author-
ity does not exist.”	The	Court	was	divided	5-4,	however,	about	
whether	the	language	at	issue	in	these	cases	is	in	fact	“plain.”	
Indeed,	Justice	Alito’s	opinion	in	National Ass’n of Home Build-
ers	 arguably	 ignores	 the	“plain	meaning”	of	a	provision	of	a	
more	 specific	 and	 subsequently	 enacted	 statutory	 provision.	
Section	7(b)	of	the	ESA	provides	that:	“[e]ach	Federal	agency	
shall,	 in	 consultation	with	 [federal	wildlife	 agencies]	 insure 
that any	[agency	action]	authorized, funded or carried out by 
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species or threatened species [or their 
habitat].”
Fourth,	 the	Court’s	 judicial	capacity	does	not	 invite	con-
sideration	of	sustainability.	Article	III	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	
grants	federal	courts	authority	to	resolve	“cases”	and	“contro-
versies”	involving	the	Constitution,	laws	of	the	United	States,	or	
treaties.	Sustainability	falls	into	none	of	these	categories.	Sus-
tainability	is	a	guiding	principle,	not	a	constitutionally	enshrined	
doctrine.	No	U.S.	law	requires	or	even	recognizes	sustainability.	
And,	 the	United	States	has	not	 ratified	an	 international	 treaty	
that	does	so	either.	Moreover,	no	member	of	the	Court	studied	
environmental	 law.	None	of	 them	have	much	 if	any	practical	
experience	with	environmental	law	in	general,	and	sustainability	
in	particular.	And	while	some	members	have	regulatory	experi-
ence,	none	of	the	current	members	have	held	elected	political	
office,	often	the	crucible	for	implementing	sustainability.	So	to	
the	members	of	the	Court,	sustainability	is	unnoticed.	
Finally,	and	surprisingly,	sustainability—even	as	a	govern-
ing	principle—isn’t	the	subject	of	advocacy	before	the	Court.	
Supreme	Court	litigants	of	every	persuasion—government,	pri-
vate,	public	interest,	whomever—ignore	sustainability	too.	As	
far	as	 I	can	 tell,	no	party	 in	any	environmental	 (or	any	other	
case	for	that	matter)	has	bothered	to	invoke	“sustainability”	in	
a	pleading,	brief,	or	argument.120	Even	amici,	with	much	wider	
latitude	to	advocate	policy	positions	not	at	issue	in	any	claim,	
defense	 or	 “Question	 Presented,”	 have	 yet	 to	 argue	 that	 the	
Court	consider	sustainability.121	So	perhaps	the	reason	sustain-
ability	doesn’t	exist	in	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	is	the	simplest:	it	
has	yet	to	be	presented	to	the	Court.	
Thus,	 sustainability	 remains	 a	 concept	 in	 search	 of	 law	
subject	to	review	by	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court.	Without	a	plain	
meaning	 foothold,	 therefore,	 sustainability	 does	 not	 seem	 to	
exist.
conclusIon
Early	returns	suggest	that	environmental	cases	hold	inter-
est	for	the	Roberts	Court.	It	already	has	decided	about	a	dozen	
core	environmental	cases	in	three	years,	almost	three	times	the	
rate	during	the	Burger	and	Rehnquist	Courts.	Yet,	sustainabil-
ity	seems	to	matter	not	at	all.	The	Court	accepted	the	business/
industry	 position	 in	Entergy, Coeur Alaska,	 and	Burlington 
Northern,	and	the	government’s	less	environmentally	protective	
position	in	Summers	and	Winter.	In	Home Builders,	it	held	that	
EPA’s	delegation	to	a	State	of	an	environmental	permitting	pro-
gram	under	the	Clean	Water	Act	does	not	trigger	“consultation”	
under	the	Endangered	Species	Act.	
The	Court	 seems	 to	be	 especially	 interested	 in	 reversing	
sustainability	 reinforcing	 decisions	 out	 of	 the	Ninth	Circuit.	
Indeed,	it	reversed	each	of	the	four	cases	from	that	circuit	for	
which	it	granted	review,	cases	where	the	Ninth	Circuit	arguably	
agreed	with	the	pro-sustainable	result.	It	also	reversed	a	Second	
Circuit	opinion	that	arguably	produced	an	outcome	more	consis-
tent	with	sustainability.	
There	are	some	counterexamples.	In	Massachusetts v. EPA,	
the	Court	held	that	Title	II	of	the	Clean	Air	Act	authorizes	EPA	
to	regulate	greenhouse	gas	emissions	from	new	motor	vehicles	
that	“endanger”	public	health	or	welfare.	In	Duke Energy,	it	held	
that	EPA	by	regulation	could	define	the	word	“modification”	dif-
ferently,	and	more	stringently,	in	different	parts	of	the	Clean	Air	
Act.	In	Oneida,	a	plurality	concluded	that	a	county’s	flow	con-
trol	ordinance—requiring	that	all	solid	waste	generated	within	
the	county	to	be	delivered	to	the	county’s	publicly	owned	solid	
waste	processing	facility—does	not	violate	 the	dormant	com-
merce	clause.	In	Atlantic, it	found	that	under	CERCLA	Section	
107(a)	private	parties	not	subject	to	an	enforcement	action	who	
incur	“other	necessary	response	costs”	may	seek	cost	recovery	
claims	against	“any	other	person,”	including	the	Federal	Gov-
ernment.	Each	result	arguably	promotes	sustainability.
In	sum,	the	Court	seems	at	worst	hostile	to,	at	best	agnostic	
about,	and	most	likely	ignorant	of	sustainability	as	a	governing	
principle.	
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As	a	consequence	of	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court’s	landmark	2007	decision	in	Massachusetts v. Environmental Pro-tection Agency,	 reduced	 standing	 requirements	 have	
enabled	litigators	to	pursue	environmental	claims	and	compel	
U.S.	Federal	agencies	 to	enforce	existing	statutes.	Center for 
Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency	 is	
predicated	upon	these	reduced	standing	requirements.	On	May	
14,	2009,	the	Center	for	Biological	Diversity	(“CBD”)	filed	a	
complaint	 in	 the	Western	District	 of	Washington	 against	 the	
Environmental	Protection	Agency	(“EPA”)	based	on	EPA’s	fail-
ure	to	list	and	regulate	damage	caused	to	Washington’s	coastal	
waters	by	ocean	acidification.1	In	the	suit,	the	CBD	alleged	that	
the	EPA’s	approval	of	Washington’s	 list	of	 impaired	waters,	
which	 only	 included	 inland	 waters	 and	 did	 not	 include	 the	
adversely	affected	coastal	ocean	areas,	harmed	the	right	of	its	
members	to	enjoy	the	marine	animals	in	the	area.2	As	a	result	of	
the	EPA’s	action,	CBD	also	claimed	that	its	members	suffered	
procedural	and	informational	injury.3	Pursuant	to	the	holding	in	
Massachusetts,	where	the	Court	found	that	the	EPA	violated	its	
statutory	obligation	when	it	declined	to	regulate	CO2	and	green-
house	gasses	(“GHG”),	the	CBD	is	seeking	to	compel	similar	
EPA	action	by	 requesting	declaratory	 relief	 against	 the	EPA	
for	its	procedurally	improper	approval	of	Washington’s	list	of	
impaired	waters.4	
Prior	 to	Massachusetts,	 environmental	 litigants	 had	 dif-
ficulty	meeting	 requirements	 for	 substantive	 and	 procedural	
standing,	because	comprehensive	regulations	such	as	the	Clean	
Air	Act	 (“CAA”)	 preempted	 claims	 that	 fell	 under	 its	man-
date.5	Massachusetts	was	significant	because	the	Court	found	
substantive	 standing	 despite	 the	 difficulty	 of	 proving	 injury,	
traceability,	and	redressability,	and	it	also	vested	environmental	
litigants	with	the	right	to	enforce	procedural	violations	by	fed-
eral	agencies	such	as	the	EPA.6	Massachusetts	held	that	a	plain-
tiff	can	claim	procedural	standing	when	the	alleged	harm	can	be	
redressed	by	the	government	agency	reconsidering	the	adminis-
trative	decision	that	caused	the	harm.7	This	procedural	standing	
forms	the	basis	of	much	of	the	current	litigation	against	govern-
ment	agencies	for	not	enforcing	statutory	regulations	according	
to	provisions	of	the	Clean	Air	Act,	Clean	Water	Act,	National	
Environmental	Policy	Act,	Endangered	Species	Act,	and	other	
federal	and	state	environmental	protection	laws.	
As	a	result	of	 the	decision	in	Massachusetts,	courts	have	
found	standing	in	several	recent	cases	of	environmental	litiga-
tion.8	Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency	follows	in	the	footsteps	of	these	prior	cases.	
At	issue	in	Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental 
Protection Agency	is	the	listing	provision	of	the	Clean	Water	Act	
(“CWA”),	which	requires	states	to	establish	water	quality	stan-
dards	and	prepare	lists	of	water	bodies	where	pollution	controls	
are	insufficient	(known	as	the	“impaired	waters	list”).9	After	the	
list	is	prepared,	it	is	submitted	to	the	EPA	and	approved,	disap-
proved,	or	partially	disapproved.10	On	August	15,	2007	the	CBD	
submitted	data	to	Washington	Department	of	Ecology	(“WDE”)	
to	notify	them	that	Washington’s	coastal	ocean	waters	should	
be	 included	on	 the	 impaired	waters	 list	because	 the	pH	 level	
was	outside	 the	range	proscribed	by	state	 law,	and	was	caus-
ing	damage	to	ocean	fauna.11	Subsequently,	CBD	petitioned	the	
WDE	to	include	the	ocean	waters	on	the	CWA	impaired	waters	
list.12	However	on	June	23,	2008	when	WDE	submitted	the	list	
to	 the	EPA	for	approval,	 the	acidified	ocean	waters	were	not	
included.13	As	a	result,	the	CBD	submitted	letters	to	the	EPA	
with	 scientific	 documentation	 contending	 that	Washington’s	
coastal	ocean	waters	were	impaired	due	to	substantial	changes	
in	pH	level	that	were	beyond	statutory	limits,	and	requested	that	
the	EPA	include	the	acidified	waters	on	the	list.14	Despite	the	
evidence	submitted	by	CBD	that	demonstrated	that	the	waters	
were	 impaired	due	 to	 ocean	 acidification,	 the	EPA	approved	
Washington’s	list	on	January	29,	2009.15	
CBD	brought	suit	against	the	EPA	because	of	its	approval	
of	Washington’s	 list	of	 impaired	waters	without	 the	acidified	
ocean	waters	allegedly	violated	CWA	section	303(d).16	CBD	
also	contends	 that	 the	EPA’s	approval	of	 the	 list	violated	 the	
Administrative	Procedure	Act,	which	allows	judicial	review	of	
agency	action	that	is	arbitrary,	capricious,	and	not	in	accordance	
with	 the	 law.17	 CBD	 seeks	 declaratory	 relief	 from	 the	 court	
that	the	EPA	violated	its	duties	under	the	CWA	and	an	order	to	
require	that	the	EPA	add	the	impaired	ocean	waters	to	the	list.18	
If	CBD’s	complaint	is	successful,	the	EPA	would	be	compelled	
to	address	the	effect	of	CO2	emissions	on	ocean	acidification.
The	decisions	in	Massachusetts	and	its	successors	have	had	
a	significant	 impact	on	environmental	 litigation	 in	 the	United	
States.	Although	some	provisions	of	the	various	environmental	
laws	discussed	above	may	be	rendered	obsolete	for	the	purpose	
of	climate-related	litigation	because	of	 their	absorption	into	a	
new	climate	and	energy	regulatory	regime	under	consideration	
in	Congress,	Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental 
Protection Agency	demonstrates	 that	 the	reduced	requirement	
for	 substantive	 and	 procedural	 standing	 established	 in	Mas-
sachusetts	will	 continue	 to	 stimulate	environmental	 litigation	
against	agencies’	lack	of	regulatory	enforcement.19
Endnotes:	Environmental	Litigation	Standing	After	Massachusetts	v.	
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InTroducTIon
Courts	function	as	an	arm	of	government	that	is	critical	in	 the	 separation	of	powers	doctrine,	and	 they	play	a	crucial	role	in	giving	effect	to	legislative	and	executive	
intentions	and	pronouncements.	Judicial	power	enables	sover-
eign	states	 to	decide	controversies	between	itself	and	its	sub-
jects	and	between	the	subjects	inter se	(between	themselves).1	
Judiciaries	the	world	over	balance	the	interests	of	society	with	
economic	development,	environmental	 sustainability,	and	 the	
competing	interests	of	persons	and	entities.	Sustainable	devel-
opment	is	defined	as	development	“that	meets	the	needs	of	the	
present	without	compromising	the	ability	of	future	generations	
to	meet	 their	own	needs.”2	Sustainable	development	 requires	
mediation	between	the	interests	of	current	generations	and	those	
of	 future	generations	 as	well	 as	between	 competing	 interests	
of	current	generations.	Not	surprisingly,	the	judiciary	has	been	
called	upon	in	the	quest	for	enforcing	sustainable	development	
policies	owing	to	 its	 traditional	role	 in	dispute	resolution	and	
interpretation	of	laws.	As	D.	Kaniaru,	L.	Kurukulasuriya,	and	
C.	Okidi	state:
The	judiciary	plays	a	critical	role	in	the	enhancement	
and	 interpretation	of	environmental	 law	and	 the	vin-
dication	of	the	public	interest	in	a	healthy	and	secure	
environment.	Judiciaries	have,	and	will	most	certainly	
continue	to	play	a	pivotal	role	both	in	the	development	
and	 implementation	 of	 legislative	 and	 institutional	
regimes	for	sustainable	development.	A	judiciary,	well	
informed	 on	 the	 contemporary	 developments	 in	 the	
field	of	international	and	national	imperatives	of	envi-
ronmentally	friendly	development	will	be	a	major	force	
in	 strengthening	 national	 efforts	 to	 realise	 the	 goals	
of	environmentally	friendly	development	and,	in	par-
ticular,	in	vindicating	the	rights	of	individuals	substan-
tively	and	in	accessing	the	judicial	process.3
The	role	of	the	judiciary	is	particularly	important	in	devel-
oping	countries,	such	as	those	in	Africa,	where	the	bulk	of	the	
population	is	poor	and	relies	on	natural	resources	for	livelihood	
and	sustenance,	and	where	the	countries’	economies	have	those	
same	resources	as	the	bedrock	of	the	gross	domestic	product.	
At	the	World	Summit	on	Sustainable	Development4	in	Johan-
nesburg	in	2002,	chief	justices	and	senior	judges	from	around	
the	world	presented	the	Johannesburg	Principles	on	the	Role	of	
Law	and	Sustainable	Development.5	The	Principles	had	been	
adopted	at	the	Global	Judges	Symposium	on	the	Role	of	Law	
and	Sustainable	Development.6	The	Principles	underscored	the	
critical	 role	 that	 judiciaries	around	 the	world	can	and	 should	
play	in	efforts	to	promote	sustainable	development.7	The	judges	
underscored	the	fact	that:
an	independent	Judiciary	and	judicial	process	is	vital	
for	 the	 implementation,	 development	 and	 enforce-
ment	of	environmental	 law,	and	that	members	of	 the	
Judiciary,	as	well	as	those	contributing	to	the	judicial	
process	at	the	national,	regional	and	global	levels,	are	
crucial	partners	 for	promoting	compliance	with,	 and	
the	implementation	and	enforcement	of,	international	
and	national	environmental	law	.	.	.	.8
The	 assembled	 judges	 then	 made	 a	 commitment	 to	
“contribut[e]	 towards	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 sustain-
able	development	through	the	judicial	mandate	to	implement,	
develop	and	enforce	the	law,	and	to	uphold	the	Rule	of	Law	and	
the	democratic	process.”9	
It	is	against	this	background	that	this	paper	assesses	the	role	
that	judiciaries	in	East	Africa	have	played	in	the	quest	for	sus-
tainable	development.	It	focuses	on	Kenya,	Uganda,	and	Tanza-
nia,	the	original	members	of	the	East	African	Community.	These	
three	countries	also	have	legal	systems	drawing	on	the	common	
law	tradition.	The	paper	first	summarizes	the	key	environmen-
tal	 issues	 in	 the	 region	 as	 a	 prelude	 to	 the	discussion	on	 the	
legal	framework	for	environmental	management	and	the	court	
structure	in	the	three	countries	in	the	following	section.	It	then	
analyzes	 several	 trends	 in	 judgments	and	 the	emerging	 juris-
prudence	on	environmental	law	matters	from	the	courts	in	East	
Africa.10	Finally,	it	proposes	ways	of	improving	the	role	of	the	
judiciaries	in	fostering	sustainable	development	in	East	Africa.
major envIronmenTal Issues and challenGes 
For susTaInable developmenT In easT aFrIca
As	a	region,	East	Africa	is	 largely	poor:	 two	of	the	three	
countries	reviewed	in	this	paper	are	classified	as	Least	Devel-
oped11	and	only	Kenya	as	Developing.	The	region	is,	however,	
endowed	with	 numerous	 natural	 resources	 including	 forests,	
wildlife,	fisheries,	minerals,	land,	rivers,	and	Lake	Victoria,	the	
second	largest	freshwater	lake	in	the	world.	The	major	environ-
mental	resources	in	East	Africa	may	be	categorized	broadly	into	
either	transboundary	or	national	ecosystems.12
The	key	challenges	 to	 the	 environment	 in	 the	 region	are	
driven	and	controlled	by	three	factors:	(i)	high	populations	and	
the	attendant	pressure	from	the	interaction	between	the	popula-
tion	and	their	surroundings;	(ii)	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	legal	
courtS aS championS of SuStainable 
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framework	put	in	place	to	regulate	these	pressures;	and	(iii)	the	
weak	institutional	arrangements	in	place	for	monitoring	compli-
ance	leading	to	widespread	non-compliance	with	the	law	by	all	
concerned.13	 The	 resulting	 environmental	 challenges	 include	
land	degradation,	poor	 land	use	and	 land	management,	over-
exploitation	of	fisheries,	water	pollution,	poor	waste	disposal	
management,	water	scarcity,	biodiversity	loss,	wetlands	destruc-
tion,	deforestation,	and	climate	change.14
A	synoptic	review	of	the	regional	environment	shows	that	
natural	 resources	are	not	being	managed	 in	a	sustainable	and	
rational	manner.15	The	rate	of	degradation	and	exploitation	of	
resources	threatens	the	region’s	quest	for	sustainable	develop-
ment	and	thus	brings	great	challenges	for	the	judiciaries	in	East	
Africa.	With	the	region’s	high	levels	of	poverty,	food	insecurity,	
underdevelopment,	low	levels	of	awareness,	barriers	to	access	to	
information,	and	institutional	challenges,	the	judiciaries	have	an	
increasingly	critical	role	to	play.
The leGal FrameWork For envIronmenTal 
manaGemenT
regional
Within	East	Africa,	the	totality	of	law	is	derived	from	both	
regional	legal	instruments	and	national	legislation.16	In	addition,	
however,	 recourse	must	 be	 had	 to	 continental	 environmental	
laws17	and	 international	environmental	 laws,	 since	East	Afri-
can	countries	are	members	of	the	international	community.	The	
principal	legal	instrument	at	the	regional	level	is	the	Treaty	for	
the	Establishment	of	the	East	African	Community	(“Treaty”).18	
The	Treaty	was	signed	on	November	30,	1999	and	entered	into	
force	on	July	7,	2000,	heralding	the	rebirth	of	the	East	Africa	
Community	 (“Community”)	 as	 a	 regional	 integration	 bloc.19	
The	broad	objective	of	the	Community	is	stipulated	in	the	Treaty	
to	be	“the	development	of	policies	and	programmes	aimed	at	
widening	and	deepening	co-operation	among	the	partner	states	
in	political,	economic,	social	and	cultural	fields,	research	and	
technology,	defence,	security	and	legal	and	judicial	affairs.”20	
Broadly	speaking,	therefore,	the	Treaty	envisages	development	
of	programs	and	policies	in	a	diverse	range	of	areas,	including	
the	environmental	field.	Article	5(3)	stipulates	that:
For	purposes	set	out	in	paragraph	1	of	this	Article	and	
as	 subsequently	 provided	 in	 particular	 provisions	 of	
this	Treaty,	the	community	shall	ensure:
(a)	The	attainment	of	sustainable	growth	and	develop-
ment	of	the	Partner	States	by	the	promotion	of	a	
more	 balanced	 and	 harmonious	 development	 of	
the	Partner	states.
.	.	.	
(c)	The	promotion	of	sustainable	utilization	of	natu-
ral	 resources	of	 the	partner	states	and	 the	 taking	
of	measures	that	would	in	turn,	raise	the	standard	
of	 living	and	 improve	 the	quality	of	 life	of	 their	
populations.21	
Further,	Chapters	19	and	20	of	the	Treaty22	contain	substan-
tive	 provisions	 addressing	 environment	 and	 natural	 resource	
management	and	tourism	and	wildlife	management.	In	addition	
to	 these	 expansive	 provisions,	 the	 East	 African	 Community	
has	 also	 developed	 two	 protocols	 relevant	 to	 environmental	
management:	the	Protocol	for	the	Sustainable	Development	of	
Lake	Victoria23	 and	 the	 Protocol	 on	Environment	 and	Natu-
ral	Resources.24	Taken	together	with	international	instruments	
to	which	the	East	Africa	Partner	States	are	parties,	 these	pro-
vide	the	legal	framework	for	environmental	management	at	the	
regional	level.	
national 
Environmental	management	in	the	three	East	African	coun-
tries	derives	from	the	states’	constitutions,	parliamentary	laws,	
and	regulations	made	pursuant	to	such	laws.	Additionally,	the	
customs	and	traditional	practices	of	local	communities	continue	
to	provide	important	rules	and	provisions	for	the	management	
of	the	environment	in	all	three	countries.	The	framework	envi-
ronmental	 laws	 recognize	 the	 importance	 of	 such	 customary	
laws,	providing	that	in	determining	environmental	matters	and	
upholding	sustainable	development,	courts	should	be	guided	by,	
amongst	other	things,	the	cultural	and	social	principles	tradition-
ally	applied	by	communities	for	the	management	of	the	environ-
ment.	The	only	caveat	to	this	provision	is	that	such	principles	
and	practices	should	not	be	repugnant	to	justice	and	morality.25
The	principal	source	of	all	laws	in	each	of	the	three	coun-
tries	is	each	country’s	respective	constitution.	The	constitutions	
of	Uganda,26	Tanzania,27	and	Kenya28	treat	the	issue	of	environ-
ment	differently.29	Of	the	three,	Uganda	has	the	most	compre-
hensive	provisions	on	the	environment.	
In	Uganda,	 the	National	Objectives	and	Directive	Princi-
ples	of	State	Policy	of	the	Constitution	contains	a	directive	on	
protection	of	natural	resources,	which	provides	that	“The	State	
shall	protect	important	natural	resources,	including	land,	water,	
wetlands,	minerals,	oil,	fauna	and	flora	on	behalf	of	the	people	
of	Uganda.”30	There	is	also	a	directive	on	environmental	man-
agement,	 requiring	 the	State	 to	promote	 sustainable	develop-
ment	and	public	awareness	of	the	need	to	manage	land,	air,	and	
water	resources	in	a	balanced	and	sustainable	manner	for	present	
and	future	generations;31	promote	and	implement	energy	poli-
cies	that	will	ensure	that	people’s	basic	needs	and	those	of	the	
environment	are	met;32	create	and	develop	parks,	reserves,	and	
recreation	areas;	ensure	conservation	of	natural	resources;	and	
promote	rational	use	of	natural	resources	so	as	to	safeguard	and	
protect	biodiversity	of	Uganda.33	Although	these	provisions	are	
only	hortatory,	they	demonstrate	the	premium	that	the	Constitu-
tion	places	on	environment	and	natural	resource	management.	
Additionally,	the	substantive	part	of	the	Constitution	on	funda-
mental	rights	and	freedoms	guarantees	every	Ugandan	the	right	
to	a	clean	and	healthy	environment,34	and	gives	every	Ugandan	
the	right	to	apply	to	a	court	for	redress	if	that	right	is	violated.35
The	 Tanzanian	 and	 Kenyan	 constitutions,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	do	not	contain	an	enumerated	right	to	a	clean	and	healthy	
environment.	 Instead,	both	guarantee	 the	 right	 to	 life,	which,	
following	 the	 expansive	 jurisprudence	 and	 interpretation	 of	
other	courts	 such	as	 those	 in	Asia,36	has	been	held	by	courts	
in	 both	 countries	 to	 include	 the	 right	 to	 a	 clean	 and	 healthy	
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environment.37	 Additionally,	 the	 Tanzanian	 Constitution,	 in	
the	part	 on	Fundamental	Objectives	 and	Directive	Principles	
of	State	Policy,38	urges	the	Tanzanian	Government	and	all	its	
agencies	to	direct	their	policies	and	programs	towards	ensuring	
“that	public	affairs	are	conducted	 in	such	a	way	as	 to	ensure	
that	the	national	resources	and	heritage	are	harnessed,	preserved	
and	applied	toward	the	common	good	and	the	prevention	of	the	
exploitation	of	one	man	by	another.”39	
The	Kenyan	Constitution40	has	no	part	dealing	with	direc-
tive	policies.	Since	2001,	with	the	establishment	of	the	Constitu-
tion	of	Kenya	Review	Commission,	the	country	has	been	going	
through	a	structured	process	to	review	and	rewrite	its	constitu-
tion.41	As	part	of	that	process	and	following	the	National	Con-
stitutional	Conference	in	2004,	it	produced	a	draft	constitution,	
which	included	provisions	guaranteeing	the	right	to	a	clean	and	
healthy	environment	as	a	constitutional	right.42	The	review	pro-
cess	has	not	ended	and	has	been	dogged	with	controversy,	the	
result	of	which	is	that	the	environmental	provisions	remain	aspi-
rations	awaiting	the	adoption	of	a	new	constitutional	order	 in	
Kenya.43
In	 addition	 to	 constitutional	provisions,	 the	East	African	
countries	also	have	statutes	dealing	with	the	environment.	The	
principal	laws	are	those	referred	to	as	framework	environmen-
tal	statutes,	a	concept	that	emerged	in	the	1990s	to	describe	a	
statute	dedicated	 to	environmental	management	and	“encom-
passing	regimes	of	planning,	management,	fiscal	incentives	and	
penal	 sanctions.”44	Uganda	was	 the	first	 country	 to	 adopt	 its	
National	Environmental	Act45	in	1995,	followed	by	Kenya,	with	
its	Environmental	Management	and	Coordination	Act	in	1999.46	
Tanzania	closed	the	circuit	when	it	adopted	the	Environmental	
Management	Act	in	2004.47	The	Acts	provide	the	framework	for	
sustainable	environmental	management	and	create	the	institu-
tional	mechanisms	for	environmental	management.48	They	con-
tain	legal	provisions	reiterating	the	right	to	a	clean	and	healthy	
environment,49	establish	a	central	environmental	authority,50	and	
have	detailed	provisions	requiring	environmental	impact	assess-
ments.51	To	complement	the	framework	laws,	each	of	the	coun-
tries	has	additional	legislation	governing	specific	sectors	of	the	
environment	including	fisheries,	forestry,	wildlife,	and	water.52
DiSpute reSolution mechaniSmS for environmental 
matterS
Within	the	traditional	structure	of	government,	the	arm	of	
government	responsible	for	dispute	resolution	is	the	judiciary.	
In	all	the	three	countries	under	study,	the	judiciary	serves	this	
dispute	 resolution	 function.	 The	 constitutions	 of	 Uganda,53	
Kenya,54	and	Tanzania55	describe	the	structure	of	the	judiciary.	
In	Uganda,	in	addition	to	the	Constitution,	the	Judicature	Act56	
and	the	Magistrates’	Courts	Act57	provide	for	the	structure	and	
functions	of	 the	Ugandan	 judiciary.	At	 the	 apex	of	 the	 court	
structure	in	Uganda	is	the	Supreme	Court,58	which	is	the	court	of	
last	resort	with	appellate	powers	for	decisions	emanating	from	
the	Court	of	Appeal.59	Below	the	Supreme	Court	are	the	Court	
of	Appeal,60	which	also	serves	as	the	first	instance	constitutional	
court	in	Uganda,61	then	the	High	Court,62	which	has	unlimited	
original	jurisdiction	in	all	matters	and	such	appellate	jurisdic-
tion	as	conferred	on	it	by	the	Constitution.63	The	Constitution	
stipulates	that	 the	country,	 through	parliament,	shall	establish	
such	subordinate	courts	as	it	shall	desire.64	Pursuant	to	this	con-
stitutional	stipulation,	Parliament	has	provided	for	magistrates’	
courts	 to	hear	 limited	criminal	and	civil	cases	as	“reasonably	
practicable.”65	It	has	also	established	local	county	courts	to	hear	
simple	civil	cases	falling	within	their	jurisdiction,66	as	well	as	a	
military	court	system.67	
Tanzania’s	court	system	comprises	of	a	Court	of	Appeal	as	
the	final	court	with	appellate	 jurisdiction	over	decisions	from	
the	High	Court.68	The	High	Court	has	jurisdiction	as	specified	
by	the	Constitution	or	any	other	law.69	Below	these	courts	are	
the	Resident’s	Magistrate’s	Courts,	District	Courts,	and	Primary	
Courts.70
The	Kenyan	Constitution	provides	for	the	court	structure	at	
Chapter	IV.71	This	is	augmented	by	the	provisions	of	the	Judi-
cature	Act,72 the	Magistrates’	Courts	Act,73 and	the Appellate	
Jurisdiction	Act.74 The	Constitution	stipulates that	the	highest	
court	shall	be	the	Court	of	Appeal,75	with	powers	to	hear	appeals	
from	 the	High	Court.	The	High	Court	has	original	unlimited	
jurisdiction	to	hear	and	determine	all	civil	and	criminal	cases.76	
It	also	has	powers	to	hear	appeals	from	subordinate	courts.77	In	
2007,	 the	Chief	Justice	of	 the	Republic	of	Kenya	administra-
tively	created	a	Division	of	the	High	Court	charged	with	han-
dling	 land	 and	 environmental	 cases.78	 The	Constitution	 also	
empowers	Parliament	to	establish	subordinate	courts.79	Under	
this	provision,	Parliament	has	created	the	resident	magistrate’s	
courts,	which	have	jurisdiction	over	civil	and	criminal	matters.80	
Unlike	the	High	Court,	which	has	unlimited	jurisdiction,	the	res-
ident	magistrates’	courts’	jurisdiction	is	limited	both	geographi-
cally	and	monetarily.81
At	the	regional	level,	the	Treaty	for	the	East	African	Com-
munity	creates	 the	East	African	Court	of	Justice,82	consisting	
of	the	First	Instance	Division	and	the	Appellate	Division.83	The	
Court’s	jurisdiction	is	limited	to	interpretation	and	application	of	
the	Treaty,84	until	such	time	as	the	Partner	States,	on	recommen-
dation	of	the	Council	of	Ministers	shall,	by	protocol,	extend	the	
jurisdiction	to	other	areas	and	issues.85	So	far,	no	environmental	
matters	have	been	brought	before	this	court.
In	addition	to	the	national-	and	regional-level	courts,	there	
are	two	other	mechanisms	for	resolving	environmental	disputes.	
The	first	utilizes	informal	traditional	community-level	mecha-
nisms,	principally	the	institution	of	 the	elders.	Although	such	
traditional	institutions	may	vary	from	place	to	place,	most	com-
munities	 in	Kenya,	Uganda,	and	Tanzania	have	some	mecha-
nism	 to	 resolve	 disputes	 at	 a	 local	 level.86	 Secondly,	 there	
exist	quasi-judicial	mechanisms	and	 institutions	for	 resolving	
environmental	disputes	in	Kenya	and	Tanzania.	In	Kenya,	the	
Environmental	Management	and	Coordination	Act	creates	two	
bodies	with	limited	powers.	The	first	is	the	Public	Complaints	
Committee87	with	powers	 to	 investigate,	 either	on	 its	motion	
or	on	 the	basis	of	a	 report	by	any	person,88	any	action	of	 the	
National	Environmental	Management	Authority	or	any	case	of	
environmental	degradation	in	Kenya	and	subsequently	prepare	
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a	report.	The	Committee	is	essentially	Kenya’s	environmental	
ombudsman.89	The	second	is	the	National	Environment	Tribu-
nal,90	established	to	“offer	specialized,	expeditious	and	cheaper	
justice	 than	ordinary	 courts	of	 law.”91	 Its	mandate	 is	 to	hear	
appeals	arising	 from	administrative	decisions	of	 the	National	
Environmental	Management	Authority.92
Similarly,	the	Tanzanian	Environmental	Management	Act	
establishes	an	Environmental	Appeals	Tribunal93	to	hear	appeals	
arising	 from	the	decision	or	omission	of	 the	minister	 respon-
sible	for	environment	matters,	“restriction	or	failure	to	impose	
any	condition,	limitation	or	restriction	issued	under	the	Act	and	
approval	or	disapproval	of	an	environmental	impact	statement	
by	the	Minister.”94	The	Tribunal,	however,	has	yet	to	be	actually	
established.95	Uganda	has	not	made	any	provisions	for	such	an	
institution.
analysIs oF sIGnIFIcanT envIronmenTal 
judGmenTs
This	section	reviews	the	performance	of	the	East	African	
courts	 as	 a	 dispute	 resolution	mechanism	 for	 environmental	
matters.	The	enactment	of	the	constitutional	provisions	on	envi-
ronment	in	Uganda	in	1995	followed	by	the	adoption	of	frame-
work	environmental	statutes	 in	 the	 three	countries	heralded	a	
new	era	 in	environmental	management.	With	more	expansive	
provisions,	recognition	of	the	rights	and	obligations	of	citizens	
to	ensure	a	clean	and	healthy	environment,	and	more	relaxed	
rules	on	access	to	environmental	justice	in	conformity	with	the	
requirements	of	Principle	10	of	the	Rio	Declaration,96	one	would	
expect	more	robust	action	from	the	judiciary	in	East	Africa	than	
has	been	seen.	
Except	for	the	East	African	Court	of	Justice,	which	has	not	
had	occasion	 to	determine	a	case	of	an	environmental	nature	
since	its	establishment,97	the	national	courts	of	East	Africa	have	
demonstrated	 their	 contribution	 and	 approach	 to	 sustainable	
development	generally	and	sound	environmental	management	
in	particular.	This	section	reviews	the	landmark	decisions	that	
have	come	out	of	the	courts	in	East	Africa	so	as	to	determine	
the	emerging	trend	from	such	cases.	It	does	not,	however,	ana-
lyze	decisions	of	the	subordinate	courts	in	any	of	the	three	coun-
tries	owing	principally	to	the	absence	of	law	reporting	at	these	
levels.98
right to life anD a healthy environment
As	discussed	earlier,	of	the	three	countries,	only	Uganda	has	
constitutional	provisions	on	the	right	to	a	clean	and	healthy	envi-
ronment.	The	other	two	enumerate	those	rights	in	environmental	
statutes.	However,	courts	in	the	countries	have	been	supportive	
of	protecting	the	right	to	a	clean	and	healthy	environment.	
The	High	Court	of	Uganda	had	occasion	to	address	environ-
mental	harm	as	a	breach	of	the	right	to	privacy	and	the	home	in	
Dr. Bwogi Richard Kanyerezi v. The Management Committee 
Rubaga Girls School.99	The	plaintiff	complained	that	the	defen-
dants’	toilets	emitted	odiferous	gases	that	reached	the	plaintiff’s	
home	 thus	unreasonably	 interfering	with	and	diminishing	 the	
plaintiff’s	ordinary	use	and	enjoyment	of	his	home.100	In	spite	
of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 defendant’s	 school	 benefited	 society,	 the	
court	held	that	the	defendants	should	cease	using	the	toilets.101	
Although	this	case	was	argued	from	the	traditional	common	law	
principle	of	nuisance,	it	illustrates	the	use	of	privacy	and	home	
rights	to	protect	the	environment.102	
Kenya	and	Tanzanian	courts	have	had	to	grapple	with	what	
the	right	to	life	really	means	in	the	context	of	the	environment.	
The	question	has	been	whether	the	scope	should	be	extended	to	
include	a	right	to	the	means	necessary	for	supporting	life.	For	
example,	 because	 air	 and	water	 are	necessary	 to	 sustain	 life,	
does	the	right	to	life	necessarily	imply	a	right	to	clean	air	and	
water?103	The	courts	of	Kenya	and	Tanzania,	which	only	have	a	
“right	to	life”	standard	with	which	to	anchor	environmental	pro-
tection	via	their	constitutions,	have	both	returned	a	“yes”	verdict	
to	the	above	question.104	
Tanzania	appears	to	be	the	first	African	nation	whose	courts	
have	addressed	 the	scope	of	 the	constitutional	 right	 to	 life	 in	
provisions	 in	 the	 context	 of	 environmental	 protection.105	 In	
the	case	of	Joseph D. Kessy v. Dar es Salaam City Council,106	
the	residents	of	Tabata,	a	suburb	of	Dar	es	Salaam,	sought	an	
injunction	to	stop	the	Dar	es	Salaam	City	Council	from	continu-
ing	 to	dump	and	burn	waste	 in	 the	area.	The	City	Council	 in	
turn	sought	an	extension	to	continue	with	the	said	activities.	The	
Court	of	Appeals	of	Tanzania,107	in	denying	the	City	Council	
its	requested	extension,	held	that	their	actions	endangered	the	
health	and	lives	of	the	applicants	and	thus	violated	the	constitu-
tional	right	to	life.	In	the	words	of	Justice	Lugakingira:
I	 have	 never	 heard	 it	 anywhere	 before	 for	 a	 public	
authority,	or	even	an	individual	to	go	to	court	and	con-
fidently	seek	for	permission	to	pollute	the	environment	
and	endanger	people’s	lives,	regardless	of	their	number.	
Such	wonders	appear	to	be	peculiarly	Tanzanian,	but	I	
regret	to	say	that	it	is	not	given	to	any	court	to	grant	
such	a	prayer.	Article	14	of	our	constitution	provides	
that	every	person	has	a	right	to	live	and	to	protection	
of	his	life	by	the	society.	It	is	therefore,	a	contradiction	
in	terms	and	a	denial	of	this	basic	right	deliberately	to	
expose	anybody’s	life	to	danger	or,	what	is	eminently	
monstrous,	to	enlist	the	assistance	of	the	court	in	this	
infringement.108
Nearly	ten	years	later	the	High	Court	of	Kenya	reached	a	
similar	verdict	regarding	the	constitutional	right	to	life.	In	the	
case	of	Waweru v. Republic,109 the	applicants,	property	own-
ers	 in	 the	 small	Kenyan	 town	of	Kiserian,	 had	been	 charged	
with	the	offence	of	discharging	raw	sewage	into	a	public	water	
source	contrary	to	provisions	of	the	Public	Health	Act.110	The	
applicants	filed	a	constitutional	reference	against	the	charge,111	
arguing	that	they	had	been	discriminated	against	since	not	all	
land	owners	had	been	charged,	although	the	actions	complained	
against	 were	 carried	 out	 by	 all	 land	 owners	 in	 Kiserian.112	
Although	the	Court	agreed	with	the	applicants	it	went	on	sua 
sponte	(without	any	of	the	parties	raising	the	issue)	to	discuss	
the	implications	of	the	applicants’	action	for	sustainable	devel-
opment	and	environmental	management.113	The	Court	held	that	
the	constitutional	right	to	life	as	enshrined	in	section	71	of	the	
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Kenyan	Constitution	includes	the	right	to	a	clean	and	healthy	
environment.	In	the	Court’s	words:
Under	 section	71	of	 the	Constitution	 all	 persons	 are	
entitled	to	the	right	to	life	–	In	our	view	the	right	to	life	
is	not	just	a	matter	of	keeping	body	and	soul	together	
because	in	this	modern	age	that	right	could	be	threat-
ened	by	many	things	including	the	environment.114
Then	it	went	on	to	hold	that:
	It	 is	quite	evident	from	perusing	the	most	important	
international	instruments	on	the	environment	that	the	
word	life	and	the	environment	are	inseparable	and	the	
word	 life	means	much	more	 than	 keeping	 body	 and	
soul	together.115
locuS StanDi anD public intereSt litigation
The	 effectiveness	 of	 substantive	 legal	 provisions	 to	
protect	the	environment	hinges	upon	accompanying	procedural	
provisions	to	facilitate	enforcement.	One	key	aspect	relates	to	
provisions	guaranteeing	access	to	justice.	Traditionally,	under	
common	 law,	 in	 environmental	 matters,	 access	 was	 granted	
to	 individuals	who	had	 locus standi (standing	 to	sue).116	The	
normal	 rule	 for	 locus standi is	 that	 one	 should	have	 a	direct	
personal	 and	proprietary	 relationship	with	 the	 subject	matter	
of	litigation.117	This	followed	from	the	fact	that	litigation	was	
about	private	rights	and	interests,	and	the	“common	law	legal	
systems	.	.	.	always	.	.	.	ready	to	come	to	the	aid	of	individuals	
suffering	damage,	whether	of	a	personal	or	proprietary	nature,	
where	 the	 activities	 of	 others	 may	 have	 caused	 damage	 or	
loss.”118
This	private	nature	of	rights,	remedies,	and	litigation	tends	
to	 restrict	 against	 protecting	 environmental	 rights,	which	 are	
essentially	public	rights.119	To	remedy	this	situation,	there	has	
arisen	 public	 interest	 environmental	 litigation,	 where	 public	
spirited	individuals	and	groups	seek	remedies	in	court	on	behalf	
of	 the	 larger	public	 to	enforce	protection	of	 the	environment.	
The	success	of	Public	Interest	Litigation	requires	courts	to	have	
a	relaxed	view	on	the	rule	of	locus standi.120 
Traditionally,	courts	in	East	Africa	took	a	restrictive	view	
on	locus standi,	following	the	traditional	view	at	common	law,	
espoused	 in	 the	 famous	English	case	of	Gouriet vs. Union of 
Post Office Workers,121 where	it	was	held	that	unless	a	litigant	
could	demonstrate	personal	injury	and	loss,	the	matter	was	one	
within	the	realm	of	public	law,	where	only	the	Attorney	General	
had	locus standi	to	institute	the	action.	The	only	exceptions	to	
this	rule	were	representative	suits	or	a	relator	action.122	How-
ever,	especially	with	the	enactment	of	broad	provisions	in	the	
framework	environmental	laws,	courts	have	started	interpreting	
the	rules	of locus standi	liberally,	generally	holding	that	in	envi-
ronmental	cases,	individuals	have	standing	notwithstanding	the	
lack	of	a	personal	and	proprietary	interest	in	the	matter.	The	most	
celebrated	case	on	this	point	is	a	case	from	the	Tanzanian	High	
Court,	Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. The Attorney General,123	in	
which Justice	Lugakingira	departed	from	the	traditional	view	on	
locus standi, arguing	that	in	the	circumstances	of	Tanzania,	if	a	
public	spirited	individual	seeks	the	Courts’	intervention	against	
legislation	or	actions	 that	pervert	 the	Constitution,	 the	Court,	
as	a	guardian	and	 trustee	of	 the	Constitution,	must	grant	him	
standing.124
In Festo Balegele and 749 others v. Dar es Salaam City 
Council,
125	a	Tanzanian	 case,	 the	plaintiffs	were	 residents	of	
Kunduchi	Mtongani.	The	defendant	City	Council	used	this	site	
to	dump	the	city’s	waste	in	execution	of	their	statutory	duty	of	
waste	disposal.126	The	dumped	refuse	endangered	the	residents’	
lives.127	They	went	to	the	Court	of	Appeal	of	Tanzania	seeking	
restraining	orders.128	On	the	issue	of	locus standi,	the	plaintiffs	
were	held	to	have	standing	to	apply	for	the	orders	based	on	sev-
eral	factors.129	First,	they	were	residents	of	the	site	at	issue.	Sec-
ond,	the	site	fell	within	the	area	of	jurisdiction	of	the	defendant	
City	Council.	Third,	this	site	was	zoned	as	a	residential	area,	as	
opposed	to	a	dumping	site.	Fourth,	the	dumped	refuse	and	waste	
turned	the	area	into	a	health	hazard	and	a	nuisance	to	the	plain-
tiffs.	Therefore,	the	plaintiffs	were	aggrieved	by	the	action	of	
the	defendant.130	The	Court	echoed	the	sentiments	of	its	earlier	
decision	in	Abdi Athumani and 9 others v. The District Com-
missioner of Tunduru District and others.
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	In	that	case,	Judge	
Rubana,	writing	for	the	Court,	said	that	every	citizen	has	a	right	
to	seek	redress	in	courts	of	law	when	the	citizen	feels	that	the	
Government	has	not	functioned	within	the	orbit	or	limits	dic-
tated	by	justice	that	the	Government	had	set	for	itself.
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The	courts	in	Uganda	have	been	the	most	liberal	in	granting	
standing	to	plaintiffs	in	environmental	cases.133	Great	reliance	
has	been	placed	of	the	provisions	of	Article	50	of	the	Ugandan	
Constitution,	which	provides	that	“[a]ny	person	or	organization	
may	bring	an	action	against	the	violation	of	another	person’s	or	
group’s	human	rights.”134	Courts	have	interpreted	this	to	give	
every	person	locus standi.135	
In	Environmental Action Network Ltd. v. The Attorney Gen-
eral and National Environmental Management Authority,136	
a	public	interest	litigation	group	brought	an	application,	com-
plaining	about	the	dangers	of	second-hand	smoke	on	its	behalf	
and	on	behalf	of	the non-smoking	members	of	the	public	under	
Article	50(2)	of	the	Constitution,	to	protect	their	right	to	a	clean	
and	healthy	environment	and	their	right	to	life,	and	for	the	gen-
eral	good	of	public	health	in	Uganda.137	The	applicants	stated	
that	non-smoking	Ugandans	have	a	constitutional	right	to	life	
under	Article	22	and	a	constitutional	right	to	a	clean	and	healthy	
environment	under	Article	39	of	the	Ugandan	Constitution,138	
and	that	these	rights	were	being	threatened	by	the	unrestricted	
practice	of	persons	smoking	in	public	places.	The	respondents	
raised	several	preliminary	objections	to	the	application,	one	of	
them	being	that	the	applicants	could	not	claim	to	represent	the	
public,	 in	essence	challenging	their	 locus standi.139	The	High	
Court	of	Uganda,	in	dismissing	the	preliminary	objection	and	
holding	that	the	applicants	had	standing, relied	on	“cases	which	
decided	that	an	organization	can	bring	a	public	interest	action	
on	behalf	of	groups	or	individual	members	of	the	public	even	
though	the	applying	organization	has	no	direct	individual	inter-
est	in	the	infringing	acts	it	seeks	to	have	redressed.”140
Kenyan	courts,	though	initially	taking	a	restrictive	view	on	
locus	standi,141 have	in	the	last	few	years	caught	up	with	their	
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counterparts	in	Uganda	and	Tanzania,	liberally	granting	locus 
standi and	promoting	public	interest	 litigation.	The	new	view	
is	captured	by	the	words	of	the	High	Court	in	the	case	of	Albert 
Ruturi & Another v. Minister for Finance and Others,142	subse-
quently	quoted	with	approval	in	the	case	of	El Busaidy v. Com-
missioner of Lands & 2 Others:143
We	state	with	firm	conviction	that	as	part	of	the	reason-
able,	 fair	and	 just	procedure	 to	uphold	constitutional	
guarantees,	the	right	of	access	to	justice	entails	a	lib-
eral	approach	to	the	question	of	locus standi.	Accord-
ingly,	in	constitutional	questions,	human	rights	cases,	
and	public	interest	litigation	and	class	actions,	the	ordi-
nary	rule	of	Anglo-Saxon	jurisprudence,	that	action	can	
be	brought	only	by	a	person	 to	whom	legal	 injury	 is	
caused,	must	be	departed	from.	In	these	types	of	cases,	
any	person	or	social	groups,	acting	in	good	faith,	can	
approach	the	Court	seeking	judicial	redress	for	a	legal	
injury	caused	or	threatened	to	be	caused	to	a	defined	
class	of	persons	represented	144
regulation of property rightS
A	critical	issue	in	environmental	management	that	is	nor-
mally	 subject	 to	 litigation	 regards	 the	 regulation	 of	 property	
rights.	Developments	 in	 law	have	 led	 to	 the	evolution	of	 the	
concept	of	public	rights	 in	private	property145	so	as	 to	ensure	
that	use	of	property	does	not	affect	the	rights	and	interests	of	
the	 larger	public.	Two	particularly	critical	 tools	available	 for	
the	state	in	regulating	property	rights	are	eminent	domain	and	
the	police	power.146	How	both	powers	are	used	in	practice	and	
courts’	attitudes	towards	these	powers	demonstrate	an	emerging	
approach	to	sustainable	development	and	environmental	protec-
tion.	In	East	Africa,	courts	have	started	to	recognize	the	state’s	
regulatory	powers	and	the	existence	of	public	rights	in	private	
property.
In	 the	Kenyan	case	of	Park View Shopping Arcade Lim-
ited v. Charles M. Kangethe and 2 Others,147 the	Court	had	to	
resolve	an	 issue	regarding	 the	use	of	a	wetland.	The	plaintiff	
corporation,	 the	 registered	owner	 a	 piece	of	 land	 in	Nairobi,	
applied	for	an	injunction	seeking	to	evict	the	respondents,	who	
were	occupying	his	land.148	He	argued	that	their	occupation	was	
infringing	on	his	constitutional	rights	to	private	property.149	The	
respondents	on	the	other	hand	argued	that	the	land	at	issue	was	a	
sensitive	wetlands	area	along	one	of	the	tributaries	of	the	Nairobi	
River	and	that,	contrary	to	the	applicant’s	assertion,	they	were	
not	trespassers,	but	rather	persons	enhancing	the	environmental	
quality	of	the	land	with	a	permit	from	the	relevant	authorities.150	
While	 the	 applicant	wanted	 to	undertake	 construction	on	 the	
land,	the	respondents	were	operating	a	flower	business.151	The	
respondents	argued	that	the	proposed	construction	was	contrary	
to	 the	general	 right	 to	a	clean	and	healthy	environment	guar-
anteed	in	law.152	The	Court	held	that,	although	the	law	allows	
for	 regulation	of	property	 rights	 in	 the	 interest	of	 the	public,	
such	regulation	must	be	undertaken	in	a	lawful	manner.	Justice	
Ojwang	wrote:
If,	therefore	the	defendants/respondents	had	genuinely	
wished	 to	pursue	 the	cause	of	environmental	protec-
tion	.	.	.	the	logical	and	correct	cause	of	action	for	them	
would	have	been	to	approach	the	Ministry	of	environ-
ment	and	plead	for	compulsory	acquisition	of	the	suit	
land	.	.	.	.	[I]t	is	not	acceptable	that	they	should	forcibly	
occupy	the	suit	land	and	then	plead	public	interest	in	
environmental	conservation,	to	keep	out	the	registered	
owner.153
The	Court	further	ordered	the	Minister	for	Environment	to	
assess	the	status	of	the	land	and	take	appropriate	action	thereaf-
ter,	in	essence	recognizing	the	fact	that	property	rights	can	be	
regulated	for	environmental	protection.154	
The	High	Court	 of	Uganda	 has	 also	 confirmed	 the	 gov-
ernment’s	 right	 to	 regulate	property	 rights	 for	 environmental	
protection	 in	 the	 case	 of	Sheer Property Limited v. National 
Environmental Management Authority.155 The	 case	 involved	
an	application	by	Sheer	Property	Limited	seeking	to	quash	the	
refusal	 of	 the	National	 Environmental	Management	Author-
ity	 (“NEMA”)	 to	grant	an	Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	
license	for	the	respondent’s	proposed	development	on	its	land,	a	
wetlands	area	near	the	shores	of	Lake	Victoria.156	In	the	May	29,	
2009	judgment,	Justice	Mugamba	reached	the	conclusion	that	
NEMA	had	the	right	to	regulate	land	use,	the	private	property	
owner’s	rights	notwithstanding.157
environmental impact aSSeSSmentS
Environmental	 Impact	Assessments	 (“EIAs”)	 enable	 the	
examination,	 analysis,	 and	 assessment	 of	 proposed	 projects,	
policies,	or	programs	for	their	environmental	impact,	thus	inte-
grating	 environmental	 issues	 into	 development	 planning	 and	
increasing	the	potential	for	environmentally	sound	and	sustain-
able	development.	The	EIA	process,	as	argued	by	Hunter	and	
others,	 “should	 ensure	 that	 before	 granting	 approval	 (1)	 the	
appropriate	 government	 authorities	 have	 fully	 identified	 and	
considered	 the	 environmental	 effects	 of	 proposed	 activities	
under	their	jurisdiction	and	control	and	(2)	affected	citizens	have	
an	opportunity	to	understand	the	proposed	project	or	policy	and	
to	express	their	views	to	decision-makers.”158	The	EIA	is	also	a	
means	for	the	democratization	of	decision-making	on	environ-
mental	issues	and	the	allocation	of	natural	resources—however,	
this	hinges	upon	the	nature	and	the	extent	of	public	participation	
in	the	process.
East	African	countries	provide	for	EIAs	in	their	framework	
environmental	statutes.	In	Kenya,	a	change	in	philosophy	came	
about	before	the	framework	law	was	enacted	due	to	the	clamor	
by	 civil	 society	 to	 enact	 the	Physical	Planning	Act,	 1996.
159
	
This	Act	sought,	inter alia,	to	use	planning	as	a	specific	method	
of	preventing	environmental	degradation,	and	provides	for	the	
use	of	environmental	impact	assessments.
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	For	EIA	purposes,	
the	 Physical	 Planning	 Act	 obligates	 developers	 to	 seek	 and	
obtain	plan	information	from	the	relevant	 local	authorities.161	
Local	authorities	are	further	empowered	to	demolish	buildings	
built	without	their	permission.	In	the	Kenyan	case	of	Momanyi	
v.	 Bosire,162	 these	 planning	 requirements	 received	 judicial	
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recognition.	 In	 this	 case,	Momanyi	 was	 a	 resident	 of	 Imara	
Daima	Estate	 in	Nairobi.	Bosire	obtained	plan	information	to	
put	up	a	kiosk	at	the	entrance	of	the	Estate.	Rather	than	a	kiosk,	
however,	 he	 constructed	 a	 resort	 for	 selling	 liquor	 and	other	
related	products.	The	plaintiff	and	others	instituted	a	suit	against	
Bosire	and	the	Nairobi	City	Council.	The	court	held	that	Bosire	
was	in	breach	of	the	Physical	Planning	Act	requirements	relating	
to	plan	information.	Similarly,	the	City	Council	was	in	breach	
of	its	statutory	obligation	for	failing	to	demolish	the	building	as	
it	was	built	without	plan	information.163	Accordingly,	the	resort	
was	pulled	down.164
Similarly,	the	High	Court	of	Uganda	in	National Association 
of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE) v. Nile Power Lim-
ited
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	held	that	activities	of	economic	benefit	to	the	community	
must	be	lawfully	authorized.	In	this	case,	the	applicants	sought	
an	injunction	to	restrain	the	respondent	company	from	conclud-
ing	a	power	project	agreement	with	the	government	of	Uganda	
until	the	EIA	on	the	project	had	been	approved.	Although	the	
Court	declined	to	grant	 the	injunction	sought,	 it	declared	that	
the	Lead	Agency	and	the	National	Environment	Authority	must	
approve	 the	EIA	study	on	 the	project.166	 It	observed	 that	 the	
signing	of	the	protested	agreements	was	subject	to	the	law	and	
any	contravention	of	the	law	would	be	challenged.
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harnessInG The role oF courTs as champIons 
For susTaInable developmenT
The	environmental	challenges	facing	East	Africa	and	 the	
rest	of	Africa	are	many	and	growing.	Increasing	poverty,	land	
degradation,	 and	 the	 huge	 threats	 posed	 by	 climate	 change,	
against	a	background	of	corruption	and	other	governance	chal-
lenges,168	require	the	concerted	efforts	of	all	actors.	The	judi-
ciary,	more	 than	 any	 other	 institution,	 is	 uniquely	 placed	 to	
help	society	 implement	appropriate	strategies	 for	confronting	
these	challenges	and	to	thus	deliver	on	sustainable	development	
because	the	judiciaries,	by	their	nature,	are	expected	to	medi-
ate	between	different	interests	in	society	and	they	are	removed	
from	 the	 daily	 political	 pressures	 and	 interests	 that	 confront	
the	executive	and	legislature	in	most	African	countries.	In	any	
case,	the	laws	on	environmental	management	require	an	arbiter	
who	will	ensjure	that	they	are	adhered	to	and	transgression	dealt	
with.	Courts	in	East	Africa	are	slowly	waking	up	to	the	reality	
that	 they	have	this	critical	role.	They	are	starting	to	be	asser-
tive,	innovative,	and	inspirational	in	their	judgments.	However,	
they	 are	 still	 faced	with	 numerous	 obstacles	 requiring	 atten-
tion	if	they	are	to	be	fully	effective	as	champions	of	sustainable	
development.	Moving	into	the	future	requires	increased	capacity	
building,	the	development	of	robust	jurisprudence,	and	a	judi-
ciary	that	realizes	that	its	task	is	not	just	to	react	and	adjudicate,	
but	also	to	inform	and	provide	leadership.	Above	all,	judiciaries	
must	help	society	to	adhere	to	the	rule	of	law	and	inculcate	envi-
ronmental	ethos	and	values.	
Klaus	Toepfer,	 former	United	Nations	Environment	Pro-
gramme	(“UNEP”)	Executive	Director	wrote	in	the	preface	to	
the	book	Making Law Work, (Volumes I and II) - Environmental 
Compliance & Sustainable Development169	the	following:
The	future	of	the	Earth	may	well	turn	on	how	quickly	we	
can	 improve	 the	 legal	 framework	 for	 sustainable	
development	.	.	.	.	Sustainable	development	cannot	be	
achieved	 unless	 laws	 governing	 society,	 the	 econ-
omy,	 and	 our	 relationship	 with	 the	 Earth	 connect	
with	our	deepest	values	and	are	put	into	practice	inter-
nationally	 and	 domesticaly	 Law	 must	 be	 enforced	
and	complied	with	by	all	of	 society,	and	all	of	 soci-
ety	must	share	this	obligation.170	
The	judiciary	should	be	at	the	forefront	in	ensuring	that	East	
Africa	realizes	the	goal	of	sustainable	development.	For,	as	Jus-
tice	Ojwang’	has	written:
In	the	case	of	the	environment	.	.	.	the	state	of	the	law	
may	well	be	relatively	obscure;	yet	a	decision	must	be	
pronounced.	From	my	understanding	of	 the	 law,	and	
from	my	own	experience	of	judicial	decision-making,	
where	the	question	before	the	Court	relates	to	the	envi-
ronment,	and	the	legislature’s	guidance	is	by	no	means	
comprehensive,	the	Court,	once	it	ascertains	the	facts,	
must	appreciate	the	relevant	principles which	ought	to	
be	reflected	in	the	law	.	.	.	.	So,	whenever	the	Court	has	
an	opportunity	to	declare	the	law	on	an	environmental	
question,	the	shape	of	that	law	should	be	conservatory 
of the environment and the natural resources; and	the	
Court	should	apply	this	principle	to	determine,	where	
possible,	such	rights	or	duties	as	may	appear	to	be	more	
immediately	 linked	 to	 economic,	 social,	 cultural,	 or	
political	situations.171
The	 cases	 reviewed	 above	 demonstrate	 the	 great	 strides	
that	courts	in	East	Africa	are	making	in	promoting	sustainable	
development	in	East	Africa.	The	initial	seeds	have	been	sown,	
but	more	work	still	lies	ahead	to	ensure	that	courts	become	true	
bastions	of	justice	and	champions	for	sustainable	development.
Among	the	steps	that	need	to	be	taken	are	enhanced	train-
ing	and	capacity	building	for	the	judiciary.	Environmental	law	
is	a	fairly	recent	branch	of	law.	It	was	only	introduced	in	law	
schools	after	a	good	number	of	the	judges	currently	working	in	
East	Africa	had	already	graduated.	Even	after	the	subject	was	
introduced,	 it	was	 an	 elective	 rather	 than	 a	 required	 subject.	
Consequently,	not	many	judges	have	academic	knowledge	and	
experience	in	environmental	law.	It	is	therefore	critical	that,	as	
called	for	by	the	Global	Judges’	Symposium	on	the	Rule	of	Law	
and	Sustainable	Development,172	capacity	building	programs	on	
environmental	law	be	mounted	for	members	of	the	judiciary.	In	
Uganda	and	Kenya,	commendable	efforts	have	been	made	both	
by	UNEP	under	the	Partnership	for	Development	of	Environ-
mental	Law	in	Africa	program	and	by	local	civil	society	orga-
nizations173	to	organize	colloquia	for	judges	on	environmental	
law.	The	efforts	in	Tanzania	on	this	front	are	still	minimal.174	
With	 the	 establishment	 of	 judicial	 training	 institutes	 in	 East	
Africa,175	 training	 on	 environmental	 law	 should	 be	 entering	
the	mainstream	and	made	continuous	so	as	to	ensure	that	judi-
cial	officers	keep	abreast	of	the	latest	developments	in	the	field	
of	environmental	 law	and	 thus	are	better	able	 to	make	sound	
decisions.
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The	 three	 East	 African	 countries	 follow	 the	 doctrine	 of	
stare decisis	and	judicial	precedent,	where	decisions	of	previous	
superior	courts	are	binding	on	inferior	 tribunals.	To	be	effec-
tive,	this	process	requires	a	functioning	legal	reporting	system.	
The	 status	 of	 law	 reporting	 in	East	Africa	 is,	 however,	 very	
weak.	Kenya	leads	with	commendable	efforts	by	the	National	
Council	for	Law	Reporting.176	It	has	produced	a	volume	of	land	
and	environmental	reports,	containing	landmark	environmental	
judgments	in	Kenya	from	1909	to	2006.177	This	program	should	
be	emulated	in	all	three	countries	to	provide	easy	reference	and	
a	dedicated	law	reporting	process	on	environmental	cases,	and	
to	help	develop	a	sound	body	of	environmental	jurisprudence	in	
East	Africa.
There	is	also	need	to	modernize	courts	generally	to	increase	
their	 effectiveness.	The	 information	 superhighway	has	yet	 to	
reach	 the	courts	 in	East	Africa.	They	are	 still	 traditional	 and	
largely	 archaic	 institutions.	 To	 reap	 the	 benefits	 of	 informa-
tion	 technology,	modernization	of	 judiciaries	by	 introduction	
of	computers,	 stenographers	 to	 record	court	proceedings,	and	
internet	connection	would	greatly	enhance	the	performance	of	
these	courts.	The	effectiveness	of	the	judiciary	will	also	depend	
to	a	large	degree	on	its	independence	and	freedom	from	political	
interference,	especially	by	the	executive	branch,	and	its	fidelity	
to	the	rule	of	the	law.	
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Apr. 3, 2006, available at http://www.eac.int/advisory-opinions/doc_
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25	  See Environmental Management and Coordination Act, No. 8 (1999) pt. II 
§ 5(b) (Kenya) [hereinafter EMCA], available at http://www.reconcile-ea.org/
wkelc/env_mgt_act.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
26	  COnstitutiOn (1995) (Uganda), available at http://www.ugandaonlinelawli-
brary.com/files/constitution/constitution_1995.pdf.
27	  COnstitutiOn (1997) (Tanz.), available at http://www.issafrica.org/cdct/
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SuStainable Development law & policy
Clean	water	is	essential	to	human	development	and	sus-tainability,	yet	fragmented	management	of	transbound-ary	waters	puts	this	valuable	resource	at	risk.1	A	recent	
controversy	between	 the	governments	of	Argentina	and	Uru-
guay	over	the	construction	of	two	pulp	mills	on	the	River	Uru-
guay2	illustrates	the	tension	in	sustainable	development	between	
promoting	economic	prosperity	and	protecting	the	environment.	
On	May	4,	2006,	the	Argentine	government	instituted	pro-
ceedings	with	the	International	Court	of	Justice	(“ICJ”)	against	
the	government	of	Uruguay	for	allegedly	violating	a	1975	treaty	
that	imposes	obligations	on	the	two	nations	to	curb	pollution	in	
the	river	that	forms	their	border.3	Argentina	contends	the	dis-
charge	of	chemicals	from	the	pulp	mills	will	adversely	affect	the	
river	and	communities	settled	along	the	river’s	banks,4	an	asser-
tion	which	Uruguay	 denies.5	Argentine	 citizens	 protested	 by	
blockading	a	bridge	over	the	river,	effectively	disrupting	tourist	
and	commercial	activity	in	Uruguay,6	which	Uruguay	insists	has	
resulted	in	serious	economic	damage.7	
The	ICJ	 is	currently	deliberating	Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay),8	but	its	actions	thus	far	invite	
doubts	about	 the	ICJ’s	efficacy	in	adjudicating	transboundary	
water	pollution	disputes.	One	concern	is	the	reluctance	of	the	
ICJ	to	utilize	provisional	measures,	a	form	of	injunctive	relief.	
The	ICJ	denied	requests	from	Argentina	and	Uruguay	to	sus-
pend	construction	of	the	pulp	mills	and	end	blockading	of	the	
bridge,	respectively.9	Between	1946	and	1994,	the	ICJ	employed	
provisional	measures	in	approximately	half	of	the	cases	where	
one	or	more	parties	requested	such	intervention.10	Pulp Mills on 
the River Uruguay	is	the	first	case	since	2003	to	even	request	
provisional	measures.11	The	record	indicates	that	the	ICJ	resists	
wielding	this	powerful	tool	unless	the	requesting	party	can	prove	
imminent	and	irreparable	harm	to	their	interests,	opting	instead	
to	appeal	to	the	good	faith	of	the	parties	not	to	cause	injury	until	
the	case	has	been	formally	decided.12	Thus,	even	though	the	ICJ	
could	have	 issued	provisional	measures	within	six	months	of	
Argentina	filing	its	complaint,	both	Argentina’s	environmental	
interest	and	Uruguay’s	economic	interest	in	the	River	Uruguay	
have	gone	unchecked	for	over	three	years.
Further,	even	if	the	ICJ	exhibited	willingness	to	issue	pro-
visional	 measures,	 its	 capacity	 to	 enforce	 such	 measures	 is	
uncertain.	While	Article	94	of	the	United	Nations	Charter	allows	
recourse	 to	 the	Security	Council	when	a	party	 ignores	a	final	
judgment	of	the	ICJ,	no	such	similar	proceedings	exist	for	provi-
sional	measures.13	A	party	could	decline	to	abide	by	provisional	
measures	asserted	against	it	without	penalty.
The	extensive	transboundary	water	dispute	history	between	
the	United	States	and	Canada	provides	an	example	of	an	alterna-
tive	to	the	ICJ.	The	Boundary	Waters	Treaty	of	190914	estab-
lished	 the	International	Joint	Commission	(“Commission”)	 to	
prevent	disputes	 regarding	 the	use	of	boundary	waters.15	The	
Commission	is	independent	in	nature	and	comprised	of	officials	
and	permanent	employees	from	both	countries.16	Its	responsibili-
ties	include:	“(1)	quasi-judicial	determinations;	(2)	investigative	
and	advisory	assignments;	and	(3)	arbitrations.”17	The	Commis-
sion	first	encountered	transboundary	water	pollution	concerns	in	
1912,	when	it	was	asked	to	recommend	a	plan	for	preventing	
and	remedying	pollution	in	shared	U.S.-Canadian	waters.18	The	
Commission	also	played	a	central	role	in	a	contentious	dispute	
between	the	United	States	and	Canada	over	transboundary	air	
pollution	that	spawned	the	famous	Trail	Smelter	arbitration	in	
1941.19	More	recently,	in	1990,	it	adopted	a	policy	of	zero	dis-
charge	and	virtual	elimination	of	toxic	substances.20	
The	 longevity	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Commission	 are	
the	result	of	a	firm	commitment	to	pollution	abatement	and	an	
inclusive	approach	to	addressing	transboundary	water	pollution	
disputes,	which	encourages	public	participation	and	consensus-
driven	 initiatives.21	A	 transboundary	water	 pollution	 dispute	
cannot	be	settled	without	the	participation	of	officials	from	both	
countries.22	Moreover,	 projects	 that	may	 affect	U.S.-Canada	
boundary	water	require	approval	of	the	Commission,	which	is	
tasked	with	balancing	divergent	interests	fairly.23
The	Commission,	of	course,	is	not	flawless.	However,	if	the	
1975	River	Uruguay	treaty	included	a	similar	entity	to	address	
transboundary	water	pollution	disputes,	 the	Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay	case	may	never	have	progressed	to	the	ICJ.	The	
Commission	benefits	 from	a	strong	 framework,	dedication	of	
the	governments	directly	affected	by	transboundary	water	pol-
lution	disputes,	and	a	system	of	regulation	that	 is	flexible	yet	
efficient.24	Where	the	ICJ	attempts	enforcement	of	practically	
unenforceable	 international	 law,	 the	Commission	 encourages	
transparency	 and	 compliance.	 Regardless	 of	 the	 outcome	 of	
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay,	the	international	community	
must	develop	other	methods	of	resolving	transboundary	water	
pollution	 disputes	 before	 economic	 development	 and	 water	
quality	suffer	irrevocably.
iS the international court of JuStice the 
right forum for tranSbounDary water 
pollution DiSputeS?
by Kate Halloran*
* Kate Halloran is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University 
Washington College of Law.
Endnotes:	Is	the	International	Court	of	Justice	the	Right	Forum	for	
Transboundary	Water	Pollution	Disputes?	continued on page 85
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the international court of JuStice’S 
treatment of “SuStainable Development”  
anD implicationS for argentina v. uruguay
by Lauren Trevisan*
The	International	Court	of	Justice	(“ICJ”)	gave	the	concept	of	“sustainable	development”	its	first	thorough	airing	in	1997	 in	 its	 decision	 concerning	 the	Gabcikovo-Nagy-
maros	Project.1	In	this	decision	and	all	others	to	date,	however,	
the	ICJ	has	stopped	short	of	treating	sustainable	development	
as	a	core	adjudicatory	norm.2	The	pending	Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay)3	case	provides	the	court	
an	opportunity	to	refine	and	further	develop	its	treatment	of	the	
concept	of	sustainable	development.	
Though	the	ICJ	included	the	concept	of	sustainable	devel-
opment	in	an	Advisory	Opinion	in	1996,4	the	Gabcikovo-Nagy-
maros	case	was	the	ICJ’s	first	use	of	sustainable	development	in	
its	jurisprudence.	At	dispute	in	the	case	was	the	development	of	
a	system	of	locks	on	the	Danube	River	pursuant	to	a	1977	treaty	
between	Hungary	 and	Czechoslovakia.5	The	 purposes	 of	 the	
project,	which	began	in	1978,6	were	to	produce	hydroelectricity,	
improve	navigation,	and	protect	against	flooding.7	In	1989	Hun-
gary	decided	to	abandon	the	project,	largely	due	to	intense	criti-
cism	from	Hungarian	scientists	and	environmentalists	centering	
on	threats	to	groundwater	and	wetlands.8	In	response,	Slovakia	
attempted	to	continue	the	project	by	unilaterally	diverting	the	
river	to	serve	a	power	station	on	its	territory.9	
The	parties	took	their	dispute	to	the	ICJ	and	requested	that	
the	court	consider	 their	rights	and	obligations	under	the	1977	
treaty.10	In	making	its	determination,	the	ICJ	looked	beyond	the	
parties’	 treaty	relationship	and	referred	to	other	relevant	con-
ventions	 to	which	 the	States	were	a	party,	as	well	as	 to	 rules	
of	customary	international	law.11	It	also	considered	sustainable	
development	as	a	concept	central	to	the	resolution	of	the	dispute:
Throughout	the	ages,	mankind	has,	for	economic	and	
other	reasons,	constantly	interfered	with	nature.	In	the	
past,	this	was	often	done	without	consideration	of	the	
effects	 upon	 the	 environment.	Owing	 to	 new	 scien-
tific	insights	and	to	a	growing	awareness	of	the	risks	
for	mankind	.	.	.	new	norms	and	standards	have	been	
developed,	set	forth	in	a	great	number	of	instruments	
during	the	last	two	decades.	Such	new	norms	have	to	
be	 taken	 into	 consideration,	 and	 such	new	standards	
given	proper	weight,	not	only	when	states	contemplate	
new	activities	 but	 also	when	 continuing	with	 activi-
ties	begun	in	the	past.	This	need	to	reconcile	economic	
development	 with	 protection	 of	 the	 environment	 is	
aptly	expressed	in	the	concept	of	sustainable	develop-
ment.	For	the	purposes	of	the	present	case,	this	means	
that	the	Parties	together	should	look	afresh	at	the	effects	
on	the	environment	of	the	operation	of	the	[Slovakian]	
power	plant.12
While	in	this	case	the	ICJ	recommended	use	of	the	concept	
of	sustainable	development	in	sovereign	decision-making,13	it	
“stopped	short	of	declaring	or	referring	to	sustainable	develop-
ment	as	a	norm	of	customary	international	law.”14
Currently	pending	is	another	case	that	will	call	on	the	panel	
to	consider	issues	of	sustainable	development,	specifically	giving	
the	court	the	opportunity	to	resolve	the	questions	of	international	
environmental	 law	 and	 the	 legal	 implications	 of	 sustainable	
development	that	it	left	open	in	the	Gabcikovo-Nagymaros	deci-
sion.15	On	October	2,	2009	the	Court	heard	final	oral	arguments	
in	Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.16	In	2003	and	2005	Uru-
guay	authorized	two	pulp	mills	to	be	built	on	its	portion	of	the	
River	Uruguay,	which	constitutes	the	border	between	Uruguay	
and	Argentina.17	Argentina	alleged	that	the	mills	threatened	the	
health	of	the	river	and	local	residents	and	were	in	violation	of	
the	Statute	of	the	River	Uruguay,	a	1975	agreement	between	the	
two	nations	to	govern	the	river’s	management.
Argentina	claimed	 that	 the	Statute	of	 the	River	Uruguay	
incorporated	international	environmental	standards,	and	that	its	
right	to	protect	the	environment	of	the	river	is	derived	from	both	
the	letter	of	the	statute	and	the	“principles	and	rules	of	interna-
tional	law.”18	Uruguay	contends	that	its	duty	is	not	to	prevent	all	
pollution,	but	rather	to	follow	appropriate	rules	and	measures	to	
prevent	it	in	the	context	of	development.	19	Uruguay	claims	it	is	
subject	to	an	“obligation	of	conduct,	not	an	obligation	of	result”	
which	is	“consistent	with	the	principles	of	general	international	
law.”20
Both	parties	in	this	case	frame	their	rights	and	obligations	to	
protect	the	environment	of	the	River	Uruguay	as	complying	with	
“general	 international	 law.”	This	case,	 therefore,	 is	an	oppor-
tunity	 for	 the	 ICJ	 to	delineate	what	 it	 considers	 international	
environmental	standards	to	be.21	In	its	Gabcikovo-Nagymaros	
decision,	the	ICJ	“missed	the	opportunity	to	give	further	defini-
tion	to	the	concept	of	sustainable	development.”22	Over	ten	years	
later,	in	a	world	where	sustainable	development	is	arguably	an	
even	greater	concern,	the	court	should	take	this	opportunity	to	
set	a	basis	for	the	enforceability	of	international	environmental	
norms,23	including	sustainable	development.
*Lauren Trevisan is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University 
Washington College of Law
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towarDS a JuriSpruDence of SuStainable 
Development in South aSia:  
litigation in the public intereSt 
by Shyami Fernando Puvimanasinghe*
This paper presents an updated version of part of a chapter 
in “Foreign Investment, Human Rights and the Environment: 
A Perspective from South Asia on the Role of Public Interna-
tional Law for Development,” published by Koninklijke Brill 
NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, in 2007, which in turn consisted of 
an adapted version of the author’s PhD thesis.
InTroducTIon
South	 Asia,	 according	 to	 the	 grouping	 of	 the	 South	Asian	Association	 for	 Regional	 Cooperation,	 consists	of	Afghanistan,	 Bangladesh,	 Bhutan,	 India,	Maldives,	
Nepal,	Pakistan	and	Sri	Lanka.	Although	Southern	Asia	is	by	
and	large	one	of	the	economically	poorest	regions	of	the	world,	
it	is	rich	in	non-economic	terms—ecological,	historical,	cultural,	
ethical,	philosophical,	and	spiritual.	The	Indian	sub-continent	is	
home	to	a	value	system	involving	the	spiritual,	ethical,	individ-
ual,	and	collective	dimensions	of	human	life,	which	are	all	inter-
connected	and	require	mutual	accommodation,	as	all	phenomena	
in	nature	are	united	in	a	physical	and	metaphysical	relationship.	
Religious	traditions	and	philosophical	thought	in	Southern	Asia	
find	close	 links	with	 justice,	equity,	and	sustainable	develop-
ment;	non-violence	and	compassion	for	all;	reconciliation,	har-
mony,	equilibrium	and	the	middle	path;	equitable	distribution	
of	 resources	and	moderation	 in	consumption.	Throughout	 the	
colonial	and	post-colonial	history	of	most	of	the	countries	in	the	
region,	however,	the	traditional	wisdom	of	holistic	approaches	
to	development	have	been	gradually	replaced	by	globally	domi-
nant	models	of	economic	development	and	today	the	problems	
of	development	versus	the	environment	and	human	rights,	pov-
erty,	pollution	and	overpopulation:	indiscriminate	liberalization	
and	urbanization	are	commonplace.
In	a	variety	of	 issues	 ranging	 from	a	massive	 leakage	of	
methyl-isocyanate	gas	to	phosphate	mining,	and	from	the	noise	
of	 a	 thermal	 power	 plant	 generator	 to	 Genetically	Modified	
Organisms,	public	interest	litigation1	(“PIL”)	has	evolved	as	a	
popular	tool	in	the	South	Asian	region2	since	the	mid-1980s.	It	
has	taken	diverse	forms,	like	representative	standing,	where	a	
concerned	person	or	organization	comes	forward	to	espouse	the	
cause	of	poor	or	otherwise	underprivileged	persons;	and	citizen	
standing,	which	enables	any	person	to	bring	a	suit	as	a	matter	of	
public	interest,	as	a	concerned	member	of	the	citizenry.	Given	
the	various	and	numerous	classifications	that	divide	the	social	
fabric	in	this	region,	it	is	fair	that	poor,	illiterate,	legally-illit-
erate,	minority,	low	caste,	and	other	disadvantaged	and	under-
privileged	persons	gain	access	to	justice	through	distortions	of	
traditional	 doctrines	of	 standing.	The	 test	 for	 locus standi in	
these	cases	has,	within	limits,	been	liberalized	from	the	need	to	
be	an	aggrieved	person,	to	simply	being	a	person	with	a	genu-
ine	and	sufficient	concern.	In	addition,	class	actions	allow	one	
suit	in	the	case	of	multiple	plaintiffs	and/or	defendants,	and	have	
been	useful	in	this	area.
Before	the	Bhopal	disaster,	PIL	emerged	as	a	tool	in	cases	of	
social	injustice,	for	instance	bonded	and	child	labor,	and	issues	
of	public	accountability,	like	illegal	payments	to	public	officials.	
In	relation	to	challenges	to	development	projects,	Indian	courts	
had	consistently	been	slow	to	interfere	with	projects	beneficial	
to	development.3	In	the	case	of	the	Sardar	Sarovar	Dam	Project,	
PIL	was	invoked	by	the	Narmada	Bachao	Andolan,	challenging	
the	failure	to	ensure	rehabilitation	for	millions	of	persons	dis-
placed	by	the	construction	of	over	300	dams	across	the	Narmada	
river.	Protracted	litigation	ended	years	later	in	2000.4	The	main	
catalyst	for	the	evolution	of	PIL	was	the	Bhopal	disaster.	In	its	
immediate	aftermath,	the	victims	of	this	catastrophic	industrial	
accident	first	brought	action	against	Union	Carbide	in	India.	The	
Indian	government	then	passed	legislation,	assumed	the	role	of	
parens patriae,	and	filed	suit	against	the	parent	company	in	the	
US,	on	behalf	of	the	victims.	This	course	of	action	was	largely	
due	 to	 lack	 of	 legislation,	 enforcement	 capacity,	 and	 legal	
resources	in	India	at	that	time.	The	ensuing	case	of	In re Union 
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster5 concerned	liability	and	com-
pensation	for	thousands	of	deaths	and	personal	injuries.	How-
ever,	the	case	was	sent	back	to	India	on	the	basis	of	forum non 
conveniens.	Finally,	it	was	settled	out	of	court,	and	the	settlement	
was	given	judicial	assent	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	India.6	Thus	
the	issue	of	liability	was	never	adjudicated	by	a	court	of	law.	
Under	the	settlement,	Union	Carbide	was	to	pay	$470	million,	
generally	thought	to	be	inadequate.7	Poor	implementation	means	
that	victims	of	Bhopal	lacked	redress	for	decades,	as	highlighted	
on	the	20th	anniversary	of	the	disaster,	on	December	3,	2004.8
The	realization	of	the	total	incapacity	of	the	host	state	legal	
system	to	deal	with	such	a	disaster	led	to	the	passage	of	envi-
ronment-related	laws	and	litigation	in	India	in	the	years	imme-
diately	following	the	Bhopal	accident.	Most	states	in	the	region	
have	 since	 invoked	 legislative,	 constitutional,	 and	 judicial	
mechanisms	to	further	environmental	protection	and	sustainable	
* Having served as a Senior Lecturer, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka, and 
worked for human rights, health, HIV/AIDS, environment and development in 
non-governmental organizations in Gaborone, Botswana, the author, a Senior 
Research Fellow, Centre for Sustainable Development Law, McGill Univer-
sity, Montreal, Canada is currently employed in the intergovernmental sector 
in Geneva, Switzerland. This article represents the views of the author in her 
personal capacity.
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development,	and	their	experience	can	be	informative	for	other	
developing	countries.9	Legislation	for	environmental	protection	
has	now	been	passed	 in	most	countries	 in	South	Asia.10	This	
includes	provisions	requiring	environmental	impact	assessments	
for	 development	 projects,	 statutory	 environmental	 pollution	
control	by	administrative	agencies,11	and	environmental	stan-
dards	for	discharge	of	emissions	and	effluents.12
Several	constitutions	in	the	region	recognize	an	obligation	
of	the	state	as	well	as	citizens,	to	protect	the	environment.13	In	
addition,	the	right	to	life	(and	liberty)	is	enshrined	in	some	con-
stitutions14	and	has	been	interpreted	
by	 the	 judiciary	 to	 include	 the	
right	to	a	clean	and	healthy	envi-
ronment.15	 In	 the	 Indian	 case	 of	
Subash Kumar v. State of Bihar,	
the	petitioner	filed	a	public	inter-
est	 litigation	 pleading	 infringe-
ment	 of	 the	 right	 to	 life	 arising	
from	the	pollution	of	the	Bokaro	
River	 by	 the	 sludge	 discharged	
from	the	Tata	Iron	and	Steel	Com-
pany,	 alleged	 to	 have	 made	 the	
water	unfit	for	drinking	or	irriga-
tion.	The	court	recognized	that	the	
right	 to	 life	 includes	 the	 right	 to	
enjoyment	of	pollution-free	water	
and	air.	 It	 stated	 that	 if	anything	
endangers	 or	 impairs	 the	 qual-
ity	of	 life,	 an	 affected	person	or	
a	genuinely	interested	person	can	
bring	a	public	interest	suit,	which	
envisages	 legal	 proceedings	 for	
vindication	or	enforcement	of	fun-
damental	rights	of	a	group	or	community	unable	to	enforce	its	
rights	on	account	of	incapacity,	poverty,	or	ignorance	of	law.16
In	Pakistan,	an	adequate	standard	of	living	has	been	inter-
preted	 to	 include	an	environment	adequate	 for	 the	health	and	
well-being	of	the	people.17	In	the	case	of	Shehla Zia and Oth-
ers v. WAPDA,18	 the	 right	 to	 life	was	upheld	and	 interpreted	
to	 include	 a	healthy	 environment.	The	petitioners,	who	were	
residents	in	the	vicinity	of	a	grid	station	being	constructed	by	
the	respondents,	alleged	that	the	electromagnetic	field	created	
by	high	voltage	transmission	lines	would	pose	a	serious	health	
hazard.	It	was	held	that	the	word	“life”	cannot	be	restricted	to	
the	vegetative	or	animal	life	or	mere	existence	between	concep-
tion	and	death.	Life	should	be	interpreted	widely,	 to	enable	a	
person	not	only	to	sustain	life,	but	also	to	enjoy	it.	Where	life	
of	citizens	is	degraded,	the	quality	of	life	is	adversely	affected,	
and	 health	 hazards	 are	 created	 affecting	 a	 large	 number	 of	
people,	the	court	may	order	the	stoppage	of	activities	that	cre-
ate	pollution	and	environmental	degradation.	Since	the	scien-
tific	evidence	was	inconclusive	in	 this	case,	 the	court	applied	
the	precautionary	principle.	Noting	that	energy	is	essential	for	
life,	commerce,	and	 industry,	 the	court	held	 that	a	balance	 in	
the	form	of	a	policy	of	sustainable	development	was	necessary,	
appointing	a	Commissioner	to	examine	and	study	the	scheme	
and	report	back	to	it.
A	body	of	 jurisprudence	on	sustainable	development	and	
its	domestic	implementation	has	evolved	in	India.19	Most	other	
countries	 in	 the	 region	 have	 followed	 in	 the	 same	 direction.	
Their	 various	 efforts	 viewed	 collectively	 point	 to	 the	 evolu-
tion	 of	 a	 body	of	 regional,	 or	 comparative,	 jurisprudence	 on	
issues	of	development	and	environment	with	an	overt	human	
rights	dimension,	largely	through	the	agency	of	citizen	involve-
ment,	 legal	 representation	 in	 the	 public	 interest,	 and	 judicial	
innovation.	 The	 contribution	 of	
the	 judiciary—especially	 the	
higher	 judiciary—is	 striking,	
especially	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
lesser	commitment	to	sustain-
ability	 on	 the	 part	 of	 most	
third	 world	 politicians.	 The	
case	 law	 should	 in	 principle	
be	 applicable	 to	 both	 global	
and	 local	 business,	 provided	
that	transnational	corporations	
can	also	be	subject	to	domestic	
law	in	host	states.	Most	of	the	
cases	concern	local	industries,	
but	some	also	deal	with	trans-
national	 business.	 Whatever	
the	 factual	 context	 may	 be,	
the	 legal	 issues	are	 the	same,	
and	 the	 legal	 principles	 have	
been	applied	 to	 the	balancing	
of	conflicting	interests	of	envi-
ronment,	 development,	 and	
human	rights.	The	case	law	is	
therefore	of	basic	relevance	to	this	study	and	to	foreign	invest-
ment	activities.	
judIcIal InTervenTIon In susTaInable 
developmenT In The reGIonal TerraIn
Heightened	 sensitivity	 and	 concerted	 action	 in	 the	 judi-
ciary,	legal	profession,	and	civil	society	have	helped	to	create	
an	expanded	notion	of	access	to	justice20	and	to	foster	the	phe-
nomenon	of	PIL.21	Related	developments	 include	a	degree	of	
shift	from	adversarial	to	inquisitorial	judicial	methods22	suited	
to	environmental	issues,	a	broad	and	purposive	approach	to	stat-
utory	interpretation,23	and	a	measure	of	flexibility	in	procedure	
adopted	and	redress	granted.24	The Dhera Dun case25	involved	
a	 public	 interest	 petition	 addressed	 to	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	
India	by	the	Rural	Litigation	and	Entitlement	Kendra.	The	court	
directed	that	all	fresh	quarrying	in	the	Himalayan	region	of	the	
Dhera	Dun	district	be	stopped	and	ultimately	ordered	the	closure	
of	several	mines.	The	lessees	of	the	mines	submitted	a	scheme	
for	 limestone	 quarrying,	which	was	 rejected.	On	 appeal,	 the	
court	emphasized	that	the	environmental	disturbance	caused	by	
limestone	mining	had	to	be	balanced	against	the	need	for	lime-
stone	in	industry.	After	careful	consideration	and	study	of	the	
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issues,	mostly	on	its	own	initiative,	the	court	upheld	the	closure	
of	the	quarries.	In	view	of	the	unemployment	that	would	ensue,	
the	court	ordered	employment	of	the	workers	in	the	reforestation	
and	soil	conservation	program	in	the	area.	This	type	of	strong	
and	 proactive	 judicial	 action	 is	 evident	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 other	
PIL	cases.	Aruna Rodrigues v. Union of India,	for	example,	is	
an	ongoing	litigation	over	Genetically	Modified	Organisms	in	
which	the	Supreme	Court	has	placed	tight	restrictions	on	GMO	
crop	testing,	like	prescribing	safe	distances	for	test	crops	from	
other	farms	and	requiring	testing	to	confirm	that	no	crop	con-
tamination	has	occurred.26
Judicial	intervention	has	served	to	scrutinize	governmental	
and	private	sector	activities	and	abate	administrative	apathy.27	
Significant	measures	 include	 the	 creative	 usage	 of	Directive	
Principles	of	State	Policy,28	 judicial	 recognition	of	a	 right	 to	
a	healthy	environment,29	and	the	interpretation	of	an	adequate	
standard	of	living	to	include	an	adequate	quality	of	life	and	envi-
ronment.	In	cases	like	Juan Antonio Oposa v.	The Honourable 
Fulgencio S. Factoran in	 the	
Philippines,	 which	 recognized	
intergenerational	equity	and	 the	
right	to	a	balanced	and	healthful	
ecology,30	 human	 rights	 provi-
sions	 have	 been	 used	 for	 envi-
ronmental	 protection.31	 Judicial	
measures	 have	 also	 liberalized	
locus standi	 to	 include	any	per-
son	genuinely	concerned	for	the	
environment,32	 placed	 a	 public	
trust	 obligation	 on	 states	 over	
natural	 resources,33	 imposed	
absolute	 liability	 for	 accidents	
arising	 from	 ultra-hazardous	
activities,34	applied	the	polluter-
pays	and	precautionary	principles,35	
and	promoted	sustainable	development	and	good	governance.36
The	 Indian	 case	 of	Municipal Council Ratlam v.	Vard-
ichand37	extended	the	frontiers	of	public	nuisance	through	inno-
vative	interpretation	in	light	of	India’s	constitutional	embodiment	
of	social	justice	and	human	rights.	The	facts	arose	from	what	
the	Supreme	Court	described	as	a	“Third	World	Humanscape,”	
where	overpopulation,	large-scale	pollution,	ill-planned	urban-
ization,	abject	poverty,	and	dire	need	of	basic	amenities	com-
bined	with	 official	 inaction	 and	 apathy	 to	 create	 a	miserable	
predicament	for	slum	and	shanty	dwellers	in	a	particular	ward	
in	Ratlam,	Madhya	Pradesh.	Justice	Krishna	Iyer	confirmed	the	
finding	of	public	nuisance	by	the	lower	courts.38	Fortifying	judi-
cial	powers	to	enforce	laws,	the	judge	stated	that	the	nature	of	
the	judicial	process	is	not	merely	adjudicatory	nor	is	it	that	of	an	
umpire	only.	Affirmative	action	to	make	the	remedy	effective	is	
the	essence	of	the	right,	which	otherwise	becomes	sterile.	Justice	
Iyer	also	referred	to	the	need	for	the	judiciary	to	be	informed	
by	the	broader	principle	of	access	to	justice	necessitated	by	the	
conditions	of	developing	countries	and	obligated	by	the	Indian	
Constitution.	This	case	adopts	a	holistic	approach	in	terms	of	its	
orders	for	local	development	and	provision	of	basic	needs.	
Several	 recent	cases	of	public	 interest	 litigation	 in	South	
Asia	further	elucidate	the	concept	of	sustainable	development	
and	move	 its	 implementation	forward.	The	superior	courts	of	
India	were	the	catalysts	for	judicial	activism	and	innovation	in	
the	region	and	public	 interest	 litigation	 is	now	also	common-
place	in	the	lower	courts.	Cases	include	Akhil v.	Secretary A.P. 
Pollution Control Board W.P.;39	A.P. Pollution Control Board 
v. Appellate Authority Under Water Act W.P.;40	A.P. Gunnies 
Merchants Association v.	Government of Andhra Pradesh;41	
Research Foundation for Science v. Union of India;42	Chin-
nappa v.	Union of India43	and	Beena Sarasan v. Kerala Zone 
Management Authority et al.44	In	Research Foundation for Sci-
ence and Technology and Natural Resources Policy v.	Union 
of India et al.,45	a	public	interest	suit	led	to	the	appointment	by	
the	Supreme	Court	of	a	Committee	to	inquire	into	the	issue	of	
hazardous	wastes.
In	 Pakistan,	 recent	 cases	
include	 Bokhari v. Federa-
tion of Pakistan46	and	Irfan v.	
Lahore Development Author-
ity (“Lahore	 Air	 Pollution	
Case”).47	 The	 first	 case	 con-
cerned	 the	grounding	and	col-
lapse	 of	 a	 ship	 in	 the	 port	 of	
Karachi	 in	 2003,	 leading	 to	 a	
major	 oil-spill,	 which	 caused	
far-reaching	 environmental	
damage.	The	ability	of	the	legal	
system	to	respond	was,	 in	 this	
case	before	the	Supreme	Court,	
found	to	be	totally	lacking	due	
to	many	reasons	including	lack	
of	preparedness	and	failure	to	rat-
ify	relevant	international	conventions.	This	case	was	held	to	be	
suitable	for	public	interest	litigation.	The	Court	went	on	to	dis-
cuss	public	interest	litigation	as	it	had	evolved	in	India	and	Paki-
stan,	where	it	was	said	to	be	particularly	useful	because	of	the	
realities	of	poverty,	illiteracy,	and	institutional	fragility.	It	was	
found	that	in	Pakistan,	PIL	had	been	used	in	a	very	wide	range	
of	social	issues,	from	environmental	pollution	to	the	prevention	
of	exploitation	of	children.	The	Lahore	Air	Pollution	Case	con-
cerned	air	and	noise	pollution	from	rickshaws,	mini	buses,	and	
other	vehicles	and	the	non-performance	of	statutory	duties	by	
the	relevant	authorities,	charged	with	ensuring	a	pollution	free	
environment	 for	 the	 citizens.	 The	 court	 cited	 several	 Indian	
judgments,	including	Ratlam Municipality v.	Vardichand, where	
Justice	Krishna	Iyer	had	touched	on	the	need	to	be	practical	and	
practicable	and	order	only	what	can	be	performed.
In	 Nepal, Suray Prasad Sharma Dhungel v. Godavari 
Marble Industries et al.48	was	a	 landmark	case,	decided	by	a	
full	bench	of	 the	Supreme	Court.	The	Court	held	that	a	clean	
and	healthy	environment	 is	part	of	 the	 right	 to	 life	under	 the	
Constitution.	It	upheld	the	locus standi of	NGOs	or	individuals	
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working	for	environmental	protection,	and	directed	that	relevant	
laws	necessary	for	the	protection	of	the	environment	be	enacted.	
In	Sharma et al. v.	Nepal Drinking Water Corporation et al.,49	
the	Supreme	Court	emphasized	the	significance	of	pure	drinking	
water	to	public	health	and,	without	explicitly	saying	that	it	is	a	
basic	right,	expressed	that	its	provision	was	a	responsibility	of	a	
welfare	state.	The	Court	took	account	of	several	aspects	of	the	
Nepali	Constitution,	including	the	main	objectives	of	the	state,	
and	the	spirit	of	the	Constitution.	Without	issuing	a	writ	of	man-
damus to	guarantee	the	right	to	pure	drinking	water,	as	requested	
by	the	petitioner	public	interest	lawyer,	it	alerted	the	Ministry	of	
Housing	and	Physical	Development	to	hold	the	Drinking	Water	
Corporation	accountable	in	complying	with	its	legal	obligations	
under	its	governing	statute.	In	Sharma et al. v.	His Majesty’s 
Government Cabinet Secretariat et al.,50	 the	Nepali	Supreme	
Court	was	petitioned	to	“quash	a	government	decision	allowing	
unfettered	import	of	diesel	taxies	and	leaded	petrol	from	India.”	
It	held	that	a	healthy	environment	is	a	prerequisite	to	the	pro-
tection	of	the	right	to	personal	freedom	under	the	Constitution	
and	that	the	state	has	a	primary	obligation	to	protect	the	right	
to	personal	 liberty	under	Article	12	 (1)	by	 reducing	environ-
mental	pollution	as	much	as	possible.	Based	on	the	concept	of	
sustainable	development,	the	court	stated	that	the	environment	
cannot	be	ignored	for	development.	The	court	issued	a	directive	
to	enforce	essential	measures	within	a	maximum	of	two	years	
in	order	 to	reduce	vehicular	pollution	 in	 the	Kathmandu	Val-
ley,	well	known	for	its	historical,	cultural,	and	archaeological	
significance.	
In	 Bangladesh,	 the	 case	 of	 Bangladesh Environmental 
Lawyers Association v. Secretary, Ministry of Environment and 
Forests,51	concerned	the	neglect,	misuse,	and	lack	of	coordina-
tion	by	governmental	authorities	in	relation	to	Sonadia	Island,	
a	 precious	 forest	 area	 and	 rich	 ecosystem.	 Authorities	 were	
instead	alleged	to	be	preparing	the	land	for	industrial	purposes	
destructive	of	the	environment,	like	shrimp	cultivation,	thereby	
destroying	the	habitat	for	fauna	and	flora,	and	weakening	natu-
ral	disaster	prevention	benefits.	More	recently,	 in	Bangladesh 
Environmental Lawyers Association v.	Bangladesh et al.,	 the	
Supreme	Court	ordered	the	closing	of	ship	breaking	yards	that	
were	operating	without	necessary	environmental	clearance	and	
a	variety	of	actions	to	be	taken	by	the	government	to	prevent	
future	environmental	harm,	including	establishing	a	committee	
to	ensure	that	regulations	are	created	and	followed.52
publIc InTeresT lITIGaTIon and susTaInable 
developmenT landscape In srI lanka
Sri	 Lanka’s	 modern	 domestic	 jurisprudence	 is	 linked	
closely	 to	 relevant	 international	 law.	 The	 dynamic	 currents	
of	 sustainable	development	 law—especially	 in	 the	context	of	
human	rights,	public	interest	litigation,	and	the	environment—in	
the	domestic	courts	of	the	South	Asian	region	have	influenced	
the	 ebb	and	flow	of	 the	waters	of	 the	 island’s	 jurisprudence,	
making	 fundamental	 changes	 in	 its	 course.	The	 fabric	 of	 the	
domestic	law,	therefore,	acquires	new	motifs	and	designs,	creat-
ing	an	interesting	mosaic.	For	a	just,	equitable,	and	sustainable	
development	in	Sri	Lanka	it	is	necessary	to	identify	where	envi-
ronmental	degradation	and	resource	depletion	make	it	difficult	
to	meet	 basic	 needs,	 and	 to	modify	 human	 activities	 to	 both	
eliminate	undesirable	side-effects	and	satisfy	these	needs.53
Sri	Lanka’s	1978	Constitution	has	some	provisions	on	the	
environment	in	its	chapter	on	Directive	Principles	of	State	Pol-
icy	and	Fundamental	Duties.	Article	27(2)	says	that	the	state	is	
pledged	to	establish	in	Sri	Lanka	a	democratic	socialist	society,	
the	objectives	of	which	 include	 (e)	 the	 equitable	distribution	
among	all	citizens	of	the	material	resources	of	the	community	
and	the	social	product,	so	as	best	to	sub-serve	the	common	good.	
Article	27(14)	asserts	that	the	state	shall	protect,	preserve	and	
improve	 the	 environment	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 community.	
According	to	Article	28(f	),	it	is	the	duty	of	every	person	to	pro-
tect	nature	and	conserve	its	riches.	Although	Article	29	states	
that	 the	Directive	Principles	of	State	Policy	and	Fundamental	
Duties	are	not	justiciable,54	the	Sri	Lankan	Courts	have	given	
recognition	to	these	principles,	which	they	have	read	in	the	light	
of	principles	of	international	law.	In	a	dualist	country	such	as	Sri	
Lanka,	they	have	been	an	invaluable	aid	to	the	incorporation	of	
international	law,	and	have	facilitated	the	infiltration	of	interna-
tional	public	and	community	values	into	the	domestic	legal	sys-
tem.	The	Sri	Lankan	Constitution	does	not	provide	for	the	right	
to	life,	and	its	chapter	on	fundamental	rights	deals	mainly	with	
civil	and	political	rights,	with	limited	protection	of	social,	eco-
nomic	and	cultural	rights.	Given	these	limitations,	broad	inter-
pretations	of	the	Directive	Principles	by	the	judiciary	can	truly	
advance	social	justice.	As	pointed	out	by	Savithri	Goonesekere:
The	 jurisprudence	 being	 developed	 in	 the	 Indian	
Supreme	Court	 is	 important	for	Sri	Lanka	and	South	
Asia,	 since	 it	 provides	 insights	 into	 the	 manner	 in	
which	policy	perspectives	recognized	in	international	
standards	 can	 be	 integrated	 into	 domestic	 law.	 This	
process	 is	 important	because	 international	 treaties	 in	
India	and	Sri	Lanka	as	well	as	some	other	countries	do	
not	become	locally	enforceable	as	law	unless	they	are	
integrated	into	local	law	by	courts	and	legislatures.55
Many	public	nuisance	cases	constitute	the	relevant	jurispru-
dence	in	the	pre-environmental	era.	The	first	such	major	case	
in	Sri	Lanka	after	the	enactment	of	the	National	Environmental	
Act	(“NEA”)	was	Keangnam Enterprises Ltd. v.	Abeysinghe.56	
It	arose	from	a	complaint	by	the	inhabitants	of	a	village	in	the	
North-Western	province	 to	 the	Magistrate’s	Court	 (“MC”)	of	
Kurunegala	regarding	public	nuisance	from	blasting	and	metal	
quarrying	operations.	The	metal	was	used	to	develop	a	major	
road.	 Excessive	 noise	 and	 vibration	 from	 blasting	 day	 and	
night	had	led	to	severe	damage	to	person	and	property,	includ-
ing	 insomnia,	 fear	psychosis,	 loss	of	hearing	and	bursting	of	
ear-drums,	the	drying	up	of	wells,	failure	of	crops,	and	struc-
tural	damage	to	property.	The	Magistrate	granted	an	injunction	
restraining	the	operation	of	the	quarry	and	a	conditional	order	
to	remove	the	nuisance,	upon	which	the	company	applied	for	
revision	 to	 the	Court	of	Appeal	 (“CA”)	under	Article	138	of	
the	Constitution.	The	Keangnam	company	had	obtained	some	
licenses,	 such	 as	 a	 site	 clearance,	 but	 not	 an	 Environmental	
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Protection	Licence	(“EPL”)	as	required	by	the	NEA.	The	CA	
insisted	on	this	requirement,	which	the	company	had	applied	for	
but	not	yet	obtained.	The	Court	also	did	not	accept	 the	argu-
ment	that	the	possession	of	an	EPL	would	oust	Magisterial	juris-
diction	for	public	nuisance,	since	the	company	did	not	have	a	
license.57	In	a	subsequent	case,	the	MC	stated	that	the	blasting	
of	rocks	and	operation	of	a	metal	crusher	amounted	to	a	pub-
lic	nuisance,	even	though	the	company	had	an	EPL,	since	the	
terms	of	the	EPL	were	being	violated,	causing	severe	damage,	
including	physical	injury	to	persons,	damage	to	over	100	houses,	
and	metal	dust	pollution.58	The	quarry	was	required	to	comply	
with	the	standards	set	by	the	Central	Environmental	Authority	
(“CEA”)	in	the	EPL.	A	conditional	order	for	the	removal	of	a	
public	nuisance	was	also	granted	 in	a	case	of	pollution	 from	
untreated	chemical	effluents	discharged	into	public	waterways	
by	a	textile	dying	plant	causing	skin	rashes;	a	lime	kiln	around	
which	there	was	an	increased	incidence	of	cancer	and	tubercu-
losis;	a	factory	producing	rubber	gloves	and	boots	which	caused	
groundwater	pollution	from	toxic	chemicals	and	wastes	 lead-
ing	to	respiratory	problems;	and	a	factory	producing	sulphuric	
acid.59	In	Hettiarachchige Premasiri et al. v.	Dehiwala – Mount 
Lavinia Municipal Council,60	public	nuisance	provisions	were	
used	for	the	removal	of	a	nuisance,	in	this	case	garbage,	causing	
a	major	threat	to	public	health	as	well	as	danger	to	a	bird	sanctu-
ary	in	the	vicinity.	Since	the	nuisance	was	not	removed	by	the	
Municipal	Council	in	spite	of	having	been	given	ample	time,	the	
interim	order	was	made	absolute.	
In	all	these	cases,	the	environmental	factor	weighed	heav-
ily	with	the	courts.	While	this	is	indeed	a	welcome	position,	it	
is	submitted	that	sustainable	development	rather	than	environ-
mental	protection	per se should	be	the	guide	to	both	legislation	
and	case	law	in	the	developing	country	context.	Public	nuisance	
being	a	criminal	law	remedy	does	not	allow	much	leeway	for	
the	balancing	of	conflicting	interests,	unlike	its	civil	law	coun-
terpart,	private	nuisance.	The	facts	of	the	above	cases	are	such	
that	the	decisions	appear	to	be	just	and	equitable.	However,	this	
may	not	always	be	 the	case,	and	 it	 is	 important	 that	environ-
mental	protection	does	not	become	a	counterproductive	issue.	
Nuisance	remedies	are	ex post facto,	and	in	this	sense,	Environ-
mental	Impact	Assessments	(“EIAs”)	provide	a	better	source	of	
protection,	as	they	are	prospective	and	can	adopt	a	preventive	
approach.
PIL	has	also	become	a	common	feature	in	cases	concern-
ing	development,	environment,	and	human	rights,	which	have	
closely	linked	jurisprudence	in	Sri	Lanka.61	These	cases	usually	
involve	executive	or	administrative	action	and,	frequently,	busi-
ness	activities.	When	major	administrative	decisions	concern	the	
natural	resources	of	the	country	and	other	important	issues	of	
public	interest,	there	is	little	room	for	the	community	at	large	
to	question	these	decisions,	to	be	informed	about	their	implica-
tions,	and	to	ensure	accountable	and	good	governance.62	Deci-
sions	are	sometimes	made	behind	closed	doors	and	a	culture	of	
disclosure	is	not	common	in	public	affairs.63	In	this	context,	PIL	
serves	as	a	legal	tool	to	raise	issues	of	social	accountability	in	
decision-making	by	the	government	and	industry.
In	Sri	Lanka,	most	environmental	cases	have	been	based	
on	remedies	in	administrative	law,	fundamental	rights,	public	
nuisance,	and	the	public	 trust	doctrine.	The	question	of	 locus 
standi usually	arises	in	writ	applications,	which	are	particularly	
useful	in	invalidating	unlawful	action	by	governmental	bodies	
and	compelling	them	to	carry	out	their	statutory	duties,	respec-
tively.64	The	first	Sri	Lankan	case	 in	 the	nature	of	PIL	in	 the	
environment/development	 context	was	Environmental Foun-
dation Ltd. v. The Land Commissioner et al. (“The	Kandalama	
case”),65	which	concerned	the	granting	of	a	lease	of	state	land	
to	a	private	company	for	the	purpose	of	building	a	tourist	hotel.	
The	hotel	was	to	be	built	in	close	proximity	to	an	ancient	tank	
and	sacred	Buddhist	 temple,	upsetting	 the	 local	environment,	
both	natural	and	cultural.	In	spite	of	the	public	interest	suit	ques-
tioning	the	irregularity	of	the	lease,	and	in	contravention	of	the	
relevant	statutory	provisions,	 the	project	did	go	 through.	The	
positive	effect	of	the	case	was	that	the	authorities	were	ordered	
by	the	court	to	follow	the	correct	procedure	and	were	compelled	
to	do	so	by	providing	notice	in	the	newspaper.	This	case	was	the	
first	in	Sri	Lanka	to	uphold	the	standing	of	an	NGO	dedicated	to	
the	cause	of	environmental	protection.	It	had	important	implica-
tions	with	respect	to	access	to	justice,	the	role	of	the	judiciary,	
access	to	information,	public	participation	in	decision-making,	
and	compliance	with	and	implementation	of	the	law.	The	Envi-
ronmental	Foundation	 (“EFL”)	has	since	1981	filed	action	 in	
environmental	matters	without	its	locus standi being	challenged.
Environmental Foundation Limited et al. v.	The Attorney 
General (“The	Nawimana	case”)66	was	a	class	action	brought	by	
residents	of	two	villages	in	the	south	of	Sri	Lanka	and	involved	
a	fundamental	rights	petition	over	serious	damage	to	health	and	
property	 caused	 by	 quarry-blasting	 operations.	 The	 petition-
ers	alleged	 the	violation	of	 several	Constitutional	provisions,	
namely,	that	sovereignty	is	in	the	people	and	is	inalienable	and	
includes	fundamental	rights;	that	no	person	shall	be	subjected	
to	torture	or	to	cruel,	inhuman,	or	degrading	treatment;	the	free-
dom	to	engage	in	any	lawful	occupation;	freedom	of	movement	
and	of	choosing	a	residence;67	as	well	as	the	Directive	Principles	
of	state	policy.68	The	case	was	settled	through	mediation	of	the	
CEA,	and	the	petitioners	obtained	relief.	The	court	recognized	
the	 possibility	 of	 invoking	 fundamental	 rights	 provisions	 in	
environment-related	cases,	 and	 the	connection	between	envi-
ronment,	development,	and	human	rights.	It	also	accepted,	by	
a	majority	decision,	the	possibility	of	public	interest	litigation,	
since	the	first	petitioner	was	an	environmental	NGO.
In	Environmental Foundation Ltd. v. Ratnasiri Wickrem-
anayake, Minister of Public Administration et al.,69	there	was	
an	unequivocal	recognition	of	the	possibility	of	bringing	public	
interest	litigation	in	suitable	cases.	Until	this	judgment,	cases	in	
the	nature	of	public	interest	suits	had	been	heard,	but	with	no	
pronouncements	on	their	acceptability	as	a	matter	of	principle.	
The	judgment	is	therefore	significant	because	it	disposes	of	the	
issue	as	to	whether	public	interest	litigation	is	admissible	in	the	
Sri	Lankan	legal	system.	In	this	certiorari application,	Justice	
Ranaraja	expressly	extended	locus standi to	a	person	who	shows	
a	genuine	interest	in	the	subject	matter,	who	comes	before	the	
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court	as	a	public-spirited	person,	concerned	to	see	that	the	law	
is	obeyed	 in	 the	 interest	of	all.	Unless	any	citizen	has	 stand-
ing,	therefore,	there	is	no	means	of	keeping	public	authorities	
within	the	law	except	where	the	Attorney	General	will	act,	and	
frequently	he	will	 not.70	 In	Deshan Harinda (a minor) et al. 
v. Ceylon Electricity Board et al. (“The	Kotte	Kids	case”),71	a	
group	of	minor	children	filed	a	fundamental	rights	application	
alleging	 that	 the	noise	 from	a	 thermal	power	plant	generator	
exceeded	national	noise	standards	and	would	cause	hearing	loss	
and	other	 injuries.	Standing	was	granted	 for	 the	 case	 to	pro-
ceed	on	the	basis	of	a	violation	of	the	right	to	life.	Although	the	
Sri	 Lankan	 Constitution	 does	 not	
expressly	provide	for	the	right	to	
life,	it	was	argued	that	all	other	
rights	 would	 be	 meaningless	
and	futile	without	its	existence,	
at	least	impliedly.	The	case	was	
settled,	as	the	petitioners	agreed	
to	accept	an	ex gratia payment	
without	 prejudice	 to	 their	 civil	
rights,	 so	 there	 is	 no	 adjudica-
tory	decision.
In	 Gunarathne v. Hom-
agama Pradeshiya Sabha et 
al.,72	in	what	was	the	first	express	
reference	to	sustainable	develop-
ment	 by	 the	 Supreme	Court,	 it	
was	noted	that:	“Publicity,	trans-
parency	and	fairness	are	essen-
tial	 if	 the	 goal	 of	 sustainable	
development	is	to	be	achieved.”	
Here,	 the	court	refers	expressly	
to	 the	 prime	 elements	 of	 good	
governance, intrinsic	to	the	con-
cept	of	sustainable	development.	
The	court	stated	that	the	CEA	and	
local	authorities	must	notify	the	neighborhood	and	hear	objec-
tions,	as	well	as	inform	the	industrialists	and	hear	their	views	
in	deciding	whether	to	issue	an	EPL.	The	Court	imported	this	
requirement	in	the	licensing	process	even	though	the	law	was	
silent	on	the	matter.	The	Court	also	required	that	agencies	give	
reasons	for	their	decisions	and	must	inform	the	parties	of	such	
reasons,	thus	introducing	facets	of	natural	justice.	In	Lalanath 
de Silva v. The Minister of Forestry and Environment (“The	Air	
Pollution	case”),73	the	petitioner	averred	that	the	Minister’s	fail-
ure	to	enact	ambient	air	quality	standards	resulted	in	a	violation	
of	his	right	to	life.	The	Supreme	Court	ordered	the	enactment	
of	regulations	to	control	air	pollution	from	vehicle	emissions	in	
the	city	of	Colombo.	Regulations	were	enacted	pursuant	to	this	
decision,	which	had	the	effect	of	ensuring	steps	for	implementa-
tion	of	the	law	and	compliance	with	it.74	Leave	to	proceed	with	
this	case	was	granted	on	the	basis	of	a	violation	of	the	right	to	
life,	however,	the	case	was	decided	through	an	order	for	making	
regulations	without	dealing	with	 the	 issue	of	 the	right	 to	 life.	
This	case	is	significant	for	the	role	of	civil	society	with	regard	to	
laws	and	their	implementation	because	the	petitioner,	although	
himself	a	lawyer,	appeared	in	his	capacity	as	a	member	of	the	
citizenry.
The	case	of	Tikiri Banda Bulankulama v.	Secretary, Min-
istry of Industrial Development75	 is	 a	 significant	 example	 of	
how	consensus	reached	in	New	York,	Geneva,	or	The	Hague	
can	 touch	 the	 lives,	 livelihoods,	 and	 environments	 of	 people	
in	a	remote	village	on	a	distant	 island.	This	case	concerned	a	
joint	venture	agreement	between	the	Sri	Lankan	government	and	
the	local	subsidiary	of	a	transnational	corporation	for	the	min-
ing	of	phosphate	in	the	North-Central	Province.	The	terms	of	
the	mineral	investment	agreement	
were	 highly	 beneficial	 to	 the	
company	and	showed	little	con-
cern	 for	 human	 rights	 and	 the	
environment;	 indigenous	 cul-
ture,	history,	religion	and	value	
systems;	 and	 the	 requisites	 of	
sustainable	 development	 as	 a	
whole.	 It	was	 the	 subject	 of	 a	
public	interest	suit	by	the	local	
villagers	 (including	 rice	 and	
dairy	farmers,	owners	of	coco-
nut	 land,	 and	 the	 incumbent	
of	 a	 Buddhist	 temple)	 in	 the	
Supreme	Court.
The	 proposed	 project	 was	
to	 lead	 to	 the	 displacement	 of	
over	 2,600	 families,	 consist-
ing	 of	 around	 12,000	 persons.	
The	Supreme	Court	 found	 that	
at	previous	 rates	of	extraction,	
there	would	 be	 enough	depos-
its	for	perhaps	1,000	years,	but	
that	 the	 proposed	 agreement	
would	lead	to	complete	exhaustion	
of	phosphate	in	around	30	years.	According	to	Justice	A.R.B.	
Amerasinghe,	fairness	to	all,	including	the	people	of	Sri	Lanka,	
was	the	basic	yardstick	in	doing	justice.	The	Court	held	that	there	
was	an	imminent	infringement	of	the	fundamental	rights	of	the	
petitioners,	all	local	residents.76	The	particular	rights	were	those	
of	equality	and	equal	protection	of	the	law	under	Article	12(1);	
freedom	to	engage	in	any	lawful	occupation,	trade,	business,	or	
enterprise	under	Article	14(1)(g);	and	freedom	of	movement	and	
of	choosing	a	residence	within	Sri	Lanka	under	Article	14(1)(h).	
The	judge,	after	referring	to	the	concepts	of	sustainable	develop-
ment,77	intergenerational	equity,78	and	human	development,	as	
well	as	analyzing	the	agreement	with	reference	to	several	prin-
ciples	of	international	environmental	law,	including	Principles	
14	and	21	of	the	Stockholm	Declaration	and	Principles	1,	2,	and	
4	of	the	Rio	Declaration,	stated	as	follows:	
In	my	view,	the	proposed	agreement	must	be	consid-
ered	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 foregoing	principles.	Admit-
tedly,	the	principles	set	out	in	the	Stockholm	and	Rio	
Declarations	 are	 not	 legally	 binding	 in	 the	 way	 in	
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which	an	Act	of	our	Parliament	would	be.	It	may	be	
regarded	merely	as	“soft	law.”	Nevertheless,	as	a	mem-
ber	of	the	United	Nations,	they	could	hardly	be	ignored	
by	Sri	Lanka.	Moreover,	they	would,	in	my	view,	be	
binding	if	they	have	been	either	expressly	enacted	or	
become	a	part	of	the	domestic	law	by	adoption	by	the	
superior	courts	of	record	and	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	
particular,	in	their	decisions.79
This	pronouncement	 could	have	 significant	 ramifications	
for	 a	 dualist	 country	 like	Sri	Lanka,	where	 international	 law	
norms	need	to	be	embodied	in	enabling	legislation	to	be	bind-
ing	on	courts.	This	judgment	extends	the	incorporation	process	
to	the	intermediary	of	the	Superior	Courts.80	Deepika	Udagama	
comments	that	it	is	doubtful	that	a	petition	could	be	grounded	
directly	on	international	law	and	that	while	international	human	
rights	standards	have	been	increasingly	used	as	interpretive	aids,	
international	law	will	probably	still	have	to	be	pleaded	to	expand	
the	scope	of	existing	domestic	legal	provisions.81
The	court	disallowed	the	project	from	proceeding	unless	and	
until	legal	requirements	of	rational	planning	including	an	EIA	
was	done.	It	found	that	the	proposed	project	would	harm	health,	
safety,	 livelihoods,	and	cultural	heritage,	as	 it	even	interfered	
with	the	Jaya	Ganga,	a	wonder	of	the	ancient	world	declared	as	a	
site	to	be	preserved	under	UNESCO’s	World	Heritage	Conven-
tion.	This	cultural	heritage,	the	court	noted,	was	not	renewable,	
nor	were	the	historical	and	archaeological	value	and	the	ancient	
irrigation	 tanks	 that	were	 to	be	destroyed.	Having	considered	
the	question	as	to	whether	economic	growth	is	the	sole	criterion	
for	measuring	human	welfare,	 the	court	 stated	 that	 ignorance	
on	vital	facts	of	historical	and	cultural	significance	on	the	part	
of	persons	in	authority	can	lead	to	serious	blunders	in	current	
decision-making	processes	that	relate	to	more	than	rupees	and	
cents.	The	judgment,	 requiring	the	cancellation	of	 the	project	
unless	proper	procedures	are	followed,	draws	inspiration	from	
principles	of	 international	environmental	 law	and	sustainable	
development	(in	particular	the	separate	opinion	of	Judge	Weera-
mantry	in	the	ICJ	case,	Hungary v.	Slovakia82),	as	well	as	the	
ancient	wisdom	and	local	history	of	conservation,	sustainability,	
and	human	rights.	The	company’s	exemption	from	submitting	
its	project	to	an	EIA	was	held	to	be	an	imminent	violation	of	
the	equal	protection	clause.	Although	the	constitution	basically	
provides	only	for	civil	and	political	rights	to	be	justiciable,	the	
court	allowed	for	a	broader	interpretation	to	include	social	and	
economic	rights.83	Natural	resources	of	the	country	were	said	to	
be	held	in	guardianship	by	all	three	branches	of	the	government	
and	the	public	trust	doctrine	was	recognized.	The	judge	in	this	
case	has	been	lauded	for	having	taken	“the	parameters	of	 the	
discourse	on	constitutional	protection	of	human	rights	to	new	
heights.”84	Moreover:
While	harking	back	to	ancient	practices	does	not	gen-
erally	 provide	 grounds	 for	 a	 legal	 judgment,	 in	 this	
instance,	it	did	make	a	positive	contribution	by	empha-
sizing	 the	 universal	 and	 timeless	 nature	 of	 concepts	
such	as	 sustainable	development,	which	are	at	 times	
perceived	 as	 ‘western’	 or	 alien	 to	 non-Occidental	
societies.85
Mundy v.	Central Environmental Authority and others86	
concerned	several	appeals	relating	to	the	building	of	the	South-
ern	Expressway	linking	Colombo	city	with	the	city	of	Matara	on	
the	Southern	coast,	an	important	step	in	terms	of	infrastructure	
development	towards	enhancing	industry,	trade,	and	investment.	
Protracted	litigation	opposing	the	project	and	its	different	alter-
native	routes	involved	allegations	of	potential	damage	to	human	
rights	including	large-scale	displacement,	and	injury	to	the	envi-
ronment	including	sensitive	ecosystems.	The	Court	of	Appeal	
had	upheld	the	developmental	interest,	holding	that	when	bal-
ancing	the	competing	interests,	the	conclusion	necessarily	has	to	
be	made	in	favor	of	the	larger	interests	of	the	community,	which	
would	benefit	immensely	from	the	project.	The	Court	gave	high-
est	priority	 to	 the	public	 interest	 in	development,	 then	 to	 the	
environmental	damage	to	wetland	ecosystems,	and	lastly,	to	the	
human	interests	of	affected	persons.	Several	persons	appealed	to	
the	Supreme	Court	with	regard	to	particular	sections	of	the	route	
which	resulted	in	the	taking	of	their	lands	with	no	arrangements	
for	compensation.	The	Supreme	Court	varied	the	order	of	the	
CA	and	ordered	compensation	under	the	audi alteram principle	
of	natural	 justice	and	Constitutional	Article	12(1)	on	equality	
and	equal	protection.	In	an	innovative,	value-laden,	and	exem-
plary	expression	of	equity,	equality,	and	social	justice,	Justice	
Mark	Fernando	stated:
If	it	is	permissible	in	the	exercise	of	a	judicial	discre-
tion	to	require	a	humble	villager	to	forego	his	right	to	
a	fair	procedure	before	he	is	compelled	to	sacrifice	a	
modest	plot	of	 land	and	a	 little	hut	because	 they	are	
of	“extremely	negligible”	value	in	relation	to	a	multi-
billion	 rupee	 national	 project,	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 not	
equitable	 to	disregard	 totally	 the	 infringement	of	his	
rights:	the	smaller	the	value	of	his	property	the	greater	
his	right	to	compensation.87
Weerasekera et al. v. Keangnam Enterprises Ltd.88	
involved	a	mining	operation	alleged	to	violate	public	nuisance	
law	by	local	citizens	because	of	the	noise	level	of	its	operation.	
The	 lower	court	 found	 that	because	 the	mining	company	had	
acquired	an	EPL,	they	had	no	jurisdiction	to	hear	the	case.	The	
Court	of	Appeal	overturned	this,	holding	that	acquiring	a	license	
for	the	operation	did	not	excuse	the	Keangnam	mining	company	
from	public	nuisance	claims	over	the	way	they	run	their	opera-
tion.	This	holding	is	significant	because	it	limits	the	ability	of	
a	company	to	use	their	Environmental	Protection	License	as	a	
shield	to	other	legal	claims	over	the	impacts	of	their	operation.	
Still	 another	 significant	 case,	Environmental Foundation 
Ltd. v. Urban Development Authority et al.,89	 concerned	 the	
proposed	 leasing	out	of	 the	Galle	Face	Green,	a	popular	sea-
side	promenade	in	Colombo	city	and	a	major	public	utility	built	
by	a	British	governor	 in	 the	19th	century.	 It	has	always	been	
a	treasured	public	property	for	use	by	one	and	all,	but	was	by	
the	terms	of	the	proposed	lease	to	be	handed	over	by	the	Urban	
Development	Authority	(“UDA”)	to	a	private	company	to	build	
a	“mega	leisure	complex.”	The	Supreme	Court,	in	a	fundamental	
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rights	application,	upheld	the	argument	of	the	petitioner	NGO	
to	preserve	the	country’s	national	heritage	for	use	of	the	public.	
Very	significantly,	the	court	upheld	the	petitioner’s	argument	of	
infringement	of	the	right	to	information	by	reading	the	Consti-
tutional	Article	14(1),	on	the	freedom	of	speech	and	expression,	
as	encompassing	a	right	to	information.	This	line	of	argument	
was	adopted	because	the	Constitution	does	not	expressly	include	
the	right	to	information.	In	view	of	the	clandestine	nature	of	the	
agreement	 between	 the	UDA	and	 the	 private	 companies,	 the	
Court	also	held	that	the	petitioner’s	rights	to	equality	under	Arti-
cle	12(1)	had	been	infringed.
Environmental	Foundation	Limited	has	handled	over	three	
hundred	cases	dealing	with	environmental	matters	and	is	cur-
rently	engaged	in	litigation	covering	a	wide	variety	of	issues.	
The	Supreme	Court	has	asked	the	organization	to	intervene	in	
a	case	dealing	with	the	environmental	impacts	of	sand	mining.	
Other	ongoing	cases	have	dealt	with	air	pollution	and	included	
court	orders	for	mandatory	vehicle	emission	testing	as	well	as	
a	variety	of	actions	against	private	parties	for	noise	pollution	
and	other	torts.90	Public	interest	applications	filed	by	the	Cen-
tre	for	Environmental	Justice—another	environmental	NGO—
involve	 irregular	 and/or	 unregulated	mechanized	mining	 and	
transport	of	sand	from	sand	dunes	 in	a	wetland	ecosystem	in	
the	North-Western	Province,	without	permits	under	the	relevant	
statutes;91	activities	threatening	the	coastal	zone	and	its	habitats,	
including	destruction	of	mangroves;	sand	mining;	coral	extrac-
tion;	destructive	fishing	methods;	coastal	pollution	and	improper	
constructions—all	needing	urgent	coastal	pollution	control	and	
management.	
These	cases	are	filed	against	relevant	governmental	authori-
ties,	pleading	for	writs	of	mandamus	for	carrying	out	of	statutory	
duties,92	as	the	government	is	the	guardian	of	natural	resources	
on	behalf	of	present	and	future	generations	of	the	people	of	Sri	
Lanka.	The	most	recent	case	now	pending	before	the	Court	of	
Appeal,	and	filed	by	the	same	NGO,	concerns	the	protection	of	
a	major	national	park,	forming	a	wetland	of	international	impor-
tance	under	the	Ramsar	Convention	on	Wetlands,	and	alteration	
of	the	boundaries	of	this	park	by	the	governmental	authorities—
Centre for Environmental Justice v. Ministry of Agriculture, 
Environment, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development et al.93	
This	alteration	would,	it	is	argued,	pose	a	further	threat	to	the	
ecosystem,	already	endangered	by	landfills,	aquaculture	farms,	
fisheries,	pollution,	mining	of	minerals	and	the	clearing	of	man-
groves.	The	 petition	 argues	 that	 the	 action	 of	 the	 authorities	
is	in	breach	of	several	international	conventions	including	the	
Wetlands,	Cultural	and	Natural	Heritage,	Biodiversity	Conven-
tions	and	the	Bonn	Convention	on	Migratory	Species	of	Wild	
Animals,	several	declarations	including	the	Johannesburg	Dec-
laration,	and	relevant	articles	of	the	Sri	Lankan	Constitution.	It	
requests	writs	of	certiorari	and	mandamus.	
Three	decades	of	civil	unrest	in	Sri	Lanka	have	undoubt-
edly	slowed	the	progress	of	PIL	efforts	to	increase	sustainable	
development,	and	have	retarded	all	development	in	the	island.	A	
number	of	other	states	in	South	Asia	have	encountered	political	
turmoil	that	creates	unique	obstacles	to	sustainable	development.	
In	Sri	Lanka,	several	NGOs	demonstrated	resilience	and	resolve	
through	difficult	times	and	continued	to	file	suits	and	push	sus-
tainable	development	forward	through	the	court	system,	which	
has	by	and	large	been	receptive	to	their	efforts.	Now	with	the	
end	of	the	civil	war	and	what	one	hopes	will	be	the	dawn	of	an	
era	of	recovery,	reconciliation	and	resurrection,	there	is	renewed	
scope	for	sustainable	development	in	the	context	of	justice	and	
peace;	equity	and	solidarity	in	building	the	nation	of	post-con-
flict	Sri	Lanka.	
conclusIon 
In	the	South	Asian	region	as	a	whole,	public	interest	liti-
gation	has	been	useful	in	injecting	an	informed,	participatory,	
and	transparent	approach	to	the	processes	of	development,	and	
to	 governmental	 and	 private	 sector	 actions	 involving	 public	
resources.	It	has	provided	a	voice	to	persons	who	would	other-
wise	be	unheard.	Through	PIL,	multiple	sectors	and	stakehold-
ers	become	involved	in	the	development	process,	as	envisaged	
in	the	idea	of	sustainable	development.	PIL	has	brought	forth	an	
element	of	accountability,	and	created	a	space	for	the	portrayal	
of	a	human	face	in	development.	The	tool	of	PIL	has	afforded	a	
viable	mechanism	for	compliance	with	sustainable	development	
norms	in	a	creative,	 innovative,	and	imaginative	manner,	and	
also	helped	to	make	the	development	process	more	holistic.	On	
the	other	hand,	however,	it	has	also	meant	that	courts	become	
directly	involved	in	making	policy	decisions.	This	in	turn	has	
both	positive	and	negative	 ramifications,	and	 is	by	no	means	
uncontroversial.	 It	 could	 create	 a	 system	of	 decision-making	
that	is,	in	a	sense,	ex post facto	and	decentralized.	If	not	kept	
within	certain	 limits,	 it	could	divert	 the	development	process	
away	from	the	policy-planning	objectives	of	the	state,	leading	
to	 inconsistency	and	 incoherence.	One	 safeguard	here	 is	 that	
most	cases	revolve	around	the	central	issue	of	the	lawfulness	of	
a	decision	or	action.	
PIL	could	be	abused,	overused,	and	misused.	There	must	
therefore	be	checks,	balances,	and	limitations	in	order	that	the	
development	process	is	not	interfered	with	unnecessarily.	Prin-
ciples	of	 international	 law	should	be	 selectively	adopted	and	
suitably	adapted	to	domestic	contexts.	There	is	a	tendency	to	use	
these	tools	to	oppose	development	projects,	particularly	because	
of	opposition	 in	 the	political	arena	or	other	dynamics	 includ-
ing	religion,	culture,	or	personal	reasons.	In	order	to	maintain	
its	credibility,	PIL	should	be	steered	towards	the	attainment	of	
sustainable	development	rather	than	the	opposition	to	all	devel-
opment.	What	 is	 important	 is	 to	promote	development	 that	 is	
sustainable.	 In	 fact,	 the	 concept	 of	 sustainable	 development	
stands	 for	 the	 spirit	 of	 reconciliation	 and	 cooperation	 rather	
than	conflict	and	confrontation,	making	environmental	protec-
tion	an	integral	component	of	development.	Otherwise,	it	would	
be	counterproductive	to	the	whole	project	of	development,	and	
therefore	to	all	persons,	who	should	be	at	the	center	of	develop-
ment,	and	its	true	beneficiaries.	Sustainable	development	inte-
grates	the	right	to	development,	and	inter	and	intra-generational	
equity.	As	stated	in	Article	1	of	the	Declaration	on	the	Right	to	
Development,	“the	right	to	development	is	an	inalienable	human	
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right	by	virtue	of	which	every	human	person	and	all	peoples	
are	entitled	to	participate	in,	contribute	to,	and	enjoy	economic,	
social,	cultural	and	political	development,	in	which	all	human	
rights	and	fundamental	freedoms	can	be	fully	realized.”94
The	content	of	much	of	the	jurisprudence	tends	to	concern	
the	negative	aspects	of	large	development	projects,	such	as	dis-
placement,	and	of	industrialization,	such	as	pollution.	This	could	
be	related	to	the	influence	of	norms	of	environmental	protection	
emerging	from	international	law,	and	the	comparative	experi-
ence	and	jurisprudence	of	the	“western”	developed	world.	Envi-
ronmental	 legislation	 in	 developing	 countries	 often	 emulates	
that	of	developed	countries,	and	is	sometimes	a	virtual	reproduc-
tion.	This	is	not	an	ideal	practice,	as	the	context	of	each	coun-
try	is	different.	On	some	occasions,	explicit	reference	has	been	
made	to	international	law.	At	other	times	there	is	no	reference	
and	 the	 reasoning	 process	 is	 independent,	 but	 the	 arguments	
and	decisions	come	remarkably	close	to	the	law	of	sustainable	
development.	What	is	clear	is	that	the	domestic	jurisprudence	
is	influenced	by	international	law,	and	how	this	law	has	taken	
shape	in	the	domestic	courts	of	several	states	in	South	Asia,	as	
judiciaries	in	the	region	have	been	influenced	by	developments	
in	neighboring	states.
Many	concerns	have	been	raised	about	the	enforcement	of	
decisions	flowing	from	PIL,	which	often	lags	behind	the	deci-
sions	and	orders.	In	fact,	the	experience	of	South	Asia	has	been	
that	implementation	and	enforcement	have	tended	to	lag	behind	
the	adjudication	of	cases	and	making	of	orders.	If	enforcement	
does	not	keep	pace	with	the	jurisprudence,	 the	whole	process	
will	become	futile	and	counterproductive.	Therefore,	an	effort	
must	be	made	to	ensure	expedient	enforcement	of	orders.	Orders	
frequently	give	remedies	such	as	the	installation	of	safeguards	
in	factories,	rather	than	their	closure,	and	this	is	in	line	with	the	
constructive	spirit	of	sustainable	development	in	its	quest	for	a	
balance.	Equilibrium,	the	middle	path	and	mutual	accommoda-
tion	interconnect	with	strands	of	the	complex	web	of	the	South	
Asian	heritage	-	in	all	its	diversity	and	yet	the	unity	of	all	phe-
nomena,	its	abject	poverty	and	yet	the	abundance	of	its	wealth.	
1	  D. Nesiah, Keynote Address at the All-Asian Public Interest Environmental 
Law Conference in Nuwara Eliya (Dec. 1, 1991); H. Dembowski, Taking the 
State to Court, Public Interest Litigation and the Public Sphere in Metropolitan 
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&ULINK=4&UULINK=0#438_.
2	  According to Justice Bhagwathi, former Chief Justice of India: “Law as I 
conceive it, is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action 
when someone with real public interest ignites the jurisdiction . . . public inter-
est litigation is part of the process of participatory justice and standing in civil 
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Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union, Sindri & others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344, avail-
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instance, refused to interfere with several development projects in the 1980s, 
including those relating to power production, oil refineries, bridges and interna-
tional airports.
4	  Narmada Bachao Andalan v. Union of India & others, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 
3345, available at http://www.ielrc.org/content/c0001.pdf. 
5	  In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (aff’d as modified); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant 
Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987).
6	  Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 273, available at 
http://www.commonlii.org/cgi-commonlii/disp.pl/in/cases/INSC/1989/179.
html?query=union+carbide.
7	  See, e.g., Indira Jaising, Bhopal, Settlement or Sell-Out?, the lawyers, Mar. 
1984, at 4.
8	  Proceedings of the Int’l Conference on the 20th Anniversary of the Bhopal 
Gas Tragedy, “The Bhopal Gas Tragedy and its Effects on Process Safety,” 
Dec. 1–3, 2004, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, India, available at 
http://www.iitk.ac.in/che/jpg/bhopal2.htm.
9	  C.G. Weeramantry, Private International Law & Public International Law, 
34 rivista Di DirittO internaziOnale private e prOCessuale 313, 324 (1998). 
10	  Environmental Conservation Act, No.1 (1995) (Bangl.);  The Environment 
Protection Act, No. 29 of 1986; inDia CODe (1991);  Water (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act of 1974, No. 6 of 1974; inDia CODe (1974);  Air (Pre-
vention and Control of Pollution) Act, No. 14 of 1981; inDia CODe (1981);  The 
National Environmental Act, No. 47 (1980) (Sri Lanka);  The Environmental 
Protection Act, No. 34 (1997) (Pak.);  The Environmental Protection Act, No. 
24 (1997) (Nepal);  The Environmental Protection & Preservation Act of 1993, 
No. 4 (1993) (Maldives);  The National Environmental Protection Act of 2007 
(Bhutan).  In Bhutan, environmental conservation and sustainable develop-
ment form part of the beliefs and values, inherent to the community. They are 
high on the policy agenda, integrated into measures like the Environmental 
Assessment Act 2000, Biodiversity Act 2003, and the work of the National 
Environmental Commission, and will be central in the National Environmental 
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11	  In Sri Lanka for example, the Central Environmental Authority and local 
authorities issue Environmental Protection Licenses.
12	  Part IV B of the National Environmental Act of Sri Lanka regulates envi-
ronmental quality for inland waters and the atmosphere.  The National Environ-
mental Act, supra note 10.
13	  inDia COnst. arts. 48a & 51a(g); nepal COnst. art. 26(4) (referring to the 
need to prevent further damage to the environment through development, 
by raising public awareness); sri lanKa COnst. art. 27(14) (“the State shall 
protect, preserve and improve the environment for the benefit of the commu-
nity”); sri lanKa COnst. art. 28(f) (“the exercise and enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms is inseparable from the performance of duties and obligations and 
accordingly it is the duty of every person in Sri Lanka (f ) to protect nature and 
conserve its riches”); sri lanKa COnst. art. 27(4) (providing that the State shall 
strengthen and broaden the democratic structure of government and the demo-
cratic rights of “the People by decentralizing administration and affording all 
possible opportunities to the People to participate at every level of national life 
and in government.”).
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tenSion between hyDroelectric energy’S 
benefitS aS a renewable anD itS Detrimental 
effectS on enDangereD SpecieS
by Janet M. Hager*
Renewable	energy	has	come	to	the	forefront	politically	as	
one	of	the	means	of	achieving	energy	independence,	address-
ing	the	problem	of	climate	change,	and	restoring	the	economy.1	
Although	 renewable	 energy	 sources	will	 be	 a	 crucial	 tool	 in	
the	fight	against	climate	change,	 they	often	create	other	envi-
ronmental	 problems.2	 A	 recent	
Ninth	 Circuit	 Court	 of	Appeals	
decision,	National Wildlife Fed-
eration v. National Marine Fish-
eries Service,	 exemplifies	 how	
one	 form	 of	 renewable	 energy,	
hydroelectric	 power,	 has	 been	
challenged	by	the	environmental	
community	 for	 its	 detrimental	
effect	 on	 endangered	 fish	 spe-
cies.3	The	case	demonstrates	that,	
as	Congress	moves	to	incentivize	
hydroelectric	 power,	 there	 may	
be	a	 temptation	 for	Congress	 to	
exploit	 a	 judicial	 loophole	 to	
make	 the	 Endangered	 Species	
Act	(“ESA”)	inapplicable	to	dam	
operations.	
Hydroelectric	 power	 is	 cre-
ated	 by	 converting	 the	 kinetic	
energy	of	flowing	water	into	elec-
tricity,	typically	through	the	release	of	river	water	held	in	a	res-
ervoir	behind	a	dam	through	a	turbine.4	Although	hydroelectric	
power	is	the	most	prevalent	form	of	renewable	electricity	pro-
duction	in	the	United	States,5	currently	only	about	three	percent	
of	America’s	dams	have	the	capability	to	generate	electricity.6	
In	2007,	hydroelectric	power	constituted	5.8%	of	the	net	gen-
eration	of	electric	power,7	while	all	other	forms	of	renewable	
energy	combined	were	only	2.5%	of	the	net	generation	of	elec-
tric	power.8
Hydroelectric	power	has	garnered	increasing	political	sup-
port	as	the	nation’s	interest	in	clean	energy	has	gained	momen-
tum.	U.S.	Department	of	Energy	(“DOE”)	recently	announced	
that	it	would	dedicate	up	to	thirty-two	million	dollars	in	funding	
received	from	the	American	Reinvestment	and	Recovery	Act	of	
2009	to	add	new	turbines	and	control	technologies	to	existing	
non-federal	hydroelectric	power	projects.9	Additionally,	the	Act	
extends	eligibility	for	the	renewable	energy	production	tax	credit	
by	three	years.10	Hydroelectric	energy	is	also	included	as	one	of	
the	qualified	renewable	energy	sources	that	would	count	toward	
an	electric	utility’s	federal	renewable	electricity	credit	in	federal	
global	warming	legislation	currently	under	consideration.11	
Although	 hydroelectric	 power	 has	 gained	 support	 politi-
cally,	hydroelectric	projects	raise	significant	environmental	con-
cerns,	such	as	frustration	of	fish	migration	and	reduced	oxygen	
levels	 in	downstream	water.12	
As	 a	 recent	 article	 in	 the	Los	
Angeles	 Times	 dramatically	
explained:	 “The	 emerging	
boom	 in	 hydroelectric	 power	
pits	 two	 competing	 ecologi-
cal	 perils	 against	 each	 other:	
widespread	fish	extinctions	and	
a	warming	planet.”13	Fish	mor-
tality	 resulting	 from	 passage	
through	turbines	at	hydroelec-
tric	 facilities	 can	 be	 as	much	
as	 30%,	 although	 the	 use	 of	
the	 best	 existing	 turbines	 can	
reduce	 that	 to	5-10%.14	Some	
of	 the	 affected	 fish,	 such	 as	
species	 of	 salmon	 and	 steel-
head,	are	 listed	on	 the	 federal	
list	of	endangered	or	threatened	
species	under	the	ESA.15	
The	 ESA	 has	 provided	 a	
mechanism	 for	 challenges	 to	 hydroelectric	 power	 projects	 in	
the	courts	when	an	endangered	or	threatened	species	is	put	at	
risk	by	dam	development.	The	seminal	opinion	by	the	Supreme	
Court	of	the	United	States	in	Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 
demonstrates	that	the	ESA	has	the	power	to	defeat	a	major	con-
struction	project	if	necessary	to	save	an	endangered	species.16	In	
Tennessee Valley Authority,	the	Court	enjoined	the	operation	of	
the	Tellico	Dam,	a	project	to	which	Congress	had	appropriated	
over	one	hundred	million	dollars,	because	of	the	potential	risk	to	
the	survival	of	the	endangered	snail	darter.17	The	authority	for	
such	a	powerful	result	comes	from	the	unequivocal	language	of	
section	7	of	the	ESA,	which	requires	that	each	federal	agency	
“insure	that	any	action	authorized,	funded,	or	carried	out	by	such	
agency	.	.	.	is	not	likely	to	jeopardize	the	continued	existence	of	
any	endangered	species	or	threatened	species	.	.	.	.”18	
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Similar	to	the	decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	in	Tennessee 
Valley Authority,	the	recent	opinion	of	the	United	States	Court	
of	Appeals	of	the	Ninth	Circuit	in	National Wildlife Federation 
v. National Marine Fisheries Service	 shows	 the	power	of	 the	
ESA	to	affect	the	development	and	operation	of	hydroelectric	
facilities.	The	National	Wildlife	Federation	(“NWF”)	claimed	
that	the	National	Marine	Fisheries	Service	failed	to	adequately	
prepare	a	biological	opinion	(“BiOp”)	for	the	operations	of	the	
Federal	Columbia	River	Power	System	dams.19	At	issue	in	NWF 
were	various	species	of	salmon	and	steelhead	in	the	Columbia	
River	that	must	migrate	downstream	through	a	series	of	dams.20	
The	court	determined	that	the	2004	BiOp	issued	by	the	National	
Marine	Fisheries	Service	“contained	structural	flaws	that	ren-
dered	it	incompatible	with	the	ESA.”21
One	issue	in	NWF	that	will	continue	to	be	relevant	in	other	
actions	against	dam	projects	is	whether	the	Congressional	man-
date	of	flood	control,	irrigation,	and	power	production	created	
a	nondiscretionary	duty.22	Nondiscretionary	duties	of	agencies	
need	not	meet	 the	requirements	of	section	7	of	 the	ESA.23	In	
NWF the	Ninth	Circuit	determined	that,	while	the	broad	Con-
gressional	goals	were	mandatory,	Congress	did	not	mandate	that	
the	goals	be	accomplished	in	any	particular	way;	thus	the	agency	
actions	in	implementing	the	goals	were	discretionary	and	sub-
ject	to	requirements	of	the	ESA.24	Thus,	Congress	could	exempt	
the	actions	of	an	agency	engaged	in	dam	operations	from	the	
ESA	by	specifically	dictating	by	statute	 the	manner	 in	which	
the	agency	is	to	carry	out	the	construction	and	operation	of	the	
dam.25	
As	a	result	of	the	recent	growing	political	interest	in	hydro-
electric	power,	there	will	likely	be	a	substantial	increase	in	the	
nation’s	 hydroelectric	 energy	 capacity.26	Although	Congress	
could	 facilitate	 its	 goal	of	 increasing	hydroelectric	power	by	
exempting	 the	 operation	 of	 hydroelectric	 facilities	 from	 the	
ESA,	 the	 better	 solution	would	 be	 to	mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	
hydroelectric	facilities	on	fish	populations	with	advanced	tech-
nology.27	The	DOE’s	decision	to	incorporate	the	reduction	of	
environmental	impacts	into	its	plan	for	the	modernization	of	the	
nation’s	hydropower	infrastructure	lends	hope	that	the	DOE	will	
make	environmental	mitigation	a	priority	during	the	expansion	
of	hydroelectric	projects.28
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human rightS anD environmental protection:
the preSSure of the charter for the environment on the 
french aDminiStrative courtS
by David Marrani*
InTroducTIon
The	French	National	Assembly	adopted	 the	Charter	 for	the	Environment	 (“Charter”)	 in	2004	and	 integrated	 it	into	the	Constitution	of	the	French	Fifth	Republic	by	the	
amendment	of	March	1,	2005.	On	June	19,	2008,	 the	French	
constitutional	 council,	Conseil constitutionnel,	 in	 a	 landmark	
decision	on	 the	constitutionality	of	 the	statute	on	Genetically	
Modified	Organisms	(“law	on	genetically	modified	organisms”), 
reaffirmed	 the	 constitutional	 value	 of	 every	 right	 and	 duty	
defined	in	the	2004	Charter	for	the	Environment.1	On	October	
3,	2008,	the	Conseil d’Etat	(“French	Administrative	Supreme	
Court”),	 for	 the	 first	 time	 quashed	 a	 government	 regulation	
on	the	grounds	that	it	did	not	respect	the	Charter	for	the	Envi-
ronment.	While	constitutional	control	based	on	the	Charter	 is	
typical,	 judicial	 review	on	 the	grounds	of	 the	Constitution	 is	
exceptional.	In	fact,	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	
has	always	been	opposed	to	considering	the	Constitution,	treat-
ing	it	almost	as	taboo.	However,	this	position	is	evolving.	On	
the	one	hand,	the	Constitution	has	changed	to	incorporate	dec-
larations	of	rights,	and	on	the	other	the	French	Administrative	
Supreme	Court	has	always	been	enthusiastic	about	environmen-
tal	protection.	Therefore,	 the	French	Administrative	Supreme	
Court looked	to	the	terms	of	the	Charter,	even	though	it	had	been	
incorporated	into	the	Constitution.	The	main	problem	in	the	rea-
soning	of	 the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court,	 even	 in	
cases	involving	the	issue	of	environmental	protection,	is	that	the	
Conseil d’Etat	articulated	a	“classic”	judicial	review	of	admin-
istrative	acts.	For	instance,	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	
Court	applied	judicial	review	to	central	and	local	government	
regulations,	but	never	to	constitutional	control.	The	2008	French	
Administrative	Supreme	Court	ruling	is	therefore	a	major	step	
towards	constitutional	control	and	should	be	analyzed.
Since	 it	 is	 only	 recently	 that	 the	Constitution	has	devel-
oped	as	 a	 corpus	of	 “higher”	norms	 that	 consider	directly	or	
indirectly	environmental	protection,2	it	is	interesting	to	look	at	
how	the	operation	of	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	
has	changed	and	will,	for	environmental	reasons,	go	against	the	
taboo	of	touching	the	Constitution.	In	this	paper,	I	will	start	by	
looking	at	the	link	between	human	rights	and	the	environment	
before	considering	the	move	from	“transnational”	and	“interna-
tional”	rights	to	domestic	ones	through	“constitutionalisation.”	
I	will	then	present	the	recent	evolution	of	the	jurisprudence	of	
the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	and	consider	a	recent	
2008	case.
human rIGhTs and The envIronmenT,  
a “TransnaTIonal” and “InTernaTIonal” aFFaIr
This	section	will	analyze	the	relationships	between	human	
rights	 and	 the	 environment.	 In	 attempting	 to	 classify	 human	
rights,3	first	generation	rights	refer	to	traditional	civil	and	politi-
cal	 liberties	of	 the	western	 liberal	democracies.	Expressed	 in	
constitutional	texts,4	or	in	separate	declarations,5	first	generation	
rights	aim	to	protect	rights	such	as	 the	freedom	of	speech,	of	
religion,	and	of	expression.	Those	rights	presuppose	a	duty	of	
non-interference	on	the	part	of	governments	towards	the	individ-
uals.	Second	generation	rights	have	generally	been	considered	as	
“collective	rights,”	in	that	they	influence	the	whole	society.	Sec-
ond	generation	rights	require	affirmative	government	action	for	
their	realization:	the	right	to	education,	to	work,	to	social	secu-
rity,	to	food,	to	self-determination,	and	to	an	adequate	standard	
of	living.6	Third	generation	or	“solidarity”	rights	are	the	most	
recently	recognized	category	of	human	rights	and	include	the	
right	to	health,	to	peace,	and	to	a	healthy	environment,	among	
others.	The	right	to	health,	which	also	falls	under	the	right	to	
an	adequate	standard	of	living,	is	now	linked	with	maintaining	
environmental	quality.
Until	recently,	the	instruments	of	international	human	rights	
have	 typically	 accorded	minimal	 attention	 to	 environmental	
issues.	The	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights7	mentions	
in	article	25	(1),	“the	right	to	a	standard	of	living	adequate	for	
the	health	and	well-being	of	himself	and	of	his	family,”	while	
the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	men-
tions	 “public	 health.”8	 The	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Eco-
nomic,	 Social	 and	Cultural	 Rights9	 recognizes	 in	 article	 12,	
“[t]he	improvement	of	all	aspects	of	environmental	and	indus-
trial	hygiene”	in	relation	to	“the	right	of	everyone	to	the	enjoy-
ment	of	the	highest	attainable	standard	of	physical	and	mental	
health.”	In	fact,	the	three	primary	general	international	human	
rights	instruments	barely	mention	the	relationship	between	envi-
ronment	and	human	rights.
The	1972	Stockholm	Declaration	acted	as	one	of	the	first	
major	 international	 law	 instruments	 to	 link	human	 rights	and	
environmental	protection	objectives.	Specifically,	Principle	1	
states	that:	
Man	 has	 the	 fundamental	 right	 to	 freedom,	 equality	
and	adequate	conditions	of	life,	in	an	environment	of	a	
quality	that	permits	a	life	of	dignity	and	well-being,	and	
* Lecturer in Public and Comparative Law, School of Law, University of Essex, 
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he	bears	solemn	responsibility	to	protect	and	improve	
the	environment,	for	present	and	future	generations.10
This	proto-declaration	of	environmental	rights	stated	every	
idea	that	is	now	topical	in	environmental	law.	But	the	Declara-
tion	does	not	stop	there.	In	fact,	Principle	15	refers	more	specifi-
cally	to	environmental	protection,	while	indirectly	referring	to	
the	precautionary	principle:
In	order	to	protect	the	environment,	the	precautionary	
approach	shall	be	widely	applied	by	states	according	
to	their	capabilities.	Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effec-
tive measures to prevent environmental degradation.11	
The	1994	Draft	Principles	on	Human	Rights	and	the	Envi-
ronment	expressly	links	human	
rights	 and	 the	 environment,	
particularly	 Principle	 7,	which	
states	 that	 “[a]ll	 persons	 have	
the	 right	 to	 the	 highest	 attain-
able	standard	of	health	free	from	
environmental	harm.”12	Further-
more,	Article	12	of	the	Interna-
tional	 Union	 for	 Conservation	
of	 Nature	 Draft	 International	
Covenant	 on	Environment	 and	
Development	 also	 articulates	
states’	responsibility	as	facilitat-
ing	agents	by	asserting	that,	“[p]
arties	undertake	to	achieve	pro-
gressively	the	full	realization	of	
the	right	of	everyone	to	an	envi-
ronment	and	a	level	of	development	adequate	for	their	health,	
well-being	and	dignity.”13	
The	third	generation	rights,	as	exemplified	by	the	Charter	
for	the	Environment,	are	those	rights	primarily	connected	to	the	
environment.	Naturally,	the	first	two	categories	of	rights	some-
times	ensure	the	protection	of	third	generation	rights,	as	high-
lighted	by	state	practice.	In	Europe,	the	precautionary	principle	
could	be	added	to	this	trend,	as	part	of	the	wave	of	new	develop-
ments	to	protect	the	environment.14	Article	6	of	the	Treaty	on	
European	Union	expresses	the	necessity	for	the	EU	to	respect	the	
rights	guaranteed	by	the	European	Convention	for	the	Protection	
of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms	(“ECPHRFF”	or	
“Convention”).15	Within	the	rights	protected	by	the	Convention,	
the	European	Court	for	Human	Rights	(“ECHR”)	has	considered	
environmental	 protection,	 as	well	 as	 threats	 that	may	 impact	
people’s	 right	 to	 life	 (Guerra & Others v. Italy),16	 property	
(Chasagnou & Others v. France),17	privacy	(Guerra & Others 
v. Italy),18	access	to	court	(Athannossoplan & Others v. Switzer-
land),19	and	freedom	of	expression (Guerra & Others v. Italy).20	
The	concerns	for	health	and	the	welfare	of	the	environment	are	
human	rights	that	require	protection	and	evaluation.	
Even	 though	 there	 is	 no	 direct	 reference	 to	 the	 environ-
ment	in	the	ECPHRFF,	the	Court	aims	to	protect	human	rights	
and	fundamental	 liberties	based	on	recent	developments.	The	
Convention	became	a	charter	of	rights	in	Europe,	with	human	
dignity	at	its	heart.21	In	1976	the	commission	in	X v. Iceland22	
held	that	Article	8	of	the	Convention	did	not	extend	so	far	as	
to	protect	an	individual’s	relationship	with	his	immediate	sur-
roundings	 so	 long	 as	 the	 relationship	did	not	 involve	human	
relationships.	The	Court	of	Strasbourg	reminded	us	that	no	gen-
eral	right	to	protection	of	the	environment	exists	in	the	Conven-
tion	(Kyrtatos v. Greece).23	However,	in	today’s	society	there	
has	always	been	the	necessity	for	a	certain	level	of	protection	
(Fredin v. Sweden [No. 1]).24	The	Court	of	Strasbourg	has	often	
considered	questions	pertaining	to	environmental	protection	and	
highlighted	 their	 importance	(as	seen	 in	Taşkın and Others v. 
Turkey;25	Moreno Gómez v. Spain;26	Fadeïeva v. Russia;27	Gia-
comelli v. Italy).28	Protection	of	the	environment	is	therefore:	
.	 .	 .	 a	 value,	 the	 defence	
of	 which	 arouses	 a	 con-
stant	 and	 steady	 interest	
of	public	opinion,	and	as	a	
consequence	public	authori-
ties.	Economic	imperatives	
and	 even	 some	 fundamen-
tal	 rights,	 like	 the	 right	 of	
property,	 should	 not	 been	
granted	 primacy	 ahead	
of	 considerations	 relating	
to	 environmental	 protec-
tion,	in	particular	when	the	
state	 has	 legislated	 on	 the	
subject.29
In	the	light	of	the	case	law	
of	the	Court	of	Strasbourg,	any-
thing	may	be	used	 in	order	 to	counter	solutions	 that	may	not	
bring	 about	 the	 right	 objectives	 (Chassagnou and Others v. 
France).30	 In	fact,	 in	areas	 like	environmental	protection,	 the	
Court	respects	the	assessment	of	the	national	legislator,	except	
when	the	result	is	manifestly	unreasonable	(Immobiliare Saffi v. 
Italy).31	The	confrontation	between	state	law	and	the	law	of	the	
acephalous	society32	shows	how	under	the	guidance	of	human	
rights,	the	levels	of	law	have	evolved	over	time.	
“consITuTIonalIsaTIon” oF envIronmenTal 
human rIGhTs as a domesTIc soluTIon
In	this	respect,	 the	case	of	the	Constitution	of	the	French	
Fifth	 Republic	 is	 extremely	 interesting.	 As	 mentioned,	 the	
French	National	Assembly	incorporated	the	2004	Charter	for	the	
Environment	into	the	declaration	of	rights.	The	Charter	can	be	
classified	as	a	third	generation	declaration	of	rights.	The	National	
Assembly’s	procedure	 included	amending	 the	first	 line	of	 the	
Preamble	of	the	Constitution	of	the	French	Fifth	Republic.33	The	
Preamble	of	the	Constitution	refers	to	the	first	and	second	gener-
ation	of	rights,	through	the	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Man	and	
Citizens	of	1789	(the	first	generation	of	rights)	and	the	Preamble	
of	the	Constitution	of	the	French	Fourth	Republic	(the	second	
generation	of	rights).	In	2005,	the	National	Assembly	updated	
the	Constitution	and	inserted	a	reference	to	the	third	generation	
Until recently, 
the instruments of 
international human 
rights have typically 
accorded minimal 
attention to environmental 
issues.
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of	 rights	by	applying	 the	Charter.	 In	 the	comment	made	dur-
ing	 the	preparation	of	 the	Charter,	 legislators	made	clear	 that	
third	generation	rights	were	a	continuation	of	the	earlier	genera-
tions.34	The	first	and	second	generations	of	rights	created	a	veil	
of	protection	for	the	environment	prior	to	the	enshrinement	of	
third	generation	rights	into	law.35	Thus,	the	constitutionalisation	
of	rights	has	become	an	important	process.
The	 “constitutionalisation”	 of	 environmental	 protection	
through	the	“constitutionalisation”	of	human	rights	saw	an	expo-
nential	 increase	 since	 the	 1972	Stockholm	 conference,36	 and	
environmental	protection	is	now	a	component	of	many	constitu-
tions	in	Western	Europe.37	Then	again,	the	environment	itself	is	
characterized	by	an	absence	of	limit	and	it	seems	logical	to	think	
about	 international	 rules	 rather	 than	a	patchwork	of	domestic	
solutions.	However,	“constitutionalisation”	could	be	perceived	
as	a	more	efficient	way	of	protecting	the	environment.	“Con-
stitutionalisation”	 replaces	 international	 law	 in	Rodolfo	Sac-
co’s	terms	the	law	of	the	“grande	Société	acephalique,”38	and	
is	supposed	to	make	the	protection	effective.	After	1972,	more	
nation-states	“constitutionalised”	environmental	law,	initially	by	
enshrining	it	more	or	less	explicitly	within	their	constitutions.39	
This	enshrinement	came	via	second	generation	rights	such	as	
the	right	to	a	healthy	environment,	which	derived	more	or	less	
from	the	right	to	health	and	the	duty	of	the	state,	and	sometimes	
the	citizen,	to	protect	the	environment,	and	natural	resources.40	
The	right	to	a	healthy	environment,	considered	here	as	a	gen-
eral	human	right	of	environmental	protection,	established	 the	
idea	of	 environmental	 protection	based	on	human	 rights	 that	
evolve	around	the	protection	of	the	human	both	now	and	in	the	
future.	The	Charter,	as	a	sort	of	pure	third	generation	declara-
tion,	went	further	in	defining	the	link	between	human	rights	and	
the	environment.
In	1958,	the	Constitution	of	the	French	Fifth	Republic	cre-
ated	the	French	Constitutional	Council	to	control	the	constitu-
tionality	of	statutes.41	As	a	consequence,	France	assumed	that	
the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	would	not	operate	
any	kind	of	constitutional	control.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	French	
Administrative	Supreme	Court	considers	a	statute	as	a	specific	
set	of	norms	operating	as	a	“screen”	between	the	Constitution	
and	the	administrative	acts	of	central	and	local	governments	that	
the	administrative	courts	examine.	Therefore,	the	administrative	
judges	reviewing	an	administrative	act’s	conformity	to	a	stat-
ute	that	manifestly	did	not	conform	to	the	Constitution	would	
always	refuse	to	declare	the	administrative	act	void,	because	the	
judges	would	not	want	to	consider	the	non-constitutionality	of	
the	statute.	One	could	argue	that	because	of	the	way	that	consti-
tutional	control	and	judicial	review	operate	under	the	imperium	
of	 the	Constitution	of	 the	French	Fifth	Republic,	declarations	
of	rights	are	the	basis	for	constitutional	control	rather	than	for	
judicial	review.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	Constitution	of	
the	French	Fifth	Republic	never	intended	to	incorporate	any	dec-
larations	of	rights.	The	1958	Constitution	conformed	to	French	
tradition	by	creating	a	formal	constitution	composed	only	of	an	
institutional	architecture	and	very	 few	substantive	 rules.	Due	
to	the	rulings	of	the	constitutional	council,	the	legislators	built	
a	formal	constitution	around	the	core	of	the	formal	one.	Thus,	
this	movement	to	enlarge	the	notion	of	the	Constitution	included	
the	2004	Charter	for	the	Environment.	As	such,	this	movement	
acknowledged	 certain	 changes.	 Specifically,	 the	 movement	
acknowledged	that	human	rights	are	recognized	as	part	of	the	
most	authoritative	norm	on	French	territory.	At	the	same	time,	
however,	the	rationale	behind	the	1958	novelty	of	having	one	
institution	for	constitutional	justice	and	one	for	administrative	
justice,	made	it	fairly	certain	that	the	Charter,	like	the	other	dec-
larations	of	rights,	would	remain	a	text	presenting	rights	to	be	
protected	by	the	French	Constitutional	Council	rather	than	the	
French	Administrative	Supreme	Court.	Thus,	 only	 under	 the	
specific	procedure	of	constitutional	control	would	the	extended	
Constitution	be	used	to	protect	human	rights.	The	use	of	the	text	
of	the	Charter	by	French	courts	and	particularly	by	administra-
tive	justice	shocked	many	observers.	
The 2004 charTer For The envIronmenT and 
The French Conseil d’etat
The	issue	becomes	more	complex	when	considering	how	
the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	applies	the	Charter.	
Major	developments	highlight	the	environmental	protection	at	
different	 levels,	 from	 the	“simple”	action	of	declaring	 rights,	
to	more	complex	and	more	operational	system	of	protection	of	
these	declared	rights.
The	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	was	not	a	novice	
in	terms	of	environmental	protection.	It	has	shown	an	openness	
towards	environmental	protection	in	various	judgements,	such	as	
quashing	the	authorization	for	a	high-voltage	power	line	to	cross	
the	Verdon	park	in	the	south	of	France;42	stopping	the	construc-
tion	of	a	dam	because	it	would	endanger	species;43	ordering	the	
dismantling	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	by	Electricité de France	
because	of	a	failure	to	respect	the	public	right	to	information;44	
or	in	the	matter	of	exporting	the	aircraft	carrier	Clemenceau	to	
be	dismantled	in	India	because	of	risks	to	environmental	protec-
tion	and	public	health.45	The	work	of	 the	French	Administra-
tive	Supreme	Court	on	environmental	protection	seems	to	have	
been	steady.	More	specifically,	the	precautionary	principle	in	its	
legislative	version	has	long	been	a	reference	point	for	operat-
ing	judicial	review.	Since	the	transposition	of	the	principle	into	
French	law,	the	administrative	courts	have	enforced	the	respect	
of	the	precautionary	principle	in	central	and	local	governments’	
decision-making.46	 The	 precautionary	 principle	 acted	 as	 an	
embryo	of	 environmental	 protection,	 until	 the	 administrative	
courts	extended	the	scope	of	control	to	general	environmental	
protection	and	public	health.	Following	the	“constitutionalisa-
tion”	of	the	Charter,	and	particularly	the	precautionary	principle,	
an	administrative	court	may	now	analyze	the	nature	of	the	uncer-
tainty	of	risk	to	health	as	a	fundamental	ground	for	the	court’s	
ruling.	The	recognition	of	environmental	protection	as	a	human	
right,	therefore,	developed	and	went	even	further	than	expected.	
The	Charter	became	a	usable	document	so	that	the	“layman-citi-
zen”	reified	the	declaration	of	rights	and	used	it	as	an	instrument	
of	protection.	
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During	the	first	years	of	the	Charter	(2005-06),	the	lower	
courts’	rulings	were	clearly	going	in	that	direction.	However,	at	
that	time,	a	discrepancy	existed	in	the	appreciation	of	the	Char-
ter’s	value	within	the	administrative	courts	and	between	local	
lower	courts	and	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court.	On	
the	one	hand,	local	administrative	courts	ruled	using	the	basis	
of	the	Charter,	establishing	it	as	containing	fundamental	free-
doms	considered	to	be	of	constitutional	value.47	On	the	other,	
the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court’s	reticence	to	change	
showed	in	the	way	it	applied	the	Charter,	as	demonstrated	in	two	
2006	rulings.48	That	said,	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	
Court merely	respected	 its	 function	of	control	of	 legality	and	
avoided	operating	a	control	of	constitutionality.	 In	December	
2006,	the	Conseil d’Etat	rejected	the	Charter’s	legal	authority	
because	it	believed	it	would	be	too	vague	to	solely	mention	the	
breach	of	the	Charter.49
In	2007	and	2008,	a	series	of	cases	referred	to	the	Charter	
in	various	ways.	In	each	case,	the	parties,	mainly	environmental	
associations,	acted	consistently	in	considering	the	Charter	as	one	
of	their	legal	bases	for	seeking	judicial	review.	In	January,	the	
French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	considered	the	Charter	
together	with	the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	the	political	context	of	an	
area	in	northeast	of	France	as	the	legal	basis	for	its	decision.	In	
this	case,	however,	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	
rejected	the	review	of	a	decision	to	build	the	A	52	motorway.50	
In	February,	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court referred	
to	the	Charter,	and	particularly	to	the	precautionary	principle,	to	
reject	the	review	of	a	regulation	concerning	the	closing	dates	of	
hunting	on	the	application	of	four	environmental	associations.51	
In	May	 and	 June,	 the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court 
used	similar	reasoning	to	that	used	in	the	December	2006	case,	
considering	that	it	was	too	vague	to	solely	mention	the	breach	
of	the	Charter.52	In	three	cases	from	June	and	October	2007,	the	
French	Administrative	Supreme	Court cited	the	Charter	as	a	legal	
basis	(the	highest	one),	but	did	not	consider	it	in	its	ruling.53	In	
October	2007,	in	the	case	M. F, M. E, M. C, M et Mme B., M. et 
Mme A,	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court developed	an 
interesting	point	of	view.54	The	French	Administrative	Supreme	
Court	argued	that	when	the	French	Parliament	acted	 to	apply	
the	principles	enshrined	in	article	7	of	the	Charter	(the	right	to	
information	and	public	participation),	the	legality	of	regulations	
would	be	considered	in	light	of	the	statutes.55	The	judges	went	
on	to	explain	that	statutes	enacted	prior	to	the	Charter	should	
respect	the	Charter.56	Consequently,	the	French	Administrative	
Supreme	Court	followed	tradition	and	the	judges	ruled	on	the	
basis	of	the	French	Environmental	Code	and	not	on	the	Char-
ter.57	This	decision	marked	progress	on	 the	path	 towards	 the	
2008	landmark	case	analyzed	in	the	next	section.	However,	the	
French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	did	not	confirm	this	posi-
tion	and,	in	two	separate	cases	on	the	same	day,	acted	according	
to	its	previous	position	of	December	2006,58	as	it	did	in	cases	in	
December	2007	and	August	2008.59	Though	the	Charter	became	
valued	as	a	legal	instrument	and	is	now	taken	into	account	by	
claimants	in	the	administrative	courts,	the	way	the	courts	have	
considered	and	used	 this	 instrument	remains	variable.	This	 is	
perhaps	because	of	the	lack	of	clarity	in	the	preparation	of	the	
Charter	in	defining	the	real	aims	of	the	text.	The	administrative	
judges	have	mentioned	in	many	instances,	such	as	in	the	Decem-
ber	2006	case,	that	the	use	of	the	Charter	as	a	legal	basis	is	not	
legitimate	because	of	its	lack	of	precision.	In	fact,	the	changes	
affecting	the	administrative	judges	may	be	seen	as	an	evolution	
and	passage	from	one	phase	of	modernity	to	another	from	“the	
land	does	not	lie”	to	“human	rights	do	not	lie.”
a raDical change? the 2008 caSe
In	the	2008	case,	Commune d’Annecy,	the	French	Admin-
istrative	Supreme	Court	went	a	step	further.	The	Commissaire 
du gouvernement	Aguila,	charged	with	presenting	a	final	report	
to	 the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	before	 the	deci-
sion	of	its	plenary	assembly,	concluded	in	eight	points.	These	
eight	points	will	be	examined	here	as	an	introduction	to	this	sec-
tion.	First,	Aguila	considered	that	the	context	needed	clarifica-
tion,	for	the	following	three	reasons:	the	case	law	of	the	French	
Administrative	Supreme	Court	in	the	matter	was	not	yet	clearly	
fixed;	 the	work	 of	 the	 committee	 reviewing	 the	 fundamental	
rights	that	contributed	to	a	general	reflection	on	the	necessity	for	
clarifying	the	value	of	the	principles	enshrined	in	the	Preamble	
of	the	Constitution	of	the	French	Fifth	Republic	(together	with	
the	principles	included	in	the	Charter);61	and	the	constitutional	
amendment	of	 July	2008,	 introducing	 the	possibility	 to	bring	
a	 statute	before	 the	constitutional	 council	 after	 its	promulga-
tion.	In	the	second	point	the	Commissaire	noted	that	the	Char-
ter	served	as	an	autonomous	constitutional	text,	unique	in	the	
world	although	the	unfinished	preparatory	work	created	uncer-
tainty	making	judicial	use	difficult.62	The	third	point	served	as	
a	reminder	that	administrative	justice	has	always	been	involved	
in	the	development	and	the	application	of	environmental	law.63	
The	fourth	and	fifth	points	concern	the	case	itself,	and	will	be	
developed	later.	The	Commissaire	created	point	six	in	the	form	
of	a	question:	is	the	Charter	for	the	Environment	a	text	that	may	
be	invoked	before	an	administrative	court	directly	by	the	parties	
concerned	and	does	it	have	“full”	constitutional	value?64	Point	
seven	concerned	the	increase	of	parliamentary	power	over	envi-
ronmental	issues	as	a	result	of	the	charter.65	On	this	last	point,	
Aguila	 concluded	 by	 listing	 the	 expected	 results	 of	 the	 case	
thereby	quashing	the	government	regulation	on	the	grounds	of	
a	violation	of	the	charter;	reinforcing	the	role	of	Parliament	in	
the	area	of	environmental	law,	as	sought	by	the	authors	of	the	
Charter;	and	renewing	the	traditional	mission	of	the	administra-
tive	judge	to	look	after	the	respect	of	the	common	good,	and	the	
fundamental	rights	of	citizens.66	The	report	of	Aguila	reflected	
the	materialization	of	deep	change.
The	 2008	 case	 relates	 to	 the	 specific	 protection	 of	 large	
mountain	lakes	(larger	than	1,000	hectares).67	These	lakes	are	
currently	protected	by	both	the	“mountain	law”68	and	the	“lit-
toral	law.”69	Some	towns	and	cities	are	very	happy	about	this	
double	protection,	while	other	towns	and	cities	tried	to	relax	the	
laws	to	allow	for	new	developments	(principally	real	estate	proj-
ects).	The	case	concerns	article	187	of	the	statute	of	February	
23,	2005.70	This	covers	the	development	of	rural	 territories,71	
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which	 introduced	 a	 new	paragraph	 to	 article	L.	 145-1	of	 the	
town	planning	code:
However,	concerning	mountain	 lakes	having	an	area	
greater	 than	1,000	hectares,	a	government	 regulation	
after	advice	of	 the	Conseil d’Etat delimits	 the	sector	
within	which	the	measures	specific	to	littoral	(as	stated	
in	Chapter	VI	of	 the	present	 title)	apply	solely,	hav-
ing	taken	into	account	the	topology	of	the	area	and	the	
advice	of	waterside	municipalities.	This	sector	cannot	
reduce	the	littoral	strip	of	100	metres	defined	by	article	
L.	164-4,	part	III.	In	other	areas	of	waterside	munici-
palities,	 and	 located	 within	 the	 areas	 of	 mountains	
mentioned	in	the	first	paragraph,	the	dispositions	spe-
cific	to	mountains	of	the	present	chapter	apply	solely.72	
The	Commune d’Annecy	contested	the	government	regula-
tion	of	August	1,	2006,73	adopted	as	part	of	the	application	of	the	
new	article	of	the	town	planning	code,	to	complete	and	introduce	
new	measures	into	the	“regulations”	section	of	the	code.74	In	the	
local	authority’s	opinion,	the	new	measures	would	reduce	the	
protection	of	mountain	lakes,	by	reducing	the	perimeter	of	appli-
cation	of	the	littoral	law	around	
mountain	 lakes.	 According	 to	
the	government	regulation,	the	
perimeter	 should	 be	 delimited	
by	local	authorities’	decisions,	
made	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	
for	each	lake.	The	2006	decree	
introduced	 a	 series	 of	 regula-
tions,	codified	under	articles	R.	
145-11	to	-14,	which	outline	a	
detailed	 decision-making	 pro-
cess.	Article	 R.	 145-11	 stated	
that	either	the	state	or	the	water-
side	 municipalities	 (town	 or	
city)	had	the	authority	to	delimit	
the	perimeter	around	mountain	
lakes	 of	more	 than	 a	 1,000	hect-
ares.	Article	R.	145-12	stated	in	section	I	that	when	the	respon-
sibility	for	delimiting	the	perimeter	falls	to	the	state,	 then	the	
prefect	(representing	the	state	in	the	département75)	should	for-
ward	a	file	to	the	waterside	municipalities	comprising:	a)	a	map	
of	the	perimeter;	and	b)	a	note	presenting	the	rationale	behind	
the	limits	of	the	perimeter	(considering	places,	built	or	unbuilt;	
visibility	 from	 the	 lake;	waterside	 preservation	 of	 economic	
and	ecologic	equilibrium;	and	sites	and	landscape	quality).	The	
municipalities	had	two	months	from	the	transmission	of	the	file	
to	the	local	mayors	to	decide	on	the	project	before	their	approval	
was	 assumed.	 Section	 II	 stated	 that	when	 the	municipalities	
were	responsible	for	the	process,	they	should	send	a	similar	file	
to	the	prefect	with	each	administrative	decision	(i.e.	namely	a	
déliberation	from	each	local	council).	Article	R.	145-13	stated	
that	the	file	had	to	be	sent	with	the	advice	or	proposal	from	each	
municipality	to	be	submitted	to	a	public	inquiry	by	the	prefect	
(as	stated	by	articles	R.	123-7	to	-23	of	the	Environmental	code).	
The	prefect	had	to	communicate	the	file	and	the	results	of	the	
inquiry	to	the	government	minister	in	charge	of	town	planning.	
Finally,	article	R.	145-14	stated	that	the	central	government	had	
to	approve	the	perimeter	by	decree	upon	receiving	advice	of	the 
French	Administrative	Supreme	Court,	which	the	Journal Offi-
ciel de la République Française	published.76
The	Commune d’Annecy criticized	the	government	regula-
tion	specifically	because	it	would	breach	the	right	to	information	
and	participation	of	the	public	in	the	decision	making	process	
which	would	impact	the	environment.	The	government	regula-
tion	did	not	allow	for	public	consultation	before	the	decisions	
required	by	the	public	inquiry	of	article	R.	145-13	and	-14	and	
therefore	violated	article	7	of	the	Charter.	Aguila’s	sixth	point	
concerned	 this	 issue:	can	 the	Charter	 for	 the	Environment	be	
invoked	before	an	administrative	court	directly	by	the	parties	
concerned?	Or	in	other	words,	can	human	rights	influence	the	
way	administrative	courts	operate?
The	Constitution	of	the	French	Fifth	Republic	introduced	
a	mini	 revolution	 in	1958.	The	French	Parliament	 is	not	 free	
to	enact	everything	 it	desires	but	can	only	act	on	 the	matters	
listed,	which	became	the	“domain	of	statute	law,”	as	stipulated	
in	article	34	of	the	Constitution.	
The	 responsibility	 of	 the	 2005	
constitutional	 amendment	 that	
constitutionalised	 the	 Charter	
for	 the	 Environment	 and	 also	
added	to	article	34’s	list	that	the	
expression	 of	 the	 fundamental	
principles	 on	 the	 preservation	
of	 the	 environment	 fell	 to	 Par-
liament.	 In	 consequence,	 only	
a	 statute	 could	 be	 adopted	 to	
determine	 those	 principles,	 not	
a	regulation.77	In	the	2008	case,	
the	administrative	 judges	of	 the	
French	Administrative	Supreme	
Court	considered	 that	 the	scope	
of	action	of	 the	French	parliament	
had	 been	 altered	 by	 the	 2005	 amendment.	 Furthermore,	 the	
judges	declared	in	article	7	of	the	Charter	that,	“[e]veryone	has	
a	right,	within	the	conditions	and	limits	of	Law,	to	access	infor-
mation	relating	to	the	environment	in	the	possession	of	public	
authorities	and	to	participate	in	the	public	decision	making	pro-
cess	which	have	an	incidence	on	the	environment.”78	The	col-
lection	of	rights	and	duties	defined	in	the	Charter	(indeed,	all	
rights	and	duties	 that	proceed	from	the	Preamble	of	 the	1958	
Constitution),	therefore	had	constitutional	value.79	These	rights	
and	 duties	 are	 imposed	 on	 public	 powers	 and	 administrative	
authorities	in	their	respective	domains	of	responsibility.
In	addition,	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	con-
sidered	 that	under	 the	constitutional	 amendment	of	March	1,	
2005,	the	French	Parliament	had	sole	legislative	competence	for	
fixing	conditions	and	limiting	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	infor-
mation	relative	to	the	environment.	This	competence	included	
the	 right	 to	 access	 all	 information	 held	 by	 public	 authorities	
and	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 elaboration	 of	 public	 decisions	 that	
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may	have	an	effect	on	the	environment.	As	a	consequence,	the	
government	had	no	general	competence	in	this	area,	although	
it	could	exceptionally	make	complementary	legislation.	There-
fore,	since	2005,	a	regulation	could	be	taken	as	a	complement	to	
a	statute,	within	the	scope	of	article	7	of	the	Charter,	posterior	
or	anterior	to	2005,	so	long	as	the	regulation	conformed	with	the	
substantive	rights	included	in	the	Charter.
The	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	went	on	to	com-
ment	on	the	importance	of	article	L.	110-1	of	the	Environmental	
code.	The	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	decided	that	
the	article	should	proclaim	principles	and	not	determine	the	con-
ditions	and	limits	required	by	article	7	of	the	Charter.	Further-
more,	as	explained	above,	according	to	article	L.	145-1	of	the	
town	planning	code,	which	protects	mountain	lakes	of	an	area	
greater	than	1,000	hectares,	a	decree	following	the	advice	of	the 
French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	should	not	determine	the	
conditions	and	limits	of	the	right	to	information	and	participa-
tion	of	the	public	or	competence	of	the	French	parliament.	Since	
no	statute	has	been	enacted	to	determine	these	conditions	or	lim-
its,	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	properly	used	the	
2004	Charter	as	a	reference.	In	consequence,	the	2006	govern-
mental	regulation	became	illegal	because	it	fixed	measures	that	
were	within	the	scope	of	article	7	of	the	2004	Charter	for	the	
Environment.	This	 is	a	great	evolution	for	many	reasons,	but	
especially	because	human	rights	and	environmental	consider-
ations	finally	came	together	in	the	same	legal	culture.
conclusIon
This	paper	described	the	links	between	human	rights	and	
environmental	protection,	and	the	modification	in	the	operation	
of	French	administrative	courts	under	the	pressure	of	the	consti-
tutionalisation	of	environmental	human	rights.	The	paper	noted	
the	evolution	from	the	adoption	of	the	Charter	for	the	Environ-
ment	and	 its	 incorporation	 into	 the	 (material)	Constitution	of	
the	French	Fifth	Republic.	The	Charter	represents	a	domestic	
development	in	terms	of	human	rights,	as	it	expresses	the	third	
generation	of	human	rights.	The	weight	and	pressure	of	environ-
mental	issues forced	the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	
to	modify	its	way	of	operating.	This	is	a	profound	modification,	
as	 the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court	 is	not	separated	
from	 the	 administration	 of	 the	Republic.	 Indeed,	 the	 French	
Administrative	Supreme	Court	 is	not	only	the	highest	admin-
istrative	court;	it	is	also	a	government	advisor	and	the	organ	in	
charge	of	preparing	the	bills	and	regulations	for	both	the	French	
parliament	and	the	government.	We	now	see	the	increased	con-
sideration	for	human	rights	and	their	dissemination	in	the	legal	
culture	to	such	an	extent	that	we	may	have	entered	a	new	spatio-
temporal	dimension.	Mankind	fears	the	reality	of	its	mortality,	
and	has	realized	that	its	area	of	“play”	must	be	protected.	For	
some,	and	France	in	particular,	environmental	protection	is	best	
accomplished	by	declaring	it	a	constitutionally	protected	human	
right.	The	Charter	is	aligned	with	this	new	trend.	The	evolution	
of	the	jurisprudence	of	the	highest	French	administrative	court	is	
a	witness	of	the	changes	as	is	illustrated	in	the	recent	case	law	of	
the	French	Administrative	Supreme	Court.
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There	 are	 more	 than	 one	 hundred	 isolated	 indigenous	groups	worldwide	with	more	 than	 half	 living	 in	 Peru	and	Brazil.1	Loggers,	colonists,	and	oil	companies	are	
encroaching	on	the	lands	of	these	groups,	which	are	at	an	addi-
tional	 risk	of	extinction	from	diseases	 to	which	 they	have	no	
immunity.2	A	procedural	element	of	the	Inter-American	Com-
mission	on	Human	Rights	allowing	the	entry	of	petitions	by	third	
parties	may	provide	an	important	means	to	ensure	the	future	pro-
tection	of	these	groups,	their	culture,	and	the	forests	they	inhabit.	
Oil	and	gas	development	in	the	western	Amazon	may	soon	
increase	rapidly.3	These	blocks	overlap	some	of	the	most	bio-
logically	diverse	regions	on	the	planet	that	are	still	inhabited	by	
native	 indigenous	groups,	many	of	which	are	voluntarily	 iso-
lated.4	The	combination	of	oil,	primary	rain	forest,	and	isolated	
indigenous	groups	is	a	recipe	for	disaster.
A	line	of	decisions	from	the	Inter-American	human	rights	
system	 recognizing	 indigenous	 property	 rights	 offers	 hope.	
The	Inter-American	Commission	on	Human	Rights	(“Commis-
sion”)	is	a	human	rights	body	that	exercises	jurisdiction	to	hear	
contentious	human	rights	cases	over	all	Member	States	of	the	
Organization	of	the	American	States	(“OAS”).5	The	Commis-
sion	can	submit	a	case	to	the	Inter-American	Court	of	Human	
Rights	(“Court”)	if	the	offending	state	has	ratified	the	Ameri-
can	Convention	on	Human	Rights	and	has	explicitly	accepted	
the	Court’s	jurisdiction.6	The	States	encompassing	the	western	
Amazon	-	Brazil,	Peru,	Ecuador,	Colombia	and	Bolivia	-	have	
all	done	so.7	
In	The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nica-
ragua,8	the	Court	ordered	Nicaragua	to	grant	property	rights	to	
the	Awas	Tingi	people	who	 faced	 threats	of	 logging	on	 their	
ancestral	 lands.9	This	 landmark	case	 recognized	 the	 rights	of	
indigenous	groups	to	the	land	that	they	inhabit	based	on	their	
need	to	sustain	themselves	and	their	culture.10	With	this	prec-
edent,	the	Court	has	simultaneously	permitted	other	indigenous	
groups	 to	 establish	 their	 rights	 to	 property,	 and	 presented	 a	
potential	solution	to	the	problem	of	environmental	degradation	
in	the	Amazon.
Indigenous	cultures	have	lived	with	the	Amazon	forest	for	
millennia,	and	its	composition	is	a	result	of	their	active	manage-
ment.11	The	UN	has	recognized	the	importance	of	indigenous	
culture	and	its	ability	to	contribute	to	sustainable	development.12	
Since	Awas	Tingni,	 other	 contacted	 indigenous	 groups	 have	
succeeded	 in	 asserting	 indigenous	 property	 rights	 before	 the	
Court.13	Studies	have	demonstrated	that	contacted	tribes	rapidly	
acquire	modern	technologies	and	after	a	single	generation	can	
drastically	move	away	from	the	lifestyles	that	maintained	their	
population	in	closer	balance	with	the	surrounding	environment.14	
The	Commission	permits	third	parties	to	submit	petitions	
on	behalf	of	an	injured	party	if	the	actual	injured	party	is	unable	
to	submit	a	petition	for	itself.15	Concerned	parties	have	submit-
ted	petitions	in	favor	of	isolated	groups	and	have	successfully	
elicited	precautionary	measures	from	the	Commission	in	their	
favor.16	This	procedural	mechanism	provides	a	means	to	simul-
taneously	protect	indigenous	groups,	their	culture,	and	the	for-
ests	they	inhabit.	
There	are	also	challenges	to	the	establishment	of	indigenous	
property	rights	for	isolated	groups,	many	associated	with	effec-
tive	representation.	First,	it	may	be	difficult	to	determine	the	true	
interests	of	isolated	groups.	Second,	self-interested	parties	could	
enter	a	petition	in	the	name	of	an	isolated	group	to	advance	their	
own	interests.	Similarly,	there	is	a	risk	that	third	party	petition-
ers	will	not	be	zealous	advocates.	Finally,	there	are	often	severe	
difficulties	 in	 gathering	 evidence	 documenting	 human	 rights	
abuses	of	silent	victims	in	remote	regions.
Further,	 Inter-American	 Court	 precedent,	 while	 promis-
ing,	 also	 poses	 problems.	 The	 Court	 has	 limited	 indigenous	
land	rights	to	the	traditional	use	of	the	territory,	therefore,	state	
parties	can	still	grant	concessions	for	the	extraction	of	natural	
resources	after	consultation	with	the	affected	group.17	Addition-
ally,	the	Court	has	permitted	state	parties	to	make	the	ultimate	
determination	of	which	lands	are	returned	to	indigenous	groups	
after	consultation	with	them.18	These	rulings	are	incompatible	
with	the	nature	of	isolated	groups,	which	face	extinction	on	con-
tact	with	foreign	diseases,	are	not	available	for	consultation,	and	
live	an	itinerant	lifestyle	irrespective	of	established	boundaries.	
A	possible	solution	includes	referencing	neighboring	con-
tacted	groups	as	a	proxy	for	the	interests	of	uncontacted	groups,	
as	well	as	for	a	source	of	information	about	where	traditional	
territories	 lie.	Additionally,	natural	boundaries	 such	as	 rivers	
or	settlements	of	contacted	groups	can	assist	in	delimiting	land	
rights.	If	similar	solutions	are	not	implemented	soon,	it	could	be	
to	the	detriment	of	the	rights	of	isolated	groups,	their	culture,	and	
the	forests	 they	inhabit.	Any	future	Court	decision,	 therefore,	
must	be	tailored	to	the	groups’	unique	and	compelling	situation.	
Endnotes:	Third	Party	Petitions	as	a	Means	of	Protecting	Voluntarily	
Isolated	Indigenous	Peoples	continued on page 89
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InTroducTIon
Canada	 is	 a	 country	 with	 a	 small	 population,	 a	 large	resource	base,	 and	only	one	big	neighbor.	 	Canada’s	influence	 in	 the	post-World	War	II	period	owed	a	 lot	
to	the	role	of	External	Affairs	Minister	Lester	B.	Pearson,	who	
found	a	peaceful	resolution	to	the	Suez	Canal	Crisis.1		The	future	
Prime	Minister	helped	shape	the	world’s	image	of	Canada	as	a	
big,	green	place	populated	by	reasonable,	peace-loving	people.	
Likewise,	the	desire	of	Canada’s	governments	and	its	people	to	
solve	problems	amicably	has	 limited	 the	role	of	 the	courts	 in	
advancing	sustainable	development	in	Canada.		While	the	gov-
ernment	continues	to	view	litigation	as	“un-Canadian,”	citizens	
and	 environmental	 groups	 are	 using	 litigation	 as	 a	means	 to	
protect	the	environment.	Meanwhile,	Canada’s	green	brand	has	
lost	value,	mainly	because	the	government	has	shied	away	from	
environmental	regulation	and	enforcement.
use oF The courTs by The GovernmenT
	We	should	begin	by	saying	that	sustainable	development—
that	is,	development	that	meets	the	needs	of	current	generations	
without	compromising	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	meet	
their	needs—is	achieved	through	standard-setting	and	planning,	
not	litigation.	In	other	words,	judicial	action	can	enforce	compli-
ance	with	plans	(like	land	use	plans)	and	standards	(like	building	
codes),	but	it	cannot	fill	the	void	when	plans	and	standards	are	
missing.
lanD uSe planning
After	 Canada	 became	 the	 first	 industrialized	 country	 to	
ratify	the	United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity	in	
1992,2	it	developed,	but	ultimately	failed	to	put	into	practice,	an	
ecological	land	use	planning	framework3	that	would	provide	a	
degree	of	certainty	to	natural	resource	industries	(for	example,	
mining,	oil	and	gas,	and	forestry).	The	framework	was	intended	
to	help	establish	where	development	would	be	prohibited	and	
where	it	might	be	allowed,	subject	to	intense	coordination	across	
industry	 sectors.	For	example,	 such	coordination	could	mini-
mize	the	overall	impacts	associated	with	expansion	of	the	road	
network	into	wild	areas.4
The	 reason	 for	Canada’s	 relative	 failure	 to	plan	 resource	
development	in	a	sustainable	fashion	lies	in	the	constitutional	
division	of	 legislative	powers	between	 the	provinces	 and	 the	
federal	government.5	The	provinces	own	most	of	 the	 land	 in	
Canada.6	In	that	respect,	the	provinces	still	resemble	the	indi-
vidual	colonies	that	banded	together	to	form	a	compact	in	1867.7	
The	provinces	also	have	exclusive	legislative	authority,	subject	
to	rules	of	federal	paramountcy,	to	legislate	regarding	natural	
resource	development	on	these	“provincial	Crown	lands.”8	In	
principle,	regardless	of	how	poorly	a	province	performs	in	con-
serving	biodiversity	on	 its	 land	base,	 the	 federal	government	
does	not	step	in.	
treatieS
In	 Canada,	 as	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 federal	 govern-
ment	represents	the	country	when	it	comes	to	reporting	on	the	
implementation	of	international	treaties.9	Because	of	their	wide	
ranging	legislative	jurisdiction	under	the	Constitution,	the	prov-
inces	play	a	key	role	in	treaty	implementation.	Thus,	in	regard	
to	the	Biodiversity Convention,	for	example,	while	the	federal	
government	must	report	to	the	international	community	regard-
ing	Canada’s	progress	on	implementation,	there	is	little	the	fed-
eral	government	can	do	to	force	the	provinces	to	achieve	such	
implementation.	Similarly,	the	federal	government	cannot	force	
the	provinces	to	implement	the	North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation	 (“NAAEC”),10	under	which	each	
of	Canada,	the	United	States,	and	Mexico	commit	to	effectively	
enforce	their	environmental	laws.	Only	Alberta,	Manitoba,	and	
Quebec	have	ratified	the	NAAEC,	and	therefore,	Canada	is	only	
accountable	for	those	three	provinces	as	regards	enforcement	of	
provincial	environmental	laws	in	Canada.11
For	all	rules,	there	are	exceptions,	and	the	Migratory Birds 
Convention12	signed	with	the	United	States	in	1916	is	the	excep-
tion	here.	Great	Britain	entered	into	the	Convention	on	behalf	of	
Canada,	and	therefore,	because	of	a	rule	in	the	Canadian	Consti-
tution,	the	federal	government	has	sole	authority	to	implement	
that	treaty.13	Because	birds	are	everywhere,	the	federal	govern-
ment	has	very	broad	power	to	use	the	courts	to	enforce	migra-
tory	bird	protection	legislation	on	provincial	Crown	land	(and	
by	extension	regulate	natural	resource	extractive	industries	that	
operate	there)	but	has	hesitated	to	do	so.
	R. v. HyDRo-Québec
The	decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	(“SCC”)	in	
R. v.	Hydro-Québec14	 is	a	 leading	SCC	ruling	on	 the	 federal	
authority	to	legislate	on	environmental	matters,	but	the	decision	
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is	controversial.	In	Hydro-Québec,	 the	SCC	upheld	the	toxics	
provisions	of	the	Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1988 
on	the	basis	that	the	provisions	constituted	a	valid	exercise	of	
the	 federal	 government’s	 constitutional	 authority	 to	 legislate	
criminal	law.15	That	decision,	though	a	victory	for	the	federal	
government,	also	seemed	 to	 tie	 its	hands.	Because	 the	crimi-
nal	 law	power	is	 the	power	to	create	prohibitions	and	impose	
sanctions,	not	the	power	to	create	elaborate	regulatory	schemes,	
some	commentators	argue	that	the	SCC	should	have	upheld	the	
legislation	as	a	valid	exercise	of	the	federal	government’s	con-
stitutional	power	to	make	laws	for	the	“peace,	order	and	good	
government”	of	Canada	(the	“POGG	Power”).16	Had	the	legisla-
tion	been	upheld	under	the	POGG	Power,	the	federal	govern-
ment	would	not	have	been	left	feeling	hampered	in	its	ability	
to	adopt	federal	environmental	regulations,	though	here	again,	
views	differ.17
the common law
There	 is	 no	 common	 law	 requirement	 that	 governments	
enforce	the	law—environmental	or	otherwise.18	There	is	only	
potential	 civil	 liability	 if	 the	 government	 adopts	 an	 enforce-
ment	 policy	 and	 then	 acts	 contrary	 to	 that	 policy,	 causing	
harm.19	Enforcement	policies	 for	 federal	 environmental	 laws	
in	Canada	are	fraught	with	pro-
visions	 that	 make	 prosecution	
highly	 unlikely.	 The	 policies	
identify	 enforcement	 responses	
to	 instances	 of	 suspected	 non-
compliance,	 reserving	 prosecu-
tion	 for	 cases	where	 the	 intent	
to	 commit	 the	 offense	 can	 be	
established,	and	where	harm	 to	
the	environment	is	significant.20	
Because	most	violations	of	envi-
ronmental	 laws	are	unintended,	
and	because	most	violations	do	
not	 have	 major	 environmental	
impacts	 (though	 thousands	 of	
little	violations	by	hapless	vio-
lators	probably	do),	prosecution	
normally	does	not	occur.
the Department of JuStice
While	 a	 department	 such	 as	 Environment	 Canada	 may	
recommend	prosecution	in	certain	cases,	the	decision	to	press	
charges	 is	made	by	 the	Attorney	General	 (the	Department	of	
Justice).21	That	department	has	its	own	rules	for	deciding	which	
cases	will	go	forward.
buDgetS anD politicS
Finally,	budgetary	and	political	concerns	affect	 the	Gov-
ernment’s	use	of	 the	courts	 to	enforce	environmental	 legisla-
tion.	Politicians	decide	whether	to	allocate	human	and	financial	
resources	to	environmental	law	enforcement.	In	Canada,	envi-
ronmental	budgets	have	been	cut	in	successive	rounds	of	pro-
gram	review	every	couple	of	years	since	the	early	1990s.22	With	
most	of	 the	senior	personnel	at	Environment	Canada,	Fisher-
ies	and	Oceans,	and	all	provincial	environmental	departments	
retired	or	preparing	to	retire,	many	posts	have	been	eliminated	
or	left	vacant.23	Because	prosecution	sometimes	results	in	con-
stitutional	challenges	to	the	underlying	legislation24	and	cross-
demands	against	the	Government,	private	firms	must	be	hired	
and	costs	can	quickly	spiral	out	of	control.25	Those	costs	are	
absorbed	by	departments	with	environmental	protection	respon-
sibilities.	Those	departments	normally	choose	to	use	their	scant	
resources	to	focus	on	programs	that	are	assured	to	deliver	some	
benefits	for	the	environment,	rather	than	take	a	risk	with	pro-
tracted	 litigation.26	However,	Canada	 does	 have	 one	 notable	
prosecution	 success	 story.	 In	1993,	Tioxide	Canada	 Inc.	was	
fined	four	million	Canadian	dollars	 for	consistently	failing	 to	
heed	Government	demands	 that	 it	 install	a	system	to	 treat	 its	
toxic	 effluent	 before	 discharging	 it	 into	 the	 Saint	 Lawrence	
River.27
use oF The courTs by cITIzens and 
envIronmenTal Groups
As	explained	above,	governments	in	Canada	have	generally	
not	relied	on	the	courts	to	achieve	sustainable	development.	This	
is	in	part	owed	to	a	failure	to	adopt	a	planning	framework	and	
regulations	 that	 courts	 would	
help	 enforce	 compliance	with.	
That	said,	citizens	and	environ-
mental	groups	have	turned	to	the	
courts	with	some	success,	using	
the	very	limited	regulatory	tools	
at	their	disposal.	These	citizens	
and	environmental	groups	have	
succeeded	when	they	have	used	
the	publicity	that	comes	with	lit-
igation	as	a	high	profile	means	
of	 forcing	 the	 government’s	
hand.	Litigants	 have	 been	 less	
successful	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	
get	 around	 carefully	 worded	
provisions	 in	 environmental	
laws	that	essentially	allow	the	gov-
ernment	to	do	nothing.	Examples	are	provided	below.
 private proSecutionS (FiSHeRieS act)
Under	the	federal	Fisheries Act,	it	is	an	offense	to	disturb	
or	destroy	fish	habitat	and	to	discharge	deleterious	substances	
into	waters	frequented	by	fish.28	Individuals	can	bring	charges	
against	 violators,	 though	 the	 provincial	 or	 federal	 attorneys	
general	can	stay	those	charges	or	take	over	the	prosecution.29	
Private	prosecutions	are	often	stayed.	When	they	have	not	been	
stayed,	however,	private	prosecutions	have	led	to	high	profile	
guilty	verdicts,	notably	against	municipalities.30	Environmental	
scientists	who	were	laid	off	by	governments	have	helped	envi-
ronmental	groups,	such	as	the	Environmental	Bureau	of	Investi-
gation,	gather	evidence	of	Fisheries Act violations.	EcoJustice,	
a	non-governmental	organization,	has	provided	legal	represen-
tation	 for	 environmental	 groups	 seeking	 judicial	 redress	 for	
Enforcement policies for 
federal environmental 
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environmental	wrongs.31	These	groups	document	government	
and	industry	failures	regarding	compliance	with	the	Fisheries 
Act	by	tracking	municipal	effluent	quality	across	the	country,32	
discharges	 from	 pulp	 and	 paper	 mills,	 etc.	 The	 groups	 also	
publish	publicly-available	guides	on	how	 to	 launch	a	private	
prosecution.33
civil SuitS 
Two	interesting	decisions	of	the	SCC	involving	civil	suits	
on	environmental	matters	 are	 summarized	below.34	Here,	we	
will	only	mention	a	civil	suit	provision	in	a	Canadian	environ-
mental	statute.	
Under	the	NAAEC,	Canada	committed	to	provide	environ-
mental	remedies	to	its	citizens.35	The	Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, 1999	(“CEPA”)	creates	an	“environmental	pro-
tection	action,”	a	civil	suit	that	can	be	launched	by	adult	resi-
dents	of	Canada	against	a	party	alleged	to	have	committed	an	
offense	under	CEPA.36	Provided	 that	 the	alleged	harm	to	 the	
environment	is	significant,	the	plaintiff	may	apply	for	various	
sorts	of	injunctive	relief,	but	not	damages.37	Before	taking	such	
an	action,	the	plaintiff	must	have	first	requested	that	Environ-
ment	Canada	investigate	 the	matter,	and	then	must	have	con-
vinced	a	judge	that	Environment	Canada’s	response	was	either	
too	 slow	or	unreasonable.38	To	
our	knowledge,	no	environmen-
tal	protection	actions	have	been	
brought	since	the	act	came	into	
force.	
JuDicial review
Applications	 for	 judicial	
review	are	 favored	by	environ-
mental	 groups	 in	 Canada	 as	 a	
means	 of	 forcing	 the	 govern-
ment	to	implement	conservation	
statutes	 such	 as	 environmental	
assessment	 or	 endangered	 spe-
cies	 legislation.	 Such	 litigation	
generally	 turns	 on	 an	 analysis	
of	the	administrative	authority’s	
discretion—in	other	words,	does	
the	act	say	“the	Minister	shall”	or	
“the	Minister	may”?	The	SCC	ruling	in	Friends of the Oldman 
River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport)39	is	the	lead-
ing	case	regarding	ministerial	discretion	on	permitting	decisions	
that	trigger	environmental	assessment	requirements.	The	deci-
sion	of	the	SCC	in	that	case	set	in	motion	a	process	that	resulted	
in	the	adoption	of	the	Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
(“CEAA”).40
The	principal	 focus	of	 judicial	 review	applications	under	
CEAA	has	been	the	federal	government’s	reluctance	to	conduct	
wide-ranging	reviews	of	project	environmental	impacts.	Though	
environmental	groups	have	had	some	notable	successes	in	this	
area,41	the	tendency	of	the	Federal	Court	has	been	to	stick	to	the	
plain	language	of	the	act,	which	gives	federal	authorities	broad	
discretion	as	regards	project	and	assessment	“scoping,”	provided	
the	agency	can	establish	that	it	did	not	actively	avoid	applying	
the	law—for	example,	by	relying	on	a	provincial	agency	to	fol-
low	up	on	matters	covered	by	the	federal	legislation.42
	 Environmental	 groups	 have	 been	 somewhat	 successful	
in	using	judicial	review	to	pressure	the	federal	government	to	
develop	recovery	strategies	for	species	listed	under	the	Species 
at Risk Act.43	Here,	the	litigation	has	focused	on	questions,	such	
as	whether	 it	 is	 reasonable	 for	 the	 federal	government	not	 to	
intervene	where	provincial	recovery	actions	are	potentially	inef-
fectual,44	and	whether	the	federal	government	must	identify	(and	
therefore	protect)	the	critical	habitat	of	a	species	as	part	of	the	
development	and	implementation	of	a	recovery	strategy,	along	
with	the	question	of	what	is	the	difference	between	habitat	and	
critical	habitat.45
supreme courT decIsIons
Summarized	below	are	leading	SCC	decisions,	rendered	in	
the	last	decade,	on	matters	related	to	sustainable	development.
the precautionary principle—SpRaytecH
In	Spraytech v. Hudson,46	 the	SCC	decided	 the	constitu-
tionality	of	a	by-law	adopted	by	the	Town	of	Hudson,	Québec,	
banning	the	use	of	cosmetic	pesticides.	Charged	with	using	pes-
ticides	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 by-
law,	Spraytech	moved	 to	 have	
the	 Superior	 Court	 of	 Québec	
declare	 the	 by-law	 inopera-
tive	and	ultra vires the	 town’s	
authority	 because	 it	 conflicted	
with	 the	 provincial	 Pesticides 
Act.47	The	Superior	Court	held,	
and	the	Québec	Court	of	Appeal	
confirmed,	that	Hudson	had	the	
power	 to	 enact	 the	 by-law.48	
The	 SCC	 upheld	 the	 by-law	
because	it	did	not	impose	a	total	
ban	on	 the	use	of	 pesticides.49	
The	by-law	only	prohibited	the	
use	of	pesticides	 in	non-essen-
tial	 cases,	 such	 as	 for	 “purely	
aesthetic	pursuits.”50	
The	SCC’s	decision	in	Spray-
tech appears	to	be	informed	by	a	broad	vision	of	environmental	
law	and	the	role	of	government	in	promoting	the	general	wel-
fare.	For	example,	Justice	L’Heureux	Dubé	began	her	opinion	
by	stating	that	the	context	of	the	case	includes	“the	realization	
that	 our	 common	 future,	 that	 of	 every	Canadian	 community,	
depends	on	a	healthy	environment.”51	The	Court	deferred	to	the	
authority	of	elected	municipal	bodies,	holding	that	courts	should	
not	dictate	to	municipalities	what	is	best	for	their	constituents.52	
The	Court	also	emphasized	that	the	purpose	of	the	by-law	was	in	
line	with	the	precautionary	principle	recognized	in	international	
law,	namely,	that	sustainable	development	policies	“anticipate,	
prevent	and	attack	the	causes	of	environmental	degradation.”53
[C]itizens and 
environmental groups 
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the polluter payS principle (clean-up orDerS)—
impeRial oil
In	 Imperial Oil Ltd	v. Quebec (Minister of the Environ-
ment)54	the	SCC	decided	the	legality	of	a	clean-up	order	issued	
by	 the	Quebec	Minister	 of	 the	Environment	 (the	 “Minister”)	
against	Imperial	Oil	(“Imperial”)	under	provincial	polluter-pay	
legislation.	In	the	1980s,	a	real	estate	developer	discovered	oil	
pollution	at	a	former	Imperial	oil	site	on	the	shore	of	the	Saint	
Lawrence	River,	opposite	Quebec	City.	The	 land	was	decon-
taminated	with	the	approval	of	provincial	governmental	authori-
ties	and	houses	were	built,	but	 the	pollution	resurfaced	in	the	
1990s.	Residents	brought	an	action	against	 the	developer,	 the	
town,	Imperial	Oil,	and	the	environment	ministry.55	The	Min-
ister	ordered	 Imperial	 to	carry	out	a	 site	assessment.56	 Impe-
rial	claimed	that	the	Minister	had	a	conflict	of	interest	because	
the	Minister	had	approved	earlier	clean-up	work	and	was	now	
being	sued.	
In	deciding	that	the	Minister	
did	not	have	a	conflict	of	 inter-
est,	the	SCC	held	that	the	Minis-
ter	wears	two	hats,	adjudicative	
and	managerial,	 and	 that	when	
the	Minister	 issued	 the	 assess-
ment	 order	 the	 Minister	 was	
not	adjudicating	but	 rather	per-
forming	 the	Minister’s	 jobs	 of	
implementing	Québec’s	environ-
mental	 protection	 legislation.57	
The	Minister	had	a	political	duty	
to	 address	 the	 contamination	
problem	 and	 “choose	 the	 best	
course	of	action,	from	the	stand-
point	of	the	public	interest.”58	The	SCC	went	beyond	analyzing	
principles	of	administrative	law	when	it	decided	Imperial Oil	by	
also	considering	the	context	of	environmental	protection	legisla-
tion.	As	in	Spraytech,	the	SCC	emphasized	that	Québec	environ-
mental	legislation	is	concerned	not	only	with	safeguarding	the	
environment	of	today,	but	it	is	also	concerned	with	“evidence	of	
an	emerging	sense	of	inter-generational	solidarity	and	acknowl-
edgment	of	an	environmental	debt	to	humanity	and	the	world	of	
tomorrow.”59
the polluter payS principle (claSS actionS)— 
St. lawRence cement
In	 St. Lawrence Cement Inc v. Barrette,60	 residents	 of	
Beauport,	Québec,	instituted	a	class	action	against	St.	Lawrence	
Cement	Inc.	(“SLC”)	for	dust,	odor,	and	noise	nuisances	related	
to	the	operation	of	a	local	cement	plant.	The	residents	based	their	
claim	on	the	general	rules	of	fault-based	civil	liability,	as	well	as	
on	the	good-neighbour	provision	of	the	Québec	Civil	Code.61	
Under	Article	1457	of	the	Civil	Code,	the	claimants	were	
required	to	establish	fault,	damage,	and	causation.62	The	SCC	
reversed	the	Québec	Court	of	Appeal	and	upheld	the	decision	of	
the	trial	judge,	finding	that	SLC	had	not	committed	a	civil	fault	
since	plant	operations	complied	with	applicable	standards.	The	
SCC	also	found	that	Article	976	of	the	Civil	Code	requires	no	
proof	of	fault.63	This	article	reads:	“Neighbours	shall	suffer	the	
normal	neighbourhood	annoyances	that	are	not	beyond	the	limit	
of	tolerance	they	owe	each	other,	according	to	the	nature	or	loca-
tion	of	their	land	or	local	custom.”64
According	to	the	SCC,	conduct	is	not	the	deciding	criterion	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 abnormal	 annoyances	 under	Article	 976.65	
Rather,	liability	is	triggered	when	the	nuisance	becomes	exces-
sive	or	 intolerable.	The	SCC	relied	on	 legal	commentary	and	
precedent	 to	find	 that	Article	976	 required	no	proof	of	 fault,	
but	the	court	also	asserted	that	no-fault	liability	“furthers	envi-
ronmental	protection	objectives”	and	“reinforces	 the	applica-
tion	of	the	polluter-pay	principle,	which	[the]	Court	discussed	
in	[Imperial Oil].”66	Quoting	Imperial Oil,	the	SCC	reinforced	
the	principle	that,	in	order	to	promote	sustainable	development,	
polluters	 should	 be	 liable	 for	 the	 direct	 and	 immediate	 costs	
of	pollution.67
environmental loSS—
canFoR
In	 British Columbia v. 
Canadian Forest Products 
Ltd.,68	 the	 British	 Columbia	
(“BC”)	 government	 sought	 a	
damages	 award	 against	 Cana-
dian	 Forest	 Products	 Ltd.	
(“Canfor”)	 in	 connection	with	
a	 forest	 fire	 that	 burned	 1,491	
hectares	of	forest	in	the	BC	inte-
rior.	Canfor	was	largely	respon-
sible	 for	 the	 fire.69	 The	 BC	
government	sued	in	its	capacity	
as	owner	of	the	land,	that	is,	it	
launched	a	commercial	action	for	the	diminution	of	the	value	
of	timber.70 The	SCC	ruled	that	the	government	could	also	have	
sued	 as	 a	 representative	of	 the	public,	 for	 damages	 resulting	
from	the	environmental	impact	of	the	forest	fire.	
The	SCC	held	 that	as	defender	of	 the	public	 interest,	 the	
government	can	sue	 for	environmental	 loss	based	on	 the	 law	
of	 public	 nuisance.72	 The	 Court	 considered,	 and	 eventually	
dispensed	with,	 the	argument	 that	 in	such	cases,	only	 injunc-
tive	relief	is	available.	First,	it	noted	that	Canadian	courts	have	
not	always	adhered	to	the	narrow	view	that	the	role	of	the	gov-
ernment	in	public	nuisance	is	to	put	a	stop	to	the	activity	that	
constitutes	an	 interference	with	 the	public’s	 rights.73	Second,	
the	Court	indicated	that,	under	the	common	law	of	the	United	
States,	“it	has	long	been	accepted	that	the	state	has	a	common	
law parens patriae	jurisdiction	to	represent	the	collective	inter-
ests	of	the	public.”74	
According	to	the	Court,	the	parens patriae doctrine	has	led	
to	successful	claims	for	monetary	compensation	for	environmen-
tal	damage	in	the	United	States,	and	there	should	be	no	legal	bar-
rier	to	a	government	claim	for	compensation	in	an	action	based	
on	public	nuisance	in	Canada.75	Nonetheless,	the	SCC	refused	
to	assess	and	award	such	damages	because	complete	arguments	
for	such	a	claim	were	not	made	at	the	trial	and	appellate	level.76	
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conclusIon
Neither	the	common	law	nor	Canada’s	environmental	stat-
utes	make	the	government	liable	for	failing	to	enforce	environ-
mental	 laws.	This	makes	it	difficult	for	environmental	groups	
to	require	government	to	improve	its	performance	in	this	area.	
Private	law	is	returning	to	the	fore	as	a	source	of	remedies	for	
citizens	seeking	redress	for	environmental	wrongs.	Until	Canada	
has	a	government	plan	for	sustainable	development,	one	that	is	
translated	into	binding	standards,	the	courts	will	be	of	limited	
assistance.	 Canada’s	 international	 influence	will	 continue	 to	
wane.	
There	 is	 some	 irony	 to	Canada’s	 predicament.	Since	 the	
1950’s,	Canada	has	enjoyed	an	unlikely	place	at	 the	 sides	of	
the	world’s	powerful	countries	because	of	 its	ability	 to	exer-
cise	moral	suasion	effectively.	In	the	1980’s,	when	Canada	and	
the	world	began	to	fully	appreciate	the	need	to	protect	people	
and	 nature	 from	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 economic	 develop-
ment,	 the	government	 sought	 to	gain	acceptance	of	domestic	
environmental	regulation	by	inviting	stakeholders	to	do	the	right	
thing,	an	approach	that	had	worked	for	Canada	in	international	
relations.	If	only	the	federal	government	could	work	on	a	coop-
erative	basis	with	industry	and	the	provinces	to	achieve	mutually	
beneficial	outcomes,	it	was	thought,	Canada	would	again	shine	
through	its	non-confrontational	approach.	Unfortunately,	after	
twenty	years	of	 industry	 self-regulation,	voluntary	programs,	
and	 federal-provincial	 environmental	 accords,	 the	 country	 is	
nowhere	near	its	goal	of	building	a	sustainable	economy.	
Canada’s	refusal	to	own	up	to	its	shortcomings	has	resulted	
in	Canadian	delegations	being	sidelined	at	global	summits.	In	
all	likelihood,	it	is	not	so	much	the	failure	itself	as	the	refusal	to	
own	up	to	it	that	has	other	countries	riled.	What	they	are	prob-
ably	thinking	is:	if	the	country	with	the	second	largest	land	base	
(and	one	of	the	smallest	populations)	in	the	world	cannot	figure	
out	how	to	meet	the	needs	of	current	generations	without	com-
promising	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	meet	theirs,	then	at	
the	very	least,	we	should	stop	taking	their	advice.
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politique/operating-operation/fhm-policy/page08_e.asp	(last	visited	Oct.	10,	
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5	 	See	Constitution	Act,	1867,	30	&	31	Vict.,	Ch.	3	(U.K.),	§§	91-92	[herein-
after	Constitution	Act]	(showing	two	lists	dividing	legislative	authority	among	
Parliament	and	provincial	legislatures).
6	 	Id.	at	§.	109;	see also	britiSh columbia miniStry of agric. & lanDS, 
crown lanD factSheet	1,	http://www.agf.gov.bc.ca/clad/crownland_factsheet.
pdf	(last	visited	Oct.	30,	2009)	(noting	that	ninety-four	percent	of	land	in	Brit-
ish	Columbia	is	Provincial	Crown	land).
7	  Reference	Re: Offshore	Mineral	Rights,	[1967]	S.C.R.	792,	799	(Can.)	
(recounting	the	historical	development	of	provincial	land	control	in	British	
Columbia).
8	 	See	crown lanD factSheet,	supra	note	6,	at	1.	
9	 	laura barnett, parliamentary information & reSearch Serv., canaDa’S 
approach to the treaty-making proceSS	1,	5	(2008),	available at	http://www.
parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0845-e.htm.
10	 	North	American	Agreement	on	Environmental	Cooperation,	U.S.-Can.-
Mex.,	art.	5,	Sept.	14,	1993,	32	I.L.M.	1480	[hereinafter	NAEEC],	available 
at	http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/naaec/naaec03.
cfm?varlan=english.	
11	 	NAAEC,	Canadian	Implementation,	http://www.naaec.gc.ca/eng/implemen-
tation/implementation_e.htm	(last	visited	Oct.	30,	2009)	(noting	that	most	envi-
ronmental	legislation	in	Canada	falls	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	provinces).	
12	 	Migratory	Birds	Convention	Act, 1994	S.C,	ch.	22,	schedule	1	(Can.),	avail-
able at	http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-1994-c-22/latest/sc-1994-c-22.
html.	
13	 	See Constitution	Act,	supra	note	5,	§	132	(“The	Parliament	and	Govern-
ment	of	Canada	shall	have	all	Powers	necessary	or	proper	for	performing	the	
Obligations	of	Canada	or	of	any	Province	thereof,	as	Part	of	the	British	Empire,	
towards	Foreign	Countries,	arising	under	Treaties	between	the	Empire	and	such	
Foreign	Countries.”).
14	 	R.	v.	Hydro-Québec,	[1997]	3	S.C.R.	213	(Can.),	available at http://csc.
lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1997/1997rcs3-213/1997rcs3-213.
15	 	See id.	at	para.	161	(finding	that	the	provisions	of	the	Canadian	Environmen-
tal	Protection	Act	are	constitutional	because	the	Parliament	of	Canada	acted	
within	its	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	the	Constitution	Act,	1867).
16	 	Paul	Muldoon	&	Richard	D.	Lundgren,	The Hydro-Quebec Decision: Loud 
Hurray or Last Hurrah?,	law timeS,	Sept.	16,	1997,	available at	http://www.
cela.ca/publications/hydro-quebec-decision-loud-hurray-or-last-hurrah.	
17	 	Cf. id.	(explaining	that	the	federal	government	is	being	forced	to	push	its	
environmental	responsibilities	onto	the	provinces	because	of	budgetary	con-
cerns).
18	  Laurentide Motels Ltd. v. City Beauport,	[1989]	1	S.C.R.	705,	para.	355	(Can.),	
available at	http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1989/1989rcs1-705/1989rcs1-705.
html	(explaining	that	the	public	authority	to	enforce	the	law	is	discretionary).
19	 	Id.	
20	 	See	environment canaDa, compliance anD enforcement policieS for the 
canaDian enviRonmental pRotection act, 1999	4	(2001),	available at	http://
www.ec.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang=En&n=8233E4B5-1	(weighing	mul-
tiple	factors,	including	intent	of	the	alleged	violator,	past	violations,	and	the	
seriousness	of	the	harm	when	determining	the	nature	of	an	alleged	violation).
21	 	See	id.	(stating	that	Environment	Canada’s	enforcement	activities	include	
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The	World	Trade	Organization	(“WTO”)	encourages	its	members	to	fully	exhaust	negotiations	and	consultations	before	 bringing	 a	 case	 before	 its	 Dispute	 Settlement	
Body.1	 Indeed,	 a	majority	 of	 all	WTO	disputes	 are	 resolved	
in	consultations,2	allowing	its	members	to	gain	accountability,	
“save	face,”	and	preserve	sovereignty.	The	International	Tribu-
nal	for	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(“ITLOS”),	an	international	environ-
mental	dispute	resolution	body,	should	follow	the	 lead	of	 the	
WTO	in	requiring	a	pre-dispute	consultation	period	and	encour-
aging	its	members	to	resolve	differences	outside	of	the	Tribu-
nal’s	dispute	settlement	process.3	Although	the	WTO	sets	a	fine	
example	in	the	area	of	consultations	and	dispute	settlement,	it	
sets	a	less	impressive	and	less	relevant	standard	on	the	precau-
tionary	principle.	 In	contrast	 to	 the	WTO,	 the	 ITLOS	should	
continue	to	deftly	define	and	employ	the	precautionary	principle	
to	increase	its	authority	and	protect	ocean	resources.	
The	precautionary-like	principle	that	WTO	members	may	
invoke	is	set	forth	in	Article	5.7	of	the	Agreement	on	the	Appli-
cation	of	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary	Measures.4	It	allows	mem-
bers	to	make	a	final	decision	on	the	safety	of	a	product	when	
faced	 with	 insufficient	 scientific	 data.5	 It	 also	 requires	 the	
members	 to	actively	seek	new	 information	and	 to	 review	 the	
measures	within	“a	reasonable	period	of	time.”6	In	reality,	this	
approach	has	failed	to	achieve	much	success	within	the	WTO	
system.	The	debate	over	the	use	of	the	precautionary	principle	
presented	itself	in	WTO	cases	such	as	the	beef	hormone	debate	
where	the	European	Communities	(“EC”)	tried	to	ban	all	hor-
mone-treated	beef	from	the	United	States,	and	in	the	EC	Biotech	
Products	dispute	where	the	EC	attempted	to	ban	all	genetically	
modified	food	and	seed.7	In	these	decisions,	the	WTO	rejected	
the	use	of	the	precautionary	principle.8	Similarly,	when	Japan	
tried	to	ban	American	apples	from	entering	its	domestic	market	
by	invoking	Article	5.7,	the	Appellate	Body	of	the	WTO	ruled	
that	determination	of	“reasonable	period	of	time”	was	on	a	case-
by-case	analysis	and	that	Japan	had	failed	to	meet	the	require-
ment	for	reviewing	its	measures.9	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 treatment	 the	 precautionary	 principle	
has	received	at	the	WTO,	the	precautionary	principle	has	been	
instrumental	to	achievements	in	the	area	of	international	envi-
ronmental	law.	When	scientists	began	linking	the	use	of	chlo-
rofluorocarbons	to	ozone	depletion,	the	use	of	the	precautionary	
principle	in	an	international	agreement	galvanized	and	justified	
global	action.10	The	Montreal	Protocol	forced	the	international	
community	to	take	cost	effective	actions	to	deal	with	irreversible	
consequences	even	in	light	of	scientific	uncertainties.11	Effec-
tive	implementation	of	environmental	law	needs	to	proceed	in	
spite	of	scientific	uncertainties	in	order	to	prevent	irreversible	
damage.
The	 ITLOS	has	 successfully	 increased	 its	 legitimacy	 by	
demonstrating	 an	 effective	 formula	 through	 incorporation	 of	
the	precautionary	approach	in	its	judgments.12	In	the	Southern	
Bluefin	Tuna	 case,	 the	 ITLOS	 encouraged	 the	 parties	 to	 act	
with	 “prudence	 and	 caution”	 in	order	 to	 ensure	 conservation	
of	marine	life.13	In	1999,	its	decision	revealed	a	precautionary	
approach	and	became	the	first	instance	of	an	international	judi-
cial	decision	employing	this	notion.14	
To	 avoid	 overuse	 of	 the	 precautionary	 approach,	 which	
could	result	in	diminished	legitimacy,	the	ITLOS	established	a	
clear	threshold	in	the	Mixed	Oxide	Fuel	plant	case	(“MOX”).15	
MOX	 involved	 a	 dispute	 over	marine	 pollution	 between	 the	
United	Kingdom	(“UK”)	and	Ireland	in	which	Ireland	requested	
that	ITLOS	stop	the	UK	from	releasing	radioactive	waste	from	
the	MOX	plant	 into	 the	 Irish	Sea,	 amongst	other	provisional	
measures.16	The	Tribunal	 took	 this	opportunity	 to	 clarify	 the	
extent	and	limits	 in	 the	use	of	 the	precautionary	approach.	In	
doing	so,	the	Tribunal	emphasized	the	requirement	of	indicat-
ing	the	seriousness	of	the	potential	harm	to	the	marine	environ-
ment.17	The	 ITLOS	 ruled	 that	 Ireland	had	 failed	 to	meet	 the	
necessary	threshold	in	demonstrating	the	urgency	and	the	seri-
ousness	of	the	potential	harm.18	
The	Tribunal’s	judgment	in	the	MOX	plant	case	was	in	line	
with	Montreal	Protocol’s	Principle	15,	in	which	the	precaution-
ary	approach	was	narrowly	construed.19	In	order	to	invoke	the	
precautionary	approach,	the	harm	to	be	prevented	cannot	be	gen-
eral,	but	has	to	be	identifiable	and	clear.	Furthermore,	the	threat	
must	pose	serious	or	irreversible	damage	to	the	environment.
The	precautionary	principle	is	not	without	its	constraints.	
There	is	a	threshold	that	the	parties	have	to	prove	in	order	for	
the	Tribunal	to	use	the	approach.20	Effective	international	envi-
ronmental	law	requires	a	precautionary	approach,	and	the	exis-
tence	of	scientific	uncertainties	should	not	hinder	society	from	
taking	effective	actions	today.	The	willingness	of	the	ITLOS	to	
employ	the	precautionary	approach	in	its	judgments	has	not	only	
demonstrated	 its	 appreciation	 and	 concern	 for	 environmental	
issues,	but	has	also	given	it	legitimacy	and	a	workable	formula	
to	enhance	its	role.	
Endnotes:	Precautionary	Principle	in	the	International	Tribunal	for	
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 “Trade, of course, is neither inherently good nor bad; but 
how it is conducted in the future is now a matter of deep con-
cern—and unprecedented opportunity.”1
InTroducTIon
Sixteen	years	ago,	a	new	U.S.	President	offered	an	oppor-tunity	to	increase	North	American	environmental	protec-tion	with	an	environmental	side	agreement	to	the	North	
American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(“NAFTA”)	that	gave	citizens	
a	voice	in	enforcing	environmental	laws.2	The	side	agreement,	
known	 as	 the	North	American	Agreement	 on	Environmental	
Cooperation	 (“NAAEC”),	 provides	 a	mechanism	 for	 citizens	
to	aim	the	international	spotlight	on	a	government’s	failure	to	
enforce	 domestic	 environmental	 laws.3	 A	 similar	 agreement	
between	Chile	 and	Canada,	 the	Canada-Chile	Agreement	 on	
Environmental	Cooperation	(“CCAEC”),	allows	ordinary	citi-
zens	 to	 ask	 an	 international	 body	 to	 investigate	 alleged	non-
enforcement	 of	 environmental	
laws.4	While	 these	mechanisms	
are	 commonplace	 in	 a	 number	
of	 international	 trade	 agree-
ments,	 the	 U.S.-Chile	 Free	
Trade	Agreement	 (“USCFTA”)	
includes	a	state-to-state	dispute	
resolution	mechanism,	but	does	
not	allow	for	citizen	submissions	
on	enforcement.5	
As	 the	 international	 com-
munity	 turns	 its	 attention	 to	
environmental	 crises	 around	
the	 world,	 the	 United	 States	
must	decide	how	to	address	lax	
enforcement	 of	 environmental	
laws	by	its	trading	partners.6	While	
a	free	trade	agreement	is	only	one	avenue	for	the	United	States	
and	environmental	activists	 to	pursue	more	effective	enforce-
ment	of	every	country’s	environmental	laws,	this	article	argues	
that	a	citizen	enforcement	mechanism	is	a	vital	tool	that	must	be	
included	in	future	agreements.	Part	I	outlines	the	enforcement	
mechanisms	 under	 the	CCAEC,	NAAEC,	 and	 the	USCFTA.	
Part	 II	 argues	 that	 agreements	 without	 citizen	 enforcement	
mechanisms	cannot	effectively	increase	environmental	enforce-
ment,	while	agreements	with	these	provisions	encourage	interest	
in	environmental	issues	and	pressure	to	strengthen	environmen-
tal	regulations.	Part	III	recommends	including	citizen	enforce-
ment	mechanisms	in	future	U.S.	trade	agreements.	Finally,	Part	
IV	 concludes	 that	 free	 trade	 agreements	 offer	 an	 avenue	 for	
increased	enforcement	of	environmental	laws,	and	that	citizen	
enforcement	procedures	strengthen	those	agreements.	
backGround
ccaec & naaec citizen enforcement 
proceDureS
The	CCAEC	and	NAAEC	address	ineffective	enforcement	
of	domestic	environmental	laws	in	two	ways.	The	first	is	a	state-
to-state	 dispute	 resolution	mechanism	 for	 a	 persistent	 failure	
to	enforce	a	party’s	own	environmental	laws	in	a	manner	that	
interferes	with	free	trade.7	The	second	is	a	citizen	submission	on	
enforcement	procedure.8	This	mechanism	allows	any	citizen	to	
send	a	submission	to	either	National	Secretariat	asserting	that	a	
party	to	the	CCAEC	or	NAAEC	is	“failing	to	effectively	enforce	
its	environmental	law.”9
The	 CCAEC	 established	 a	
Commission	for	Environmental	
Cooperation	(“CEC”)	made	up	
of	a	Council,	a	Joint	Submission	
Committee,	 and	 a	 Joint	 Pub-
lic	 Advisory	 Committee.10	 A	
citizen	 submission	 to	 the	CEC	
must	meet	seven	largely	proce-
dural	 criteria	 and	be	grounded	
in	 a	 specific	 incident	 of	 non-
enforcement.11	 The	 Joint	 Sub-
mission	 Committee	 decides	
whether	 the	 submission	merits	
a	response	from	the	state,	 then	
decides	 whether	 to	 produce	 a	
public	 factual	 record.12	While	
the	intent	of	the	factual	record	is	
to	describe	and	report	events	without	passing	judgment	on	par-
ties’	actions,	parties	still	resist	the	process.13	
uScfta environmental State-to-State DiSpute 
reSolution proceDureS
Like	the	CCAEC	and	NAAEC,	the	USCFTA	obliges	both	
parties	to	“effectively	enforce”	domestic	environmental	laws.14	
The	process	can	only	begin	if	a	party	has	persistently	failed	to	
effectively	enforce	its	environmental	laws	“in	a	manner	affecting	
The United States must 
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trading partners.
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trade	between	the	Parties.”15	Under	the	CCAEC,	a	citizen	can	
pursue	an	enforcement	matter	for	a	single	failure	to	effectively	
enforce	an	environmental	law.16	The	dispute	settlement	provi-
sions	of	the	USCFTA,	however,	are	strictly	between	government	
parties,	and	require	both	a	persistent	pattern	of	non-enforcement	
and	a	showing	that	the	failure	affects	trade	between	the	parties.17	
Parties	first	address	disputes	under	the	environmental	provi-
sions	of	the	USCFTA	with	consultations.18	If	consultations	fail	
to	resolve	the	matter	within	sixty	days,	the	complaining	party	
can	initiate	the	USCFTA	dispute	resolution	procedures.19	First,	
the	 parties	 convene	 a	 meeting	
of	 the	 Commission	 to	 resolve	
the	 issue.20	 Next,	 the	 parties	
convene	an	arbitral	panel	 if	 the	
issue	remains	unresolved.21	The	
panel	can	impose	fines	of	up	to	
fifteen	million	dollars	per	day	on	
the	 non-enforcing	 party.22	 The	
complaining	party	 can	 suspend	
USCFTA	 trade	 benefits	 if	 the	
party	fails	to	pay	the	fine.23	
analysIs
effective enforcement of environmental lawS 
protect the environment, human health, anD 
foreign inveStment StreamS
Environmental	 laws	 do	 not	 enforce	 themselves;	 govern-
ments	or	private	citizens	must	enforce	those	laws.24	The	impor-
tance	of	enforcement	is	especially	true	in	Latin	America,	where	
many	countries	have	an	inconsistent	historical	relationship	with	
the	rule	of	 law.25	Effective	environmental	protection	requires	
both	effective	environmental	laws	and	consistent	enforcement	
of	those	laws.26	
Foreign	and	domestic	investors	are	unlikely	to	comply	with	
environmental	laws	if	there	are	no	consequences	for	violations.	
Because	environmental	compliance	can	be	expensive,	compa-
nies	and	investors	that	violate	environmental	regulations	gain	a	
competitive	advantage	against	those	who	do	comply.	Effective	
enforcement	reassures	investors	that	competitors	are	not	gain-
ing	a	competitive	advantage	by	avoiding	environmental	com-
pliance.27	Overall,	trade	and	investment	that	leads	to	increased	
prosperity	may	strengthen	effective	environmental	protections,	
but	the	government	or	citizens	must	enforce	those	protections.28	
State-to-State DiSpute reSolution alone DoeS 
not increaSe enforcement of environmental lawS
While	 state-to-state	 dispute	 resolution	 theoretically	 pro-
vides	a	venue	for	environmental	advocates	to	work	though	their	
governments,	 government	 action	 carries	 burdens	 that	 make	
action	unlikely.29	States	have	neither	the	capacity	nor	authority	
to	effectively	monitor	enforcement	of	another	state’s	environ-
mental	laws.30	The	absence	of	a	citizen	enforcement	mechanism	
and	 the	requirement	 that	 the	disputed	pattern	of	non-enforce-
ment	affect	trade	between	the	parties	hampers	efforts	to	improve	
environmental	protection	through	treaty	provisions.31	
State	Espousal	Mechanisms	Lead	to	Mutual	Non-
Enforcement
Both	states	in	a	free	trade	agreement	have	non-environmen-
tal	reasons	to	sign	an	agreement.32	As	a	result,	environmental	
disputes	are	unlikely	because	each	state	has	an	interest	 in	not	
enforcing	 environmental	 provisions	of	 the	 treaty.33	A	 citizen	
alleging	that	her	government	has	failed	to	enforce	environmen-
tal	laws	has	little	control	over	the	diplomatic	concerns	of	either	
government	party	to	the	treaty.34	Because	environmental	issues	
are	not	a	priority,	neither	party	has	
an	interest	in	enforcing	environ-
mental	treaty	provisions.	At	the	
same	 time,	 the	 consequences	
of	state-to-state	dispute	resolu-
tion	are	 trade	sanctions,	which	
undermine	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	
agreement:	 free	 trade.35	 As	 a	
result,	 no	 party	 has	 used	 the	
NAAEC	 or	 CCAEC	 govern-
ment	 arbitration	 provisions	 or	
the	USCFTA	state-to-state	dis-
pute	resolution	procedures.36	
High	Burdens	of	Proof	Make	an	Unused	Procedure	More	
Difficult
The	USCFTA	provides	a	dispute	resolution	mechanism	for	
state	parties	to	pursue	trade	sanctions.37	A	state	party	must	show	
that	 there	 is	 a	persistent	pattern	of	non-enforcement	 and	 that	
the	pattern	affects	trade	between	Chile	and	the	United	States.38	
These	hurdles	to	successful	sanctions	are	high	even	if	a	state	had	
an	incentive	to	pursue	a	dispute.39	
The	state	must	first	show	that	there	was	a	persistent	pattern	
of	non-enforcement.40	Effective	enforcement	 requires	consis-
tency	to	be	effective,	but	enforcement	in	Latin	America	is	more	
likely	to	be	inconsistent,	precluding	proof	of	a	consistent	pat-
tern.41	Second,	a	state	must	show	that	the	pattern	of	non-enforce-
ment	affected	trade	between	the	countries.42	For	example,	the	
state	could	show	that	non-enforcement	gives	domestic	facilities	
in	the	complained-against	country	an	advantage	over	facilities	in	
the	complaining	country.43	In	a	complex	global	economy,	a	state	
is	unlikely	to	be	able	to	prove	a	specific	impact	on	trade	between	
the	parties.44	These	high	burdens	of	proof	substantially	limit	the	
already	unlikely	state-to-state	dispute	resolution	procedure.	
a citizen enforcement proceDure iS a better 
mechaniSm for increaSing enforcement of 
environmental lawS anD promoting public 
intereSt in the environment
A	citizen	enforcement	mechanism	strikes	a	balance	between	
state	 sovereignty	and	 the	public	desire	 for	a	cleaner	environ-
ment.45	Because	citizen	submissions	do	not	rely	on	government	
action,	countries	cannot	subsume	environmental	issues	to	other	
diplomatic	concerns.46	Enforcement	of	domestic	law	preserves	
state	interest	in	sovereignty	because	the	treaty	does	not	impose	
an	international	standard.47	At	the	same	time,	a	defined	mecha-
nism	for	action	fosters	civil	society	interest	in	the	environment.48
No state party has used 
the state-to-state dispute 
resolution procedures
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Citizen	Submissions	Do	Not	Rely	on	a	Government	to	
Initiate	Treaty	Enforcement	Actions
Unlike	state-to-state	dispute	resolution,	the	citizen	submis-
sion	process	provides	a	venue	for	citizens	to	report	instances	of	
non-enforcement	in	their	own	neighborhoods	or	in	a	protected	
area	used	by	the	public.49	Citizens	have	an	interest	in	protecting	
the	natural	areas	they	use,	and	are	
more	likely	to	report	a	failure	to	
enforce	 than	 the	government.50	
Citizens	 can	 directly	 observe	
environmental	 violations	 and	
a	 lack	 of	 state	 action	 in	 their	
neighborhoods.51	 In	 contrast,	
limited	 resources	 restrict	 state	
monitoring	 of	 another	 state’s	
enforcement	activity.52	Citizens	
and	other	private	actors	are	also	
better	equipped	to	identify	inef-
fective	 enforcement	 because	
they	are	closer	to	violations.53	
Citizen	Submissions	Balance	
State	Sovereignty	and	Public	
Interest	in	Enforcement	of	
Environmental	Laws
Relying	on	citizen	enforcement	addresses	the	widespread	
concern	of	Latin	American	countries	that	environmental	provi-
sions	in	free	trade	agreements	are	an	effort	to	restrict	their	sov-
ereignty	with	outside	standards.54	The	CAAEC’s	requirement	
to	enforce	domestic	environmental	laws	allows	a	country	to	set	
a	level	of	environmental	protection	it	feels	is	appropriate.55	At	
the	same	time,	as	an	environmental	community	develops,	that	
community	can	pressure	 the	government	 to	 increase	levels	of	
environmental	protection	and	enforcement.56	States	also	see	the	
citizen	submission	as	a	lesser	threat	because	of	the	absence	of	
trade	sanctions	associated	with	a	factual	record.57	
Enforcement	of	domestic	environmental	law	imposes	lower	
sovereignty	costs	on	Latin	American	states.58	Because	only	citi-
zens	can	initiate	the	submission	process,	the	process	does	not	
raise	concerns	of	 a	 lack	of	democratic	 accountability.59	As	a	
community	of	environmental	activists	develops,	that	community	
can	lobby	for	more	protective	environmental	laws,	making	the	
government	more	responsive	to	community	concerns.	
In	contrast	to	the	dispute	resolution	proceeding	under	the	
USCFTA,	the	citizen	submission	process	does	not	carry	a	direct	
threat	of	trade	sanctions	and	instead	relies	on	the	deterrent	effect	
of	factual	records.60	This	limitation	preserves	the	benefits	of	the	
free	 trade	 agreement	while	 providing	 consequences	 for	 non-
enforcement	of	 the	 terms	of	 the	agreement.61	The	absence	of	
trade	sanctions	also	prevents	a	state-to-state	dispute	resolution	
from	punishing	exporters	and	other	private	parties	who	might	
not	have	been	involved	in	the	state’s	non-enforcement.62	
Citizen	Enforcement	Fosters	the	Development	of	a	
Community	of	Environmental	Activists
While	the	citizen	submission	process	is	theoretically	acces-
sible	to	the	general	public	without	legal	assistance,	this	process	
can	be	more	successful	when	 there	 is	a	civil	society	commu-
nity	ready	to	bring	claims.63	At	the	same	time,	the	process’	con-
crete	avenue	for	action	provides	a	
mechanism	 for	 environmental	
organizations	 in	 more	 devel-
oped	 countries	 to	 work	 with	
growing	organizations	 in	Latin	
America.64	 These	 connections	
between	environmental	 organi-
zations	 foster	 the	 development	
of	 the	 environmental	 commu-
nity,	 strengthening	 domestic	
environmental	 protections	 as	
well	 as	 the	 citizen	 submission	
process.65	Some	criticize	the	cit-
izen	submission	process	because	
it	does	not	legally	bind	the	gov-
ernment	 to	 take	 any	 action.66	
However,	even	a	limited	citizen	
submission	 process	 is	 a	 valuable	
tool	for	environmental	advocates	to	pressure	government	actors	
to	pursue	environmental	protection.67	
recommendaTIons
As	long	as	the	United	States	continues	to	expand	free	trade	
with	Latin	America,	free	trade	agreements	should	include	a	citi-
zen	enforcement	mechanism.	To	ensure	citizens	have	environ-
mental	laws	to	monitor,	the	United	States	should	refrain	from	
signing	 agreements	with	 states	 that	 do	 not	 have	 an	 effective	
legal	framework	for	environmental	protection.	While	access	to	a	
citizen	submission	process	will	not	immediately	provide	effec-
tive	environmental	protection,	it	is	an	important	step.	
incluDe a citizen SubmiSSion on enforcement 
mechaniSm in future free traDe agreementS
While	 the	 CCAEC	 citizen	 submission	 process	 is	 weak	
when	compared	to	U.S.	citizen	suit	provisions,	the	process	is	an	
innovative	mechanism	in	international	law.68	Historically,	pri-
vate	citizen	action	in	the	international	arena	was	only	available	
through	state	action,	but	citizen	submissions	allow	governments	
to	 stay	 an	 arm’s	 length	 from	 the	 proceedings.	 States	 cannot	
accuse	other	governments	of	manipulating	 the	environmental	
dispute	resolution	process	for	other	purposes	because	the	sub-
mission	process	does	not	involve	government	action.	
A	citizen	submission	mechanism	harnesses	 the	collective	
knowledge	of	 citizens	 to	 identify	 instances	of	 environmental	
non-enforcement.69	 State	 interests	 in	 preserving	 sovereignty	
would	likely	limit	any	effort	for	states	to	monitor	each	others’	
domestic	environmental	enforcement.70	A	citizen	enforcement	
mechanism	balances	 the	public	 interest	 in	consistent	enforce-
ment	and	the	state	interest	in	sovereignty.	
Because citizen 
submissions do not rely 
on government action, 
countries cannot subsume 
environmental issues to 
other diplomatic 
concerns
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At	the	same	time,	the	CEC	governing	bodies	should	have	
more	freedom	to	prepare	factual	records	without	political	inter-
ference.71	The	practical	consequences	of	a	factual	record	are	lim-
ited	to	public	disclosure	of	state	action,	and	the	state	can	blunt	
criticism	of	any	absence	of	enforcement	with	future	enforcement	
action.72	Because	treaties	require	enforcement	of	domestic	law,	
not	of	a	politically	unattainable	international	standard,	govern-
ments	should	be	able	to	effectively	enforce	their	own	domestic	
law.73	Overall,	a	citizen	submission	process	within	a	free	trade	
agreement	can	be	an	effective	mechanism	to	improve	enforce-
ment	of	environmental	laws	if	the	CEC	has	the	political	freedom	
to	pursue	factual	records.74	A	trading	partner,	however,	needs	
a	basic	environmental	framework	before	increased	enforcement	
will	increase	environmental	protection.
Do not enact free traDe 
agreementS with StateS 
that Do not proviDe 
for environmental 
protection
While	a	citizen	submission	
process	 can	 increase	 effective	
enforcement	 of	 environmental	
laws,	 increased	enforcement	of	
laws	 that	 do	 not	 exist	 cannot	
protect	the	environment.	While	
some	argue	that	free	trade	brings	
increased	 prosperity	 that	 will	
in	 turn	 increase	 environmental	
protections,	 investor	protection	
provisions	 in	 free	 trade	 agree-
ments	are	a	threat	to	new	envi-
ronmental	laws.75	Because	of	these	
investor	 protection	 provisions,	 effective	 environmental	 laws	
must	be	in	place	before	a	free	trade	agreement	can	improve	their	
enforcement.76	
While	 the	United	States	and	Chile	enacted	 the	USCFTA	
after	Chile	had	achieved	a	high	level	of	environmental	protection,	
the	recent	U.S.-Peru	Agreement	does	not	increase	environmen-
tal	protection.77	Peru	has	environmental	laws,	but	those	laws	do	
not	meet	the	“high	level”	of	environmental	protection	required	
by	the	treaty.78	Trade	agreements	can	foster	increased	environ-
mental	enforcement,	but	only	if	the	partner	country	has	effective	
environmental	laws.	If	increasing	environmental	protection	is	a	
goal	of	the	United	States	and	other	developed	countries,	those	
countries	should	not	sign	trade	agreements	with	countries	that	
lack	legal	environmental	protection.
conclusIon
While	 inclusion	of	 any	 environmental	 provisions	 in	 free	
trade	 agreements	 is	 a	 step	 forward,	 lip	 service	 to	 increased	
enforcement	of	environmental	laws	is	not	sufficient.	Effective	
enforcement	of	domestic	environmental	laws	should	be	a	stan-
dard	 condition	 of	 future	 U.S.	
free	trade	agreements.	Allowing	
state-to-state	dispute	 resolution	
on	 environmental	 issues	 is	 not	
sufficient	 to	 actually	 increase	
enforcement	 because	 states	
tend	 to	 rely	 on	 mutual	 non-
enforcement	when	 there	are	no	
other	 consequences.	 A	 citizen	
submission	on	enforcement	pro-
cess	 is	much	more	 effective	 at	
increasing	enforcement	because	
it	 takes	advantage	of,	and	even	
increases,	 public	 awareness	 of	
non-enforcement.	While	 a	 citi-
zen	 enforcement	 process	 alone	
will	not	solve	the	world’s	envi-
ronmental	 problems,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 step	 towards	 increas-
ing	 government	 accountability	 for	 effective	 enforcement	 of	
environmental	laws.	
Effective environmental 
laws must be in place 
before a free trade 
agreement can improve 
their enforcement
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conference proceeDingS
21St century infraStructure: opportunitieS 
anD hurDleS for renewable energy 
Development1
InTroducTIon: overvIeW
Not	enough	attention	has	been	paid	to	renewable	energy	infrastructure	development	critical	to	ensure	successful	project	development	for	wind,	biomass,	solar,	biofuels,	
geothermal,	distributed	generation,	and	waste	management	proj-
ects.	With	almost	$13	trillion	slated	to	be	spent	in	the	upcom-
ing	decade	on	energy	supply	and	infrastructure,	the	Conference	
sought	 to	 elucidate	 the	 type	of	 integrated	Federal,	State,	 and	
Wall	Street	support	for	infrastructure,	we	need	to	see:
•	 Renewable	energy	and	efficiency	supplies	growing	in	
the	mix
•	 An	estimated	market	clearing	price	for	carbon
•	 Increased	renewable	infrastructure	investment
•	 Access	to	capital	
The	 American	 University	 Washington	 College	 of	 Law	
(“WCL”)	 and	 the	 Renewable	 &	 Distributed	 Generation	
Resources	 Committee	 of	 the	 ABA	 Section	 of	 Environment,	
Energy	and	Resources	co-sponsored	this	conference	to	evalu-
ate	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 renewable	 infrastructure	 develop-
ment.	The	national	Conference	was	held	at	WCL	on	September	
10,	 2009.	 Podcasts	 of	 the	 panel	 discussions	 and	 lunch	 key-
note	 speech	 by	 the	 Federal	 Energy	 Regulatory	 Commission	
(“FERC”)	Chairman	Jon	Wellinghoff	are	available	through	the	
WCL	podcast	directory.2
elecTrIc TransmIssIon Gaps and boTTlenecks: 
Issues and poTenTIal soluTIons3
Assuming	 that	we	can	generate	all	 the	 renewable	energy	
we	need	in	this	country,	sufficient	electric	transmission,	distri-
bution,	and	storage	is	critical	to	move	power	from	where	it	is	
generated	to	where	it	 is	needed	and	used.	One	of	the	primary	
issues	with	 transmission	 development	 is	 determining	who	 is	
going	to	pay	and	how.	The	issue	of	who	pays	is	in	flux	between	
the	regulated	model	with	long-term	purchase	agreements	and	the	
participant	pay	model,	where	the	beneficiaries	of	the	additional	
transmission	themselves	pay	for	the	cost	of	development.	
tranSmiSSion Development: rto/iSo context
In	the	RTO/ISO	reliability	and	planning	processes,	several	
payment	methodologies	have	emerged.	First	is	the	cost	alloca-
tion	method,	whereby	one-third	of	the	transmission	development	
costs	are	shared	regionally	through	an	increase	in	rate	base,	and	
two-thirds	of	 the	 costs	 are	 allocated	 to	 the	 regional	 zones	 in	
which	the	transmission	upgrade/expansion	is	located.	The	cost	
allocation	method	is	the	basic	plan	generally	used	for	adding	a	
designated	network	resource	on	the	transmission	grid.	
Another	payment	method	is	the	balanced	portfolio	approach.	
In	 the	balanced	portfolio,	100	percent	of	 the	costs	are	spread	
across	the	entire	region.	Strict	tests	are	in	place	to	show	how	the	
benefits	exceed	the	costs	for	the	whole	region.	This	approach	is	
flexible	enough	to	make	adjustments	to	ensure	that	the	costs	are	
balanced	region-wide.	If	 the	analysis	shows	that	certain	areas	
will	not	see	as	much	benefit,	then	adjustments	can	be	made	to	
the	cost	assessment	for	better	parity	within	the	region.	
tranSmiSSion Development: private inveStorS
The	goal	of	merchant	transmission	development	is	for	pri-
vate	 investors	 to	enter	 the	market	 to	build	 transmission	 lines,	
often	to	connect	renewable	generation.	On	February	19,	2009,	
the	FERC,	by	order,	adjusted	the	policy	for	merchant	lines.4	The	
pre-existing	FERC	policy	required	negotiated	rates	based	on	ten	
criteria	to	qualify	as	a	merchant	line.	In	contrast,	the	new	policy	
enables	private	negotiations	with	an	“anchor	customer”	to	help	
diversify	the	risk.	Instead	of	ten	criteria,	the	new	policy	for	mer-
chant	transmission	lines	consists	of	only	four	criteria:	(1)	just	
and	reasonable	rates	(i.e.	merchant	has	to	be	an	investor	assum-
ing	the	full	risk	of	 the	line),	(2)	no	undue	discrimination	(i.e.	
when	the	remaining	assets	of	the	line	are	sold	in	an	open	market,	
there	must	be	consistency	among	all	investors	with	regards	to	
the	investment	terms	and	conditions),	(3)	no	undue	preference	
and	affiliate	concern	(i.e.	the	anchor	cannot	be	an	affiliate	of	the	
investor),	and	(4)	regional	reliability	and	operation	efficiency	
(i.e.	RTO	classification	no	longer	required).
leSSonS learneD from the tranSmiSSion Development 
proJectS
•	 Eminent	domain	and	control	of	the	environmental	per-
mitting	process	can	be	trumped	by	“NIMBY”	condi-
tions	in	the	relevant	market
•	 Municipal	utilities	and	cooperatives	are	more	receptive	
to	building	transmission	than	IOUs	because	of	differ-
ences	in	their	business	models
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•	 Computing	and	quantifying	 the	benefits	of	 transmis-
sion	construction	can	help	minimize	potential	lawsuits	
enjoining	 development	 and	 also	 attract	 stakeholder	
support
•	 Having	 state	 regulators	 and	 permitting	 authorities	
review	transmission	projects	in	groups,	not	one-by-one,	
together	with	stakeholder	engagement	can	accelerate	
the	permitting	process
The	 crucial	 question	 is	 still	 who	 pays	 for	 the	 transmis-
sion	investment.	State	and	Federal	government	cooperation	is	
essential	in	answering	this	question	because	to	date	it	has	been	
the	 combination	of	 state	mandates	 and	 federal	 tax	 incentives	
that	have	enabled	the	success	of	renewable	energy.	FERC	has	
solid	experience	in	siting	and	approving	natural	gas	pipelines	
and	LNG	terminals	that	can	be	applied	to	this	task.	If	regulatory	
certainty	can	be	provided,	transmission	investment	by	third	par-
ties	could	be	a	major	cleantech	financial	play	for	the	upcoming	
decade.
GeneraTIon resources: FIndInG The rIGhT mIx5
Renewable	energy	has	had	several	technologies	dominate	
the	market	 for	years,	 but	new	 innovations	 are	developing	all	
the	time.	The	panel	also	examined	what	the	renewable	energy	
generation	 portfolio	 could	 look	 like	 under	 proposed	 climate	
legislation.	
A	longstanding	player	in	renewable	energy	is	solar	power.	
Solar	power	has	numerous	benefits	like	low	operating	and	main-
tenance	costs,	very	little	degradation,	low	variability,	and	rel-
atively	easy	permitting.	The	price	for	photovoltaic	panels	has	
dropped	dramatically	in	the	last	18	months,	but	solar	power	still	
faces	issues	with	scale-up.	Gov-
ernment	 policies	 have	 been	 too	
focused	on	single	rooftop	instal-
lations	and	provide	more	money	
for	 small	 solar	 installations	 by	
imposing	size	limits.	To	achieve	
greater	market	penetration,	solar	
power	will	have	to	become	more	
than	 a	 small	 distributed	 genera-
tion	resource.
Transmission	 is	 the	 largest	
current	 constraint	 on	 the	 use	 of	
renewable	energy	sources	regard-
less	 of	 whether	 that	 energy	 is	
wind,	solar,	biomass,	or	geother-
mal.	New	transmission	lines	must	
be	 built	 to	 accommodate	 new	
population	centers	and	new	loca-
tions	of	renewable	energy.	But	even	with	the	potential	problems	
of	transmission,	wind	power	is	 the	most	ready	for	 large-scale	
production	today.	The	Department	of	Energy	has	reported	that	
the	United	States	could	meet	20	percent	of	its	total	energy	needs	
using	wind	energy.	Baseload	renewables	for	the	future	to	watch	
are:	biomass,	geothermal,	hydropower,	and	waste	management	
projects.	Their	dispatchability	offers	premium	renewable	energy	
benefits	to	the	utility	and	its	customers	especially	in	a	carbon	
constrained	world.
Natural	 gas	 has	 emerged	 as	 the	 largest	 competitor	 to	
renewable	energy.	Prices	for	natural	gas	have	dropped	due	to	
advances	in	drilling	technology.	However,	government	policies	
are	shifting	to	promote	renewable	energy	with	natural	gas	sup-
port	as	a	transition	fuel	through	2030.	The	policy	drivers	for	an	
efficient	energy	mix	include:	energy	security,	energy	indepen-
dence,	national	security,	stabilization	of	energy	prices,	and,	most	
importantly,	decreasing	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	These	poli-
cies	will	result	in	a	better	renewable	energy	generation	portfolio	
with	more	innovation	and	operating	efficiencies	from	transmis-
sion	and	storage.
Any	climate	or	energy	legislation	incentives	must	address	
the	characteristics	of	project	finance	in	order	to	encourage	the	
development	of	 renewable	energy.	Projects	must	have	a	firm	
method	 of	 revenue	 generation	 (either	 through	 a	 contract	 or	
rate	base)	and	revenue	streams	must	be	able	to	be	aggregated	
(securitized).	Furthermore,	a	market	must	be	fluid	to	function	
properly,	but	must	promote	regulatory	certainty	for	long-term	
planning.	Only	by	keeping	these	project	finance	characteristics	
in	mind	will	policy-makers	effectively	incentivize	and	promote	
the	development	of	renewable	energy.
prIvaTe InvesTmenT and The role oF The 
Federal GovernmenT: “The GoldIlocks 
conundrum”6
The	government’s	role	in	the	development	and	promotion	
of	renewable	energy	needs	to	be	the	right	size	to	be	effective—
neither	too	big	nor	too	small.	Typically,	the	government	role	in	
development	 is	 to	 fund	 basic	
and	early	applied	research.	As	
technologies	 develop,	 entre-
preneurs	 and	 industry	 begin	
to	 identify	 technologies	 with	
market	 applications,	 and	 the	
government’s	role	shifts.	In	the	
energy	field,	however,	the	gov-
ernment	 role	 in	 investment	 is	
more	important	because	of	the	
high	 risk	 involved	 in	 financ-
ing	 capital-intensive	 projects.	
The	 limited	 availability	 of	
capital	 since	 2008	 has	 also	
fostered	an	 important	govern-
ment	role	in	facilitating	market	
transformation.
The	 government	 must	
reconcile	 competing	 national	 interests:	 national	 security,	 cli-
mate	change,	supply	reliability,	and	economic	competitiveness.	
Free	market	 investors	are	hesitant	 to	invest	when	policies	are	
uncertain.	Without	a	national	legislative	mandate,	unpredictabil-
ity	reigns	as	regulations	change	rapidly	and	state	government	
policies	develop	in	patchwork	fashion.	The	utility	market	is	a	
particularly	conservative	market	that	tends	to	wait	to	see	which	
Transmission is the 
largest current constraint 
on the use of renewable 
energy sources regardless 
of whether that energy is 
wind, solar, biomass, or 
geothermal
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technologies	the	government	will	mark	as	winners	and	losers.	
Adding	 to	 the	 uncertainty,	Wall	 Street	 is	 recasting	 its	 busi-
ness	model	after	the	financial	meltdown.	Particularly	in	a	mar-
ket	downturn,	private	investors	tend	to	avoid	risking	corporate	
investment	into	new	technologies.	
To	develop	domestic	energy	in	the	United	States,	the	gov-
ernment	must	assume	a	strong	role	by	providing	increased	fund-
ing.	If	left	solely	to	the	free	market,	energy	development	will	
happen	 slowly;	megacities,	 population	 growth,	 and	 resource	
pressure	 will	 eventually	 force	
prices	 to	 rise	and	 result	 in	new	
technologies	 in	 response	 to	
the	 need.	 However,	 the	 U.S.	
can	 become	 an	 energy	 leader	
and	 avoid	 the	painful	 spikes	 in	
energy	 costs	 if	 the	 government	
steps	 in	 to	 fund	 the	 bridge	 to	
facilitate	market	transformation.	
Export	markets	 for	 clean	 tech-
nology	 products	 must	 also	 be	
preserved.	Small	businesses	will	
be	hurt	by	large	government	investment	because	they	lack	the	
resources	to	participate	in	the	government	contracting	process;	
but	small	businesses	will	always	foster	technology	development	
by	assuming	entrepreneurial	risk	and	will	require	special	private	
investment	and	government	support	to	be	an	incubator	of	future	
innovation.
To	make	a	difference	in	addressing	greenhouse	gas	emis-
sions,	we	need	to	focus	on	three	objectives:	(1)	a	reliable	elec-
tric	 system;	 (2)	 reasonable	 prices	 for	 electricity;	 and	 (3)	 an	
environmentally	 benign	 electric	 utility	 system.	 The	 federal	
government	 can	 encourage	more	 private	 sector	 participation	
and	entrepreneurial	response	by	clearly	defining	its	legislative	
goals.	The	current	climate	legislation	proposals	are	not	clearly	
defined	enough	for	capital	markets	to	play	a	crucial	role	as	advi-
sor	or	principal	investor.	The	capital	markets	need	stability	and	
certainty	to	function	properly.	Markets	are	more	efficient	than	
government	policies	for	picking	winners	and	losers.	The	market-
based	process	of	seeking	the	most	commercially	viable	projects	
tends	to	eliminate	those	that	are	not	viable	based	on	price,	scale,	
or	capital	cost	recovery.
FInancInG Issues: vIeWs From Wall sTreeT To 
sand hIll road7
The	issue	of	project	financing	is	where	the	rubber	hits	the	
road—where	the	sources	of	capital	assess	the	project	to	deter-
mine	whether	 it	 is	worthy	 of	 investment.	Venture	 capitalists	
(“VCs”)	are	one	source	for	financing	renewable	energy	project	
development.	VCs	have	made	significant	investments	in	renew-
able	energy	“moonshot”	projects	in	fields	such	as	solar,	wind,	
and	biofuels,	but	only	20–30	percent	of	those	investments	are	
likely	to	mature	to	the	projected	rate	of	return.	The	short-term	
effect	of	the	financial	downturn	has	been	that	VCs	are	increas-
ingly	concerned	about	return	on	capital.	Many	VCs	have	gravi-
tated	 toward	 conservative	 investment	 approaches	 in	 familiar	
sectors	of	investment	for	the	mid-term	which	will	be	harmful	to	
renewable	energy	companies.	
Entrepreneurs	 and	 project	 developers	must	 focus	 on	 the	
basic	needs	and	benefits	of	project	proposals	when	positioning	
for	institutional	support.	Consumers	in	general	are	technology	
neutral,	meaning	that	they	do	not	care	what	technology	is	used	
to	power	their	cars	as	long	as	the	car	performs.	Instead,	consum-
ers	are	concerned	with	whether	a	technology	meets	their	needs	
(low	cost)	and	has	additional	benefits	(quality	and	convenience).	
Technological	advancements	in	
each	sector	of	renewable	energy	
will	 create	winners	 and	 losers	
in	the	short	term.	However,	the	
market	 will	 likely	 create	 the	
long-term	 winners,	 subject	 to	
regulatory	policy.
Reviving	 the	 Initial	 Pub-
lic	Offering	 (“IPO”)	market	 is	
critical	 for	 funding	 emerging	
renewable	energy	technologies.	
During	 the	 NASDAQ	 bust	 of	
2000-2001,	the	market	responded	with	larger	investment	banks	
taking	over	smaller	ones.	Since	 the	smaller	 investment	banks	
were	the	primary	sources	of	funding	for	the	research	and	devel-
opment	of	new	products	and	services	by	entrepreneurs,	the	bust	
caused	a	shortage	of	capital	for	new	ventures	and	innovations.	
The	demise	of	the	IPO	market	has	also	caused	a	stressed	envi-
ronment	for	VCs.	The	lack	of	a	vibrant	IPO	market	means	that	
VCs	are	locked	into	current	investments	and	are	unable	to	recoup	
original	investments	to	fund	new	projects.	If	the	IPO	market	is	
not	revived,	new	technologies	may	die	on	the	vine	for	want	of	
funding	during	this	decade.	
Acquiring	 credit	 to	 fund	 renewable	 energy	 projects	 has	
become	very	difficult.	The	financial	downturn	has	pushed	banks	
into	an	ultra-conservative	mode	 in	order	 to	 stay	solvent.	The	
question	 remains,	has	 the	 IPO	market	experience	been	 trans-
ferred	 to	 the	credit	markets?	Notably,	credit	markets	are	 still	
considering	 investments	 in	 sound	 renewable	 energy	 projects	
with	 quality	 participants	 and	 a	 strong	 cash	 flow.	 In	 order	 to	
secure	credit,	projects	require	concrete	yields,	well-structured	
deals,	and	investment	grade	credits.	Investment	grade	credits	are	
critical	for	power	purchase	agreements,	construction,	and	ongo-
ing	operations	and	maintenance	in	today’s	markets.
As	 an	 alternative,	 the	United	States	 should	not	 establish	
a	sovereign	wealth	fund.	The	federal	government	often	funds	
“political”	projects	and	continues	to	fund	them	even	when	they	
are	not	profitable.	Elected	officials	are	 ill-positioned	 to	make	
difficult	decisions	that	will	cause	companies	to	fold	and	cause	
constituents	to	become	unemployed.	On	the	other	hand,	a	fund	
created	by	a	group	of	states	and	modeled	on	the	National	Sci-
ence	Foundation,	where	projects	do	not	have	specific	outcome	
requirements,	could	be	more	successful	than	a	sovereign	wealth	
fund.	Such	a	fund	could	team	with	private	equity	investors	to	
form	 joint	 ventures	 to	 fund	 renewable	 project	 development.	
The	Clean	 Energy	Development	Authority	 (“CEDA”)	 under	
Free market investors are 
hesitant to invest when 
policies are uncertain
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consideration	in	the	Senate	also	offers	promise	as	an	alternate	
financing	vehicle.	
polIcIes For The TransITIon To a carbon-
consTraIned economy8
Climate	change	has	created	a	pressing	need	for	a	technologi-
cal	transition	to	a	reduced	carbon	infrastructure,	but	the	transition	
also	requires	our	vigilance	against	
unintended	economic	and	envi-
ronmental	 consequences.	 Dis-
tributed	 power	 generation	 will	
be	 part	 of	 this	 solution,	 but	 it	
is	not	economical	enough	to	be	
the	only	 approach.	We	need	 to	
develop	 a	 utility-scale	 renew-
able	 energy	 generation	 sector.	
This	 new	 energy	 sector	 will	
require	revising	federal	and	state	
laws	and	regulations.	Currently,	
renewable	 energy	 policies	 are	
developed	at	the	state	level.	The	
need	 for	 rapid	 development	 of	
renewable	energy	to	meet	climate	and	carbon-reduction	goals	
will	require	the	federal	government	to	provide	more	stable	direc-
tion	and	a	market	clearing	price	that	properly	evaluates	the	cost	
of	carbon.	
Large	scale	renewable	generation	will	require	a	grid	over-
haul.	Climate	legislation	alone	is	insufficient	in	reducing	carbon	
emissions	without	addressing	the	national	transmission	issues.	
While	a	national	super-grid	may	not	be	effective	 from	a	cost	
perspective,	an	alternative	proposal	would	be	to	create	several	
regions	to	plan	total	energy	infrastructure	and	transmission	sys-
tems.	Such	plans	would	simultaneously	conform	to	a	national	
carbon	budget.	The	federal	government	can	facilitate	renewable	
energy	development	by	accelerating	siting	approval	instead	of	
the	current	difficult	and	slow	state	approval	processes.	Smart	
grid	and	advanced	metering	will	be	essential	for	the	solution.	
This	approach	should	also	recognize	that	effective	energy	and	
environmental	 policy	 in	 the	U.S.	 is	 best	 implemented	on	 the	
regional	level.	
At	present,	carbon	prices	are	neither	high	enough,	nor	inte-
grated	on	a	national	level,	to	prompt	a	national	renewable	energy	
source	 portfolio.	 Compounding	 this	 situation	 are	 the	 differ-
ing	needs	of	states,	and	varying	amounts	of	in-state	renewable	
resources,	 forcing	 states	 to	 grap-
ple	with	 the	choice	of	whether	
to	 create	 in-state	 green	 jobs	
through	development	of	renew-
able	 energy,	 or	 simply	 buy	
cheap,	out-of-state	energy	cred-
its.	Many	 energy	 and	 environ-
mental	policy	decisions	are	best	
made	 at	 the	 state	 or	 regional	
level.	However,	decisions	about	
transmission	 infrastructure,	
planning,	 and	 siting,	 which	
must	often	be	done	 simultane-
ously,	 are	 best	 coordinated	 at	
the	federal	level	to	remove	bar-
riers	to	development	and	allow	access	to	capital	investment.
conclusIon
Energy,	economics,	and	the	environment	have	merged	to	
drive	renewable	energy	development.	We	must	manage	 these	
sectors	in	an	integrated	manner	by	coupling	the	power	of	inter-
net	technology,	advanced	metering,	storage,	and	smart	grid	with	
access	to	capital.	The	U.S.	is	a	center	of	innovation	and	financial	
structuring	as	well	as	the	“Saudi	Arabia”	of	waste	heat,	materi-
als,	and	greenhouse	gases.	We	will	need	21st	century	infrastruc-
ture	to	achieve	important	national	solutions,	meet	our	renewable	
energy	goals,	 and	 compete	with	 emerging	global	 economies.	
Achieving	these	goals	requires	political	leadership	working	with	
the	wisdom	of	men	and	women	and	the	rule	of	law	to	contribute	
to	a	better	modern	global	society.
Climate legislation alone 
is insufficient in reducing 
carbon emissions without 
addressing the national 
transmission issues
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In	June	2009,	the	Supreme	Court	granted	certiorari	to	Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Envi-ronmental Protection,1	a	case	concerning	the	rights	of	states	
to	maintain	and	 restore	coastal	 areas.	The	case	has	created	a	
great	deal	of	interest,	with	a	majority	of	U.S.	state	attorneys	gen-
eral,	as	well	as	a	number	of	public	interest	groups,	filing	amicus	
briefs	in	support	of	Florida	and	multiple	private	property	rights	
groups	filing	in	support	of	the	land	owners.2	The	case	will	be	
heard	in	December	and	the	Supreme	Court	may	use	it	to	answer	
the	question	of	whether	a	judicial	decision	can	create	a	constitu-
tional	taking.
Judicial	taking	occurs	when	
a	statute	is	challenged	for	“tak-
ing”	 private	 property	 and	 the	
court	rules	that	the	property	right	
in	dispute	never	existed.3	In	this	
case,	 the	 question	 is	 whether	
the	Florida	Supreme	Court	was	
correct	 in	 ruling	 that	 landown-
ers	 did	 not	 have	 rights	 over	
increased	future	beach	property	
resulting	 from	 natural	 deposi-
tion	and,	therefore,	a	Florida	law	
did	not	violate	the	Constitutional	
regulatory	 takings	 clause.4	The	
U.S.	Supreme	Court	has	previously	
declined	to	intervene	in	similar	cases	because	they	are	deeply	
rooted	in	state	property	law.5
Although	the	challenge	that	led	to	the	present	case	was	filed	
in	2004	by	landowners	in	Florida	attempting	to	stop	a	planned	
beachfront	restoration,6	the	Florida	Beach	and	Shore	Preserva-
tion	Act	was	enacted	in	1961	by	the	Florida	Legislature.	The	
purpose	of	the	Act	is	to	address	beach	erosion,	which	the	leg-
islature	found	to	be	a	problem	affecting	the	local	economy	and	
general	welfare	of	society.7	The	state	has	a	duty	under	the	State	
Constitution	to	protect	and	conserve	Florida’s	beaches	as	they	
are	important	natural	resources	and	held	in	trust	for	public	use.8	
The	Act	charged	the	Florida	Department	of	Environmental	Pro-
tection	with	the	determination	of	which	beaches	are	in	need	of	
restoration	and	authorized	spending	for	up	to	seventy-five	per-
cent	of	the	actual	costs	of	restoration.9
Under	the	Florida	Beach	and	Shore	Preservation	Act,	 the	
Board	 of	 Trustees	 of	 the	 Internal	 Improvement	 Trust	 Fund	
establishes	a	fixed	erosion	control	line	(“ECL”)	to	replace	the	
mean	high	water	line	(“MHWL”),	which	fluctuates	with	the	rise	
by Jessica B. Goldstein*
and	fall	of	the	water	level.10	In	establishing	the	ECL,	the	Board	
considers	 the	MHWL,	the	extent	of	erosion,	and	landowners’	
rights.11	As	a	result,	the	ECL	becomes	the	new	fixed	property	
line,	dividing	public	lands	and	upland	property.12	When	cities	
and	towns	restore	beaches	eroded	by	hurricanes,	the	increased	
beach	area	below	the	ECL	becomes	public	beach	because	the	
restoration	is	done	using	public	funds.13	The	ECL	allows	upland	
owners	 to	 continue	 to	 exercise	 littoral	 rights,14	 such	as	boat-
ing,	fishing,	and	swimming.15	The	Act	states	that	“there	is	no	
intention	on	the	part	of	the	state	to	extend	its	claims	to	lands	not	
already	held	by	it	or	to	deprive	
any	upland	or	 submerged	 land	
owner	of	the	legitimate	and	con-
stitutional	use	and	enjoyment	of	
his	or	her	property.”16	
At	issue	in	Stop the Beach 
Renourishment is	 the	 plan	 to	
“renourish”	 beaches	 critically	
eroded	by	 a	 hurricane	 in	1995	
through	 the	 addition	 of	 sand,	
and	the	establishment	of	an	ECL	
in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 proj-
ect.17	In	2006,	a	Florida	District	
Court	held	that	the	state’s	resto-
ration	effort	was	an	unconstitu-
tional	property	 taking	 that	denied	
property	owners	their	right	to	water	contact	and	accretion,	which	
is	the	increase	of	shoreline	gradually	added	by	a	body	of	water.18	
Under	Florida	case	 law,	 landowners	were	allowed	 to	use	 the	
doctrine	of	accretion	to	own	land.19	However,	upon	appeal,	the	
Florida	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	the	Florida	Beach	and	Shore	
Preservation	Act	does	not	deprive	owners	of	their	littoral	rights	
and	reversed	the	district	court’s	ruling.20	
While	the	Florida	Supreme	Court	acknowledged	landown-
ers’	 littoral	 rights,	 it	 drew	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 present	
rights	of	use	and	access	and	the	future	rights	of	accretion	and	
reliction,21	unrelated	to	the	present	use	of	the	shore	and	water.	
Landowners	 claim	 these	 littoral	 rights	 are	 private	 property	
rights	and,	therefore,	that	the	state’s	action	constitutes	a	taking,	
which	requires	just	compensation.22	The	Florida	Supreme	Court	
held,	however,	that	the	right	does	not	exist	unless	land	is	added	
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through	accretion	or	reliction.23	Because	the	state	adds	the	sand	
for	restoration,	landowners	do	not	have	a	property	right	to	the	
increased	beachfront.24	Furthermore,	 the	court	adds	that	 there	
is	no	right	of	contact	with	water	under	Florida	common	law.25
The	Supreme	Court	of	Florida	stated	the	Florida	Beach	and	
Shore	Preservation	Act	carefully	balances	private	property	and	
public	 interests	 because	 it	 not	
only	prevents	future	erosion	but	
also	restores	presently	damaged	
beaches.26	The	court	also	noted	
that,	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 upland	
owners,	 the	 Act	 restores	 their	
beaches	and	protects	their	prop-
erty	from	future	damage	and	ero-
sion.27	 Beach	 restoration	 costs	
between	 three	 and	 five	million	
dollars	per	mile	and	Florida	offi-
cials	believe	restoring	the	beach	
is	 enough	 to	 compensate	 land-
owners.28	The	Surfrider	Founda-
tion,	a	non-profit	environmental	
organization,	 filed	 an	 amicus	
brief	arguing	 that	 (1)	 the	Florida	beach	access	provisions	are	
consistent	with	the	Florida	Constitution;	(2)	that	private	property	
owners’	rights	are	not	violated	by	the	Act;	and	(3)	judicial	tak-
ings	do	not	apply	under	the	Fifth	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.29	
However,	 the	upland	owners	argue	 that	 the	Act	converts	
private	waterfront	 property	 into	merely	water	 view	 property	
without	compensation,	as	required	under	the	Constitution.30	The	
Coalition	 of	 Property	Rights,	which	 includes	 Florida	 coastal	
property	owners,31	claims	that	the	Act	lowers	property	values	by	
allowing	the	general	public	to	use	the	beach.32	They	argue	that	
in	order	to	implement	this	Act,	the	government	abandoned	the	
decades-old	right	of	accretion,	and	landowners	claim	that	this	
constitutes	an	uncompensated	taking	of	private	property,	vio-
lating	 the	Fifth	and	Fourteenth	
Amendments.33
There	 is	 much	 specula-
tion	over	whether	the	Supreme	
Court	will	address	 the	 issue	of	
judicial	 takings	 and	 use	 this	
case	 to	 establish	 precedent,	
since	it	has	avoided	the	issue	in	
the	past.	The	Florida	Supreme	
Court	 reasonably	 determined	
that	 accretion	 rights	 are	 future	
property	 rights	and	 if	 the	 state	
did	 not	 preserve	 the	 beaches,	
accretion	would	not	occur	due	
to	the	erosion	problem.	In	fact,	
landowners	could	lose	more	of	
their	beach	than	what	the	Act	makes	public.	The	Court	should	
take	into	consideration	the	benefit	that	landowners	derive	from	
the	Florida	Beach	and	Shore	Preservation	Act.	Not	only	is	the	
state	restoring	their	beachfront	property	but	also	continuing	to	
preserve	it	and,	therefore,	beachfront	property	values.	Is	it	too	
great	a	price	to	pay	that	the	public	has	access	to	that	beach?	The	
Supreme	Court	will	have	to	decide.
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americaS
The	Caribbean’s	fragile	marine	ecosystem	is	at	a	grave	risk	
due	to	a	non-native	intruder,	the	red	lionfish.1	The	red	lionfish	
is	especially	destructive	to	ecosystems	because	of	its	voracious	
eating	habits.2	A	single	red	lionfish	is	able	to	reduce	the	num-
ber	of	small	fish	 in	a	coral	patch	reef	by	eighty	percent	 in	as	
little	as	five	weeks.3	It	is	believed	that	the	red	lionfish	was	intro-
duced	to	the	Atlantic	during	Hurricane	Andrew	in	1992,	which	
is	thought	to	have	shattered	private	aquariums	releasing	the	fish	
into	Miami’s	Biscayne	Bay.4	Covered	with	poisonous	pectoral	
spines,	the	red	lionfish	has	no	natural	predator	in	the	Atlantic	
and	has	increased	in	numbers	tenfold	from	2005	through	2007.5	
To	 try	 and	 solve	 this	 potentially	 devastating	 ecological	
threat,	conservationists	have	developed	an	innovative	plan	by	
combining	business	and	conservation:	sell	the	fish	to	consum-
ers.6	Companies,	such	as	Sea	to	Table,	have	begun	to	work	with	
local	fishermen	in	 the	Bahamas	by	helping	 the	fishermen	sell	
their	red	lionfish	catch	to	upscale	metropolitan	restaurants	in	the	
United	States.7	During	initial	trials	in	New	York	and	Chicago,	
restaurants	sold	out	of	the	red	lionfish	within	two	nights.8	
aSia 
A	former	luxury	American	ocean	liner	that	is	believed	to	be	
laden	with	high	quantities	of	toxins	recently	arrived	in	Alang,	
India,	the	hub	of	India’s	ship-breaking	yards.9	The	Platinum-II	
was	previously	anchored	forty	miles	from	Alang	as	the	Indian	
government	decided	whether	or	not	to	allow	the	ship	to	be	dis-
mantled	on	 its	 shores.10	According	 to	 the	 Indian	Platform	on	
Ship-breaking,	 the	 Platinum-II	 contains	 close	 to	 200	 tons	 of	
asbestos	and	about	210	tons	of	materials	contaminated	by	toxic	
polychlorinated	 biphenyls	 (“PCBs”)	 as	 well	 as	 radioactive	
substances.11	Groups	 such	 as	Greenpeace	opine	 that	Alang’s	
ship-breaking	yards	are	 ill-equipped	 to	 safely	dismantle	 such	
poison-laden	ships.12	
The	 scrapping	 of	 the	 Platinum-II	 is	 in	 violation	 of	 the	
Basel	Treaty,13	which	bans	signing	countries,	including	India,	
from	receiving	hazardous	waste	from	countries	who	have	not	
signed	the	treaty,	which	includes	the	United	States.14	However,	
Indian	authorities	have	stipulated	that	the	Platinum-II	should	be	
beached	and	disassembled	in	Alang,	citing	safety	concerns	that	
the	Platinum-II	was	in	too	poor	a	condition	and	may	break	apart	
in	the	open	ocean.15	Earlier	this	year,	the	Environmental	Protec-
tion	Agency	enacted	fines	against	the	owners	of	the	Platinum-II	
in	amounts	close	to	$518,000	for	illegal	distribution	and	export	
of	a	ship	containing	PCBs.	The	Platinum-II,	however,	was	not	
recalled	to	U.S.	shores.16
In	addition,	the	health	costs	of	dismantling	aging	ocean-lin-
ers	is	extremely	high	to	the	local	Indian	shipyard	workers;	a	2006	
report	by	India’s	Supreme	Court	showed	that	one	in	six	Alang	
shipyard	laborers	was	suffering	from	symptoms	of	asbestosis,	a	
fatal	illness,	and	that	the	number	of	fatal	accidents	in	the	ship-
yard	was	six	times	higher	than	even	the	average	in	the	nations	
mining	industry.17	Most	shipyard	laborers	earn	only	about	$2	to	
$3	a	day.	Even	with	such	risks	to	workers,	Indian	authorities	are	
hesitant	to	close	down	the	shipyard	as	it	is	extremely	profitable;	
scrapping	a	single	ship	can	bring	 in	revenues	of	close	 to	$10	
million.18	
africa
The	proposed	 construction	 of	 a	 hydroelectric	 dam	along	
the	Zambezi	River	in	Mozambique	has	stirred	conflict	between	
locals	and	environmental	advocates.19	While	government	offi-
cials	 argue	 the	 dam	will	 benefit	 local	 villages	 by	 supplying	
electricity	and	fostering	development,	environmental	activists	
assert	the	construction	will	displace	approximately	1,400	small	
farmers.20	The	advocates	also	contend	that	another	dam	on	the	
Zambezi	River	has	negatively	affected	the	ecology	of	the	river,	
disrupting	fishing	and	agriculture	in	the	area,	and	that	a	second	
dam	would	only	worsen	the	situation.21	The	Mozambican	gov-
ernment	believes	it	can	build	the	dam	and	minimize	impacts	to	
the	environment.22	Construction	is	scheduled	to	begin	in	2011.23
In	 eastern	 Africa,	 the	 United	 Nations	World	 Food	 Pro-
gramme	projects	that	$285	million	is	needed	to	stem	a	hunger	
crisis	resulting	from	disastrous	drought	conditions.24	Some	har-
vests	have	been	completely	wiped	out.25	A	severe	lack	of	rainfall	
has	contributed	to	the	crisis	and	forced	residents	to	drink	water	
from	contaminated	sources.26	Oxfam	argues	that,	in	addition	to	
addressing	the	immediate	food	needs	of	eastern	Africa,	better	
irrigation	and	wells	are	essential	tools	to	reduce	the	impact	of	
drought	in	the	future.27	The	Food	and	Agricultural	Organization	
advocates	a	resilient	variety	of	rice	packed	with	more	nutrition	
that	could	help	curb	the	food	crisis.28
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europe
Swedes	 are	 gaining	 a	 fresh	 perspective	 on	 their	 food	 as	
many	markets	and	restaurants	are	listing	the	amount	of	carbon	
dioxide	emitted	on	package	labels	and	menus.29	This	initiative	
follows	new	nutritional	guidelines	released	over	the	summer	by	
the	Swedish	National	Food	Administration.30	The	pioneering	
labels	couple	environmental	concerns	over	climate	change	with	
health	concerns.31	The	guidelines	advocate	choosing	vegetables	
and	meats	that	require	less	energy	to	produce	and	do	not	rec-
ommend	consuming	fish	due	to	Europe’s	suffering	fish	stocks.32	
Critics	argue	that	the	average	consumer	may	feel	overwhelmed	
by	the	deluge	of	considerations	when	buying	a	bunch	of	carrots,	
and	that	it	is	difficult	to	accurately	calculate	the	emissions	gener-
ated	by	a	food	product.33
1	 	See	Invasive Red Lionfish Threatens Reef Fish in Caribbean, yale 
env’t 360,	Aug.	15,	2008,	available at http://e360.yale.edu/content/digest.
msp?id=1383.
2	 	See	id.
3	 	See id.
4	 	See David	McFadden, Red lionfish invade the Caribbean, l.a. timeS,	Aug.	
16,	2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/16/science/sci-
lionfish16.
5	 	National	Aquarium	Waterlog,	Now serving, red lionfish, Oct.	14,	2009,	
available at http://nationalaquarium.wordpress.com/2009/10/14/now-serving-
red-lionfish/.
6	 	See Science	&	Technology,	Eat for the ecosystem, economiSt.com,	Oct.	
15,	2009,	available at http://www.economist.com/sciencetechnology/Printer-
Friendly.cfm?story_id=14637325.
7	 	See	id.
8	 	See id.
9	 	Common	Dreams,	US Toxic Ship Lands in India, Oct.	23,	2009,	available 
at http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2009/10/23	[hereinafter	Common	
Dreams].
10	 	Suda	Ramachandran,	Toxic Alert as US Ship Heads for India, aSia timeS 
online,	Oct.	24,	2009,	available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
KJ24Df01.html.
11	 	See	id.
12	 	See id.
13	 	Basel	Convention	on	the	Control	of	Transboundary	Movements	of	Hazard-
ous	Wastes	and	their	Disposal,	March	22,	1989,	1673	UNTS	126,	available at 
http://basel.int/text/text.html.	
14	 	Common	Dreams,	supra note	9.
15	 	Nitin	Sethi,	Toxic Waste on U.S. Ship: Gujarat Panel, timeS of inDia,	
Oct.	17,	2009, available at http://timesof	india.com/articleshow/msid-
5132641,prtpage-1.cms.
16	 	Ramachandran,	supra	note	10.
17	 	Jacob	Baynham,	India, World Shipping’s Toxic Waste Dump, Sfgate,	
July	6,	2008,	available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/
c/a/2008/07/06/MN2510MASF.DTL&type.
18	 	See	id.
19	 	Pete	Browne,	Debate Over Dams on Africa’s Zambezi River,	n.y. timeS,	
Oct.	19,	2009,	available at	http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/
debate-over-dams-on-africas-zambezi-river/.
20	 	Zenaida	Machado,	Watching the Water Flow Away,	allafrica.com,	Oct.	
23,	2009,	available at	http://allafrica.com/stories/200910230853.html.
21	 	See id.
22	 	See Browne,	supra	note	19.
23	 	See id.
24	 	Ethiopia asks for Urgent Food Aid,	bbc newS,	Oct.	22,	2009,	available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8319741.stm.
25	 	See	id.
26	 	Millions Facing Famine in Ethiopia as Rain Fails, the inDepenDent,	Aug.	
30,	2009,	available at	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mil-
lions-facing-famine-in-ethiopia-as-rains-fail-1779376.html.
27	 	See	Machado, supra note	20.
28	 	Mark	Kapchanga,	FAO Introduces New Rice to Fight Food Shortages in 
Region,	allafrica.com,	Oct.	19,	2009,	available at	http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/200910210461.html.
29	 	Elizabeth	Rosenthal,	To Cut Global Warming, Swedes Study Their Plates,	
n.y. timeS,	Oct.	22,	2009,	available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/
world/europe/23degrees.html?_r=1&ref=europe.
30	 	See	id.
31	 	Jennifer	LaRue	Huget, For Food Labels, First Calories, Now Carbon Foot-
prints?, waShington poSt,	Oct.	26,	2009, available at http://voices.washington-
post.com/checkup/2009/10/folks_in_the_us_who.html.
32	 	See Rosenthal, supra note	29.
33	 	Madeleine	Kennedy,	Is Carbon Counting the New Calorie Counting?,	
atlantic,	Oct.	30,	2009,	available at	http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/10/_
earlier_this_month_the.php.
Endnotes:	World	News
77 SuStainable Development law & policy
book review
aDJuDicating climate change
Edited by William C.G. Burns and Hari M. Osofsky
Reviewed by Scott M. Richey and Karla O. Torres*
* Scott M. Richey is a J.D. Candidate, May 2012, and Karla O. Torres is a J.D./
M.A. Candidate, May 2011, at American University Washington College of Law.
The	U.S.	Federal	Government	has	been	slow	in	accept-ing	and	adapting	to	empirical	findings	of	human	affected	climate	change.	Some,	therefore,	are	turning	to	the	judi-
ciary	to	affect	change.	Adjudicating Climate Change1	is	a	col-
lection	of	self-contained	essays	discussing	a	range	of	law	suits	
brought	against	those	who	directly	or	indirectly	produce	green-
house	gases.	The	book	brings	together	relevant	and	topical	case	
studies	of	 recent	 litigation,	many	of	which	are	also	available	
online	at	the	Social	Science	Research	Network.2	
The	 book	 comprises	 three	
sections:	 subnational,	 national,	
and	supranational	litigation.	The	
subnational	 section	 includes	
case	 studies	 from	 the	 United	
States,	Australia,	and	New	Zea-
land.	Stephanie	Stern	posits	 in	
“State	Action	as	Political	Voice	
in	 Climate	 Change	 Policy:	 A	
Case	 Study	 of	 the	 Minnesota	
Environmental	 Cost	 Valuation	
Regulation”	that	litigation,	even	
under	 substantially	 symbolic	
state	 statutes,	 opens	 discourse,	
encourages	 further	 legislation,	
and	pressures	 private	 actors	 to	
take	voluntary	regulation.	She	focuses	on	a	Minnesota	statute	
requiring	that	public	utilities	report	their	environmental	impact	
to	a	state	commission.	These	reports	allow	the	state	to	pursue	
utilities	with	the	lowest	societal	cost.	Although	no	utility	pro-
vider	has	ever	been	turned	down	for	potentially	having	too	great	
an	environmental	impact,	Stern	points	out	that	no	utility	com-
pany	 in	Minnesota	has	 applied	 to	 construct	 a	high-emissions	
coal-fired	power	plant	in	the	ten	years	since	enactment	of	the	
law.
The	national	 section	 presents	 case	 studies	 based	 on	 fed-
eral	 litigation.	 In	 “Tort-based	Climate	 Litigation,”	David	A.	
Grossman	proposes	viable	 tort	 theories	 for	climate	 litigation.	
The	author	describes	currently	pending	tort	actions	for	public	
nuisance,	comparing	them	to	pollution	and	handgun	cases.	He	
then	suggests	that	a	products	liability	action	might	also	be	viable	
based	on	claims	for	failure	to	warn	and	design	defect.	An	action	
might	be	brought	against	a	manufacturer	for	failing	to	warn	con-
sumers	of	the	dangers	of	climate	change	resulting	from	use	of	
its	products.	Alternatively,	a	manufacturer	might	be	found	liable	
for	a	design	defect	if	an	alternative	design	with	reduced	or	no	
emissions	is	possible.	
Federal	district	courts,	however,	have	dismissed	public	nui-
sance	actions	as	within	the	purview	of	legislators,	not	judges,	
and	 the	actions	are	currently	pending	on	 federal	circuit	court	
dockets.	Grossman	contends	 the	Supreme	Court	has	affirmed	
justiciability	 in	 cases	 where	 a	
producer	of	noxious	pollution	in	
one	state	was	successfully	sued	
by	those	harmed	by	the	nuisance	
in	another	state	and	 this	 is	suf-
ficiently	analogous	to	producers	
of	greenhouse	gases.	Further,	he	
asserts	 that	 the	pending	actions	
do	not	comprise	political	ques-
tions,	 but	 rather	 are	 ordinary	
actions	in	the	context	of	a	politi-
cally	 charged	 problem.	 While	
standing,	 preemption,	 and	 jus-
ticiability	 are	 impediments	 to	
a	 plaintiff’s	 claims,	 Grossman	
seems	 optimistic	 in	 view	 of	
Massachusetts v. EPA,3	in	which	several	states	successfully	sued	
the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	for	its	failure	to	regulate	
greenhouse	gases.
The	book’s	final	section	presents	supranational	case	studies	
highlighting	how	climate	change	can	be	addressed	in	interna-
tional	forums.	“The	Inuit	Petition	as	a	Bridge?	Beyond	Dialects	
of	Climate	Change	and	Indigenous	Peoples’	Rights,”	an	essay	
by	co-editor	Hari	Osofsky,	discusses	creative	lawyering	by	Inuit	
in	the	United	States	and	Canada	who	filed	a	petition	with	the	
Inter-American	Commission	on	Human	Rights	 in	2005.	They	
asserted	that	the	United	States	contributed	a	substantial	portion	
of	 the	world’s	greenhouse	gases	but	was	not	 taking	adequate	
environmental change 
can be affected by 
governmental and 
nongovernmental actors 
through the judiciary
78Fall 2009
policy	steps	to	reduce	them,	and	that	the	resulting	global	climate	
change	phenomenon	had	significant	impacts	on	the	Inuit.	The	
petition	further	claimed	that	these	impacts	violated	the	Inuit’s	
rights	 protected	 under	 the	 Inter-American	 human	 rights	 sys-
tem,	including	their	rights	to	life,	physical	integrity,	and	secu-
rity.	Osofsky	suggests	that,	notwithstanding	the	petition’s	initial	
rejection,	it	generated	publicity	that	may	have	placed	pressure	
on	states	to	change	their	behavior	or	at	least	engage	in	a	dialogue	
with	affected	indigenous	communities.	More	importantly,	peti-
tions	like	these	reinforce	the	idea	that	international	human	rights	
tribunals	are	appropriate	forums	for	addressing	problems	that	
cut	across	several	legal	issues.	Echoing	one	of	the	book’s	goals,	
this	essay	emphasizes	how	the	Inuit	petition	can	serve	as	a	“port	
of	entry”	for	making	progress	on	climate	change	and	environ-
mental	rights	issues.
Adjudicating Climate Change	presents	an	interesting	survey	
of	climate	change	litigation	at	local,	national,	and	international	
levels.	 The	 book	 optimistically	 points	 out	 how	 political	 and	
environmental	change	can	be	affected	by	governmental	and	non-
governmental	actors	through	the	judiciary.	Further,	the	essays	
describe	how	such	litigation	works	to	create	dialogue	with	and	
place	pressure	on	slow	moving	lawmakers	and	large	producers	
of	greenhouse	gases.
1	 	aDJuDicating climate change	(William	C.G.	Burns	&	Hari	M.	Osofsky	
eds.,	2009).
2	 	See Social	Science	Research	Network,	http://www.ssrn.com	(searching	for	
the	author	of	a	chapter	from	the	main	webpage	will	lead	to	chapters	1-4,	6,	8,	
11,	12,	14,	and	16)	(last	visited	Oct.	27,	2009).
3	 	549	U.S.	497	(2007).
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